



PEARSON BACCALAUREATE

HISTORY PAPER 3

The Cold War and the Americas (1945–1981)

Supporting every learner across the IB continuum



EUNICE PRICE • KEELY ROGERS • DANIELA SENÉS



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Contents

Introduction	v
01 Truman	2
02 The Korean War	36
03 Eisenhower and Dulles	59
04 The Vietnam War	82
05 Kennedy to Carter	118
Case Study: What was the impact of the Cold War on Cuba?	156
The Extended Essay in History	177
Glossary	181
Index	182

Introduction

How will this resource help you in your IB examination?

Coverage of Paper 3 content and skills

This book is designed to be your guide to success in your International Baccalaureate examination in History. It covers the Paper 3 Americas region, Topic 16, The Cold War and the Americas (1945–1981), and it follows the outline of content as prescribed by the IB for this topic. The foreign policies of Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon and Carter were influenced by the Cold War and this, in turn, influenced relations towards Latin America. The book also covers two significant Cold War conflicts, the Korean War and the Vietnam War, by focusing on the reasons and outcomes of countries' participation in the region. For the additional case study we have chosen to cover post-revolutionary Cuba (1959–81), as policies and events within this country are key to the dynamics of the Cold War.

As well as covering the content for this topic, this resource aims to equip you with the knowledge and skills that you will need to effectively answer the essay questions on this section of the exam. On pages viii–xi you will find some general tips on essay writing. In addition, within each chapter you will find:

- in-depth coverage and analysis of the key events
- a summary of, or reference to, historiography
- guidelines on how to answer Paper 3 essay questions effectively
- timelines to help you put events into context
- review and research activities to help you develop your understanding of the key issues and concepts.

Focus on History concepts

Throughout the book we also focus on and develop the six key concepts that have particular prominence in the Diploma History course: **causation**, **consequence**, **change**, **continuity**, **significance** and **perspectives**. Each chapter will identify the key concepts covered within it.

Focus on History assessment objectives

This resource covers the four IB assessment objectives that are relevant to both the core externally examined papers and to the internally assessed paper. So, although this book is essentially designed as a textbook to accompany Paper 3, Topic 16, it addresses all of the assessment objectives required for the History course. In other words, as you work through this book, you will be learning and practising the skills that are necessary for each of the core papers.

Nevertheless, the main focus will be the assessment objectives in Paper 3. Specifically these assessment objectives are:

Assessment Objective 1: Knowledge and understanding

- Demonstrate detailed, relevant and accurate historical knowledge.
- Demonstrate understanding of historical concepts and context.

Assessment Objective 2: Application and analysis

- Formulate clear and coherent arguments.
- Use relevant historical knowledge to effectively support analysis.

Assessment Objective 3: Synthesis and evaluation

- Integrate evidence and analysis to produce a coherent response.
- Evaluate different perspectives on historical issues and events, and integrate this evaluation effectively into a response.

Assessment Objective 4: Use and application of appropriate skills

- Structure and develop focused essays that respond effectively to the demands of a question.

The following objectives are linked to Paper 1 and the Internal Assessment and are practised and refined in the student activities throughout:

Assessment Objective 1: Knowledge and understanding

- Demonstrate understanding of historical sources (Internal Assessment and Paper 1).

Assessment Objective 2: Application and analysis

- Analyse and interpret a variety of sources (Internal Assessment and Paper 1).

Assessment Objective 3: Synthesis and evaluation

- Evaluate sources as historical evidence, recognizing their value and limitations (Internal Assessment and Paper 1).
- Synthesize information from a selection of relevant sources (Internal Assessment and Paper 1).

Assessment Objective 4: Use and application of appropriate skills

- Reflect on the methods used by, and challenges facing, the historian (Internal Assessment).
- Formulate an appropriate, focused question to guide a historical inquiry (Internal Assessment).
- Demonstrate evidence of research skills, organization, referencing and selection of appropriate sources (Internal Assessment).

Use of mark schemes

For the externally assessed components – Paper 1, Paper 2 and Paper 3 – there are two different assessment methods used:

- markbands
- detailed specific mark schemes for each examination paper.

For the internally assessed/moderated IA – there are set assessment criteria.

We will use and refer to the Paper 3 markbands extensively throughout the book. We will also offer some question-specific mark schemes for the essay

questions set in the book, these will offer indicative content for the set question. (See end of this section for the Paper 3 markbands.)

Links to IB programme as a whole

The regular use of command terms, inquiry-based research tasks, the source-based activities and reflection will not only prepare you fully for the Paper 3 essay questions, it will also help to prepare you for the requirements of your Paper 1 exam and your Internal Assessments.

The material and the case study are useful for Topic 14 of the Paper 3 syllabus and are also relevant to Paper 2, Topics 10, 11 and 12.

ATL

Approaches to teaching and learning (ATL) reflect the IB learner profile attributes, and are designed to enhance your learning and assist preparation for IAs and examinations.

ATLs run throughout the IB Middle Years Programme (MYP) and Diploma Programme (DP). They cover thinking skills, communication skills, social skills, self-management skills, and research skills. These skills encompass the key values that underpin an IB education.

ATL skills are addressed in the activity boxes throughout the book, and each Historians' perspectives feature addresses ATL thinking skills.

Extended Essay section

At the end of this book you will find a section on the Extended Essay. History is one of the most popular choices for Extended Essays. Students that choose to write their EE in History benefit from gaining a better understanding of this subject. The skills are also transferable to their other diploma subjects and are excellent preparation for tertiary level studies.

How this book works

As well as the main text, there are a number of coloured boxes in every chapter, each with their own distinctive icon. These boxes provide different information and stimulus:

Essay questions

The essay questions in each chapter will offer Paper 3 style questions for you to think about while working through the chapter.

Information boxes

These boxes contain information which will deepen and widen your knowledge, but which do not fit within the main body of the text.

One of Kennedy's campaign assistants, Richard N Goodwin, was responsible for coining the term 'Alliance for Progress'. During Kennedy's presidential campaign, he came across a magazine in Spanish published in Texas, *Alianza*. He thought that was the most appropriate term to redefine US-Latin American relations. The phrase '*Alianza para el Progreso*' was first used by Kennedy during a campaign speech in October 1960 (Weeks).



Historians' perspectives

This feature was requested by teachers and offers students an insight into different historians' opinions and sometimes opposing contemporary opinion on a historical event, action or period in time. Students will often be asked to identify evidence to support different perspectives, to consider the reasons why sometimes contemporaries and historians have drawn different conclusions and to reflect on the similarities and differences between historians' views and their own perspectives.

Historians' perspectives

The historians L Gelb and R Betts, in *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked* (1979), outlined the 'Stalemate Theory' which suggested that each successive president understood that the war was unwinnable but did not want to be the first president to lose a war; the escalation in intervention was ultimately motivated by domestic political considerations.

Significant individuals

This feature provides background information on key figures, enhancing understanding of events.

Significant individual: Henry Kissinger



Henry Kissinger was an influential US diplomat and political scientist. He was National Security Adviser and then Secretary of State in the Nixon administration (and subsequently served in the Gerald Ford administration). Kissinger played a pivotal role in US foreign policy between 1969 and 1977. He was key in the initiation of the period of détente with the USSR during the Cold War, and in US rapprochement with the People's Republic of China. Kissinger negotiated the Paris Peace Accords which ended the US involvement in the war in Vietnam, and he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. His award caused controversy, and indeed, his policies included the covert bombing of neutral Cambodia, covert interventions in Chile and supporting the human rights abusing regime in Pakistan. Kissinger is a controversial figure and he is seen by some historians as one of the great US statesmen of the 20th century, while others view him as an abuser of human rights and a war criminal.

Challenge yourself

These boxes invite you to carry out additional research on an aspect discussed in the chapter.

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

ATL Social, research, communication and thinking skills

In groups, carry out research on the reasons why the US resisted the incorporation of Argentina into the United Nations. Focus on the relationship between these two countries during the Second World War.

Hints for success

These boxes can be found alongside questions, exercises and worked examples. They provide insight into how to answer a question in order to achieve the highest marks in an examination. They also identify common pitfalls when answering such questions and suggest approaches that examiners like to see.

This question requires some careful planning before you start writing your response. You can work on a chart that lists similarities and differences between Nixon and Carter by listing all the relevant policies. This will help you avoid writing narrative, 'end-on' responses.



Writing Paper 3 essays

Your Paper 3 essays will be assessed using the set markbands and the mark schemes specific to each examination paper. The key difference between your Paper 2 and Paper 3 essays is that for Paper 3 you need to demonstrate a depth of knowledge and understanding of the topics covered, give very detailed supporting evidence and examples, and fully develop your critical analysis of the set question.

When planning and writing your Paper 3 essays you could use the grid below to check where your response meets the markband descriptors.

	Structure	Focus on demands of the question	Knowledge
0	No structure.	No clear understanding of the set question.	No relevant knowledge.
1-3	Limited attempt to structure response.	Little understanding of the set question.	Knowledge is limited, inaccurate and/or lacks relevance.
4-6	Some attempt to structure. Some paragraphing. Lacks clarity.	Some understanding of the question.	Some knowledge, however tends to be inaccurate and/or lacks relevance.
7-9	The answer has structure but is not always coherently focused on set question.	There is understanding of the set question. Question is only partially addressed.	Knowledge is usually accurate. Lacks depth and detail.
10-12	Sound structure throughout and focuses on set question. Sometimes lacks clarity.	Whole question is understood and addressed.	Knowledge is consistently accurate and relevant. Evidence and examples used to support arguments.
13-15	Consistently well structured and clearly focused on set question.	Demonstrates a thorough understanding of the question and its implications.	Knowledge is consistently detailed, accurate and relevant to the question. Evidence and examples are effectively used to support all arguments.

	Context and concepts	Critical Analysis	Perspectives
	No understanding of context and relevant concepts.	No analysis.	None.
	Limited understanding of context of question and lacks development of relevant concepts.	Mainly description rather than analysis.	None.
	Some basic understanding of context of question. Lacks or has limited development of relevant concepts.	Some limited analysis, however usually descriptive.	None.
	The context of the question is established. Lacks development of relevant concepts.	Some analysis. Tends towards description.	None.
	The context of the question is fully established, and there is clear understanding of historical concepts.	Analysis is clear and coherent. Arguments are well developed and supported with detailed examples. The conclusion is consistent with the analysis and evidence.	There is an awareness of different perspectives.
	The context of the question is fully established, and there is thorough understanding of historical concepts.	There is consistent critical analysis and all arguments are fully developed. All points are supported with detailed evidence and the conclusion is well reasoned and consistent.	There is evaluation of different perspectives and this is synthesized into analysis.

Command terms

In order to write a focused and well-structured essay that addresses the demands of the set question you need to understand the **command terms**.

Analyse

You need to break down the topic or theme of the question in order to establish key relevant elements. To avoid a descriptive approach you should attempt to find relevant analytical or thematic points. For example, for the question, 'Analyse the reasons for US involvement in the Vietnam War', you could look at long-term and short-term political, ideological, economic and social causes.

Compare

You need to identify and develop an analysis of the similarities between two or more case studies, events or developments. You must refer to both or all throughout your response.

Contrast

You need to identify and develop an analysis of the differences between two or more case studies, events or developments. You must refer to both or all throughout your response.

Compare and contrast

You need to identify and develop an analysis of the similarities and differences between two or more case studies, events or developments. You must refer to both or all throughout your response. For example, 'Compare and contrast the effects of the foreign policies of Nixon and Carter in the Americas'.

Discuss

You must offer a 'balanced' analysis. Usually this would involve identifying the successes or failures or the benefits and disadvantages of a specific policy, such as containment.

Evaluate

You need to identify and develop the strengths and limitations, or the successes and failures, of an assertion made in the question or, for example, the repercussions of a policy in the region.

Examine

You need to develop the concept or theme of the set question through different 'lenses'. For example, if you were asked to 'Examine the repercussions of Eisenhower's foreign policy for the region', you would begin by analysing what Eisenhower's foreign policy consisted of, then consider how it impacted the region.


To what extent

You need to set up arguments supporting and challenging the factor or concept of the question. You would have a 'for' and 'against' approach. For example, for the question 'Nixon's foreign policy negatively affected relations with Latin America. To what extent do you agree with this statement?' you would develop arguments supporting the statement, i.e. covert operations in Chile led to tensions, and then challenge the assumption in the question by developing, for example, the idea that relations with Cuba deteriorated before Nixon came to power.

Structuring your essay

Use the tips below to help you structure your essay; this will help you to meet the descriptors in the markbands on pages viii and ix.

How do I write a History essay?





01

Truman



Portrait of President Harry S. Truman, mid-1900s.

This chapter will look at the Americas from 1945 to 1952, a period that coincided with the terms in office of US President Harry Truman. The Second World War came to an end in 1945 and the US and the USSR emerged as global superpowers. Both economic and ideological factors played an important role in determining whether the wartime alliance would survive, but historians have also made much of how Stalin, the leader of the USSR, and Truman, the US President, adjusted their policies in line with post-war events. In particular, the establishment of spheres of influence was very important as these were vital both for economic reasons and for security. In order to deepen our understanding of circumstances that led to the emergence of the Cold War, this chapter gives a detailed overview of significant events as well as a summary of different historical interpretations of how superpower enmity came about. There will also be a detailed account of the McCarthy era that impacted both the domestic and the foreign policy of the United States.

Essay questions:

- Define the policy of 'containment' and examine its impact upon the Americas during the period from 1947 to 1952.
- 'McCarthyism impacted the domestic policy of the United States more than its foreign policy.' Discuss with reference to events up to 1953.
- Examine the impact of the Cold War upon the social and cultural developments of one country in the Americas.

The chapter will observe the social, political, and cultural impact of Truman's presidency – as well as Cold War events between 1945 and 1952 – on Latin America. It will analyse the reasons for and results of the decline in the importance of Latin America in US foreign policy.


Historians' perspectives

The historiography of the origins of the Cold War is quite well known with most interpretations being categorized as follows:

Orthodox – the USSR and its expansionist policies were blamed for the outbreak of the Cold War.

Revisionist – the outbreak of the Cold War was mostly the fault of the US because its policies reflected its monopoly of nuclear weaponry and strong economy; that made the USSR worried about its intentions.

Post-revisionist – the most recent interpretation that suggests both superpowers, the US and the USSR, were concerned about each other's intentions and adopted policies that were often misinterpreted as warlike and threatening.



Timeline

1934	Harry Truman enters politics as a Senator for the state of Missouri
1939	Germany invades Poland and war breaks out in Europe. Canada declares war on Germany
1940	Truman wins a second term as Senator for Missouri
1941	The US declares war on Japan after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Germany and Italy declare war on the US
1942	The Manhattan Project, the code name for research into building an atom bomb, begins in Los Alamos, New Mexico
1943	The leaders of the US, Britain and the Soviet Union meet in Tehran for their first wartime conference
1944	Truman is nominated to stand as Vice President at the Democratic Convention in Philadelphia
1944	Stalin and Churchill meet in Moscow to discuss spheres of influence in Eastern Europe, this becomes known as the Percentages Conference

Key concepts:

Causation and consequence

1.1

Truman: containment and its implications for the Americas

Timeline

1945	Feb	The Big Three (Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin) meet at Yalta for the second wartime conference.
	March	The Act of Chapultepec is signed by twenty Latin American countries and the US. They pledge to undertake joint action in case of foreign aggression
	April	President Roosevelt dies and is succeeded by Truman
	May	VE Day marks the surrender of Germany and the end of the war in Europe
	July	The first test of the atom bomb is successful
	July	The Potsdam Conference is attended by Truman, Stalin and Churchill (to be replaced by Clement Attlee)
	Aug	The atom bomb is dropped over Hiroshima and, three days later, another atom bomb is dropped over Nagasaki
	Sep	VJ Day marks the formal surrender of Japan and the end of the war in Asia and the Pacific. In Canada, the Gouzenko defection uncovers a Soviet spy ring

Truman becomes Vice President

At the Democratic Party convention held in Chicago in 1944, Harry S Truman was nominated as the Vice President to stand alongside Franklin D Roosevelt who was looking for a fourth term in office. Truman was a compromise candidate between Henry Wallace, a known **left-wing** sympathizer popular with civil rights supporters and labour unions, and James (Jimmy) Byrnes, a supporter of segregation and from the **right wing** of the party. Senator Truman of Missouri had supported the New Deal,

Right and Left in the Democratic Party

When used to describe political factions (groups), the Right refers to more conservative, traditional politicians who may, for example, have supported continued racial segregation or favoured **isolationism**, whereas the Left refers to politicians who might have favoured more liberal policies opposing segregation or wanted greater US involvement in the recovery of Europe.





which made him popular with the Left, but he was also popular among the Southern Democrats who represented the Right of the party. In 1944, many of the party luminaries were aware that Roosevelt was not in good health and so the choice of Vice President could be extremely important. If Roosevelt died in office, the Vice President would take over for the remainder of the term and therefore it was necessary to ensure that any potential candidate had the prerequisites to occupy the Oval Office.

The Twenty-Second Amendment



The US constitution set no limit on the number of terms that a president could run for office. Although, since the time of George Washington, who had refused to run for a third term, it had been customary for presidents to leave office after two terms. Roosevelt was the exception in that he stood for President, and won, in 1932, 1936, 1940 and 1944. In 1947, Congress then passed Amendment XXII (ratified by the US states in 1951) of the US Constitution that limited a president to two terms, totalling eight years in office. An exception was included whereby if a president died or had to leave office with two years or less of their term remaining, their successor could complete the term and stand for another two full terms in office. In other words, they could remain in office for a total of ten years. In Truman's case, he succeeded Roosevelt when there were three years remaining but, because he was in office when this amendment was passed, he could, in theory, stand for re-election in 1948 and in 1952.


There are many different reasons for this amendment being proposed, including that this was an attempt by the Republican Party to discredit Roosevelt or, alternatively, it was intended to prevent the US being ruled by a president who might use his charisma and popular appeal to remain in power.


Significant individual: Franklin Delano Roosevelt

Roosevelt won his first race for the White House in 1932 and was subsequently re-elected in 1936, 1940 and in 1944. He caught polio at the age of 29 and this had left him paralysed. The American public were not aware of this. In public, he would wear metal calipers to enable him to stand to read his speeches. In private, he used a wheelchair. His health had never fully recovered and the strain of being a wartime president took its toll.

Unlike the urbane and well-connected Roosevelt, Truman came from a poor, rural background and worked as a bank clerk and a bookkeeper before enlisting in the army when the US entered the First World War in 1917. After the war, Truman opened a haberdasher store (a men's clothing store) but the business failed and Truman went to law school, eventually becoming a judge in the Jackson County Court. It was not until 1934 that he was elected to the US Senate as one of the two Senators for the state of Missouri. He was re-elected in 1940 and appointed chairman of the Senate Special Committee set up to ensure that defence contractors were held to high standards in the production of goods and that the costs were kept to a minimum. During wartime especially, this important post gave Truman an opportunity to become better known both in the Senate and to the American public. According to the White House website, during his tenure as Chairman of the Committee, Truman made savings of '*perhaps as much as \$15 billion*' through targeting waste and corruption.

It was unsurprising therefore, that when the Democratic Party was looking for a compromise candidate for Vice President in 1944, Truman was considered a safe, dependable choice.





CHALLENGE YOURSELF

ATL

Thinking skills

In 1941, after Germany invaded the Soviet Union, Churchill made a speech to the British Parliament in which he explained his willingness to form an alliance with Stalin, stating, 'If Hitler invaded Hell, I would at least make a favourable reference to the devil in the House of Commons'. Churchill's comment suggests that 'the end justifies the means'. In other words, if allying with Stalin could help win the war, it didn't matter if he had a bloody record as an **authoritarian** leader who had sent hundreds of thousands, possibly millions, of Soviet citizens to prison camps. Do you think this kind of **Machiavellian** compromise is ever acceptable?

Zones of occupation in Germany

It was initially agreed that only the Soviet Union, the US and Britain would be the occupying powers but France was added as well as Churchill feared that, when the war ended, the US would once again retreat into isolation – possibly leaving Britain to face the Soviet Union alone. Stalin was not keen on including France, he felt it had contributed little to Allied victory, and told Britain and the US that the territory would have to come out of their zones and sectors.

The US enters the war

With the Axis Powers (the alliance of Germany, Italy and Japan) threatening to dominate Europe and Asia, the role of the United States was of great importance. Roosevelt knew that neutrality was the favoured option in Congress but was doing all he could to help Britain, and in the summer of 1941 this went a step further.

'*Glad to have you aboard, Mr Churchill*', with these words, President Roosevelt greeted the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill as he boarded USS *Augusta*, anchored in Placentia Bay, off the coast of Newfoundland in August 1941. This historic, and very secret, meeting was held when the war was not going well at all for Britain. Together, the two leaders issued a joint declaration known as the Atlantic Charter. Outlining a common purpose, the charter was not a formal, signed document but it did provide a statement of war aims that were subsequently adopted in January 1942 by the United Nations, a term first used to describe the Allies who fought the Axis Powers.

In December 1941, Japan attacked the US naval base at Pearl Harbor, leading to the US declaration of war on Japan. Germany and Italy, keeping to the terms of the military alliance, declared war on the US.

The Second World War turned a corner in 1943; Churchill described it as '*not the beginning of the end but the end of the beginning*' as both in Europe and in the Pacific, and specifically in North Africa, the Axis powers were no longer gaining ground.

The wartime leaders, Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill met in Tehran in November 1943 and negotiations brought to light some of the issues that would dominate post-war Europe. In particular, Stalin made it clear that he wanted to retain territory taken by the USSR in 1940 and, when Germany was defeated, Poland's borders should be moved westwards.

In October 1944, at the Moscow Conference, Churchill and Stalin drew up what became known as the Percentages Agreement outlining post-war spheres of influence in Eastern and Southern Europe.

The end of the war

Events were now moving rapidly and in February 1945, the Big Three met at Yalta. The end of the war in Europe was within sight. The Soviet Red Army had driven the German forces back into Germany and would soon be in Berlin. In Western Europe, after the D-Day landings, Paris was liberated by the Free French Army as the Allied forces marched towards the Rhine. At Yalta, discussions dwelt on what would become of Germany when (no longer 'if') it surrendered unconditionally to the Allies. Agreement was reached over the division of Germany into **zones of occupation** and the division of Berlin, the capital city, into sectors, each to be occupied by one of the victorious powers. A similar agreement was reached over Austria as it had been absorbed into the German Reich in 1938.

Although the US needed Stalin's support for the establishment of the UN as well as Soviet involvement to end the war against Japan, Roosevelt was aware of Stalin's aim to create a buffer zone in Eastern Europe but the **Declaration on Liberated Europe**, signed by the Big Three, stated that, in theory, free and fair elections would be held in territory liberated by the Allied forces.

The Declaration on Liberated Europe

This was a section within the Yalta Agreement that echoed the Atlantic Charter of 1941 which stated:

This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter – the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live – the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated people may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis state in Europe where, in their judgment conditions require,

- *to establish conditions of internal peace;*
- *to carry out emergency relief measures for the relief of distressed peoples;*
- *to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of Governments responsive to the will of the people; and to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.*

Activity 1

ATL Research, thinking, self-management and social skills

Working in pairs, draw up a list of issues discussed at Tehran (1943) and Yalta (1945) and see if you can find out how far the Big Three a) agreed or b) disagreed on these.

This task will help you to focus on when and why the wartime leaders started to lose trust in each other and will give you some idea of the US policies Truman inherited when he became President.


Truman becomes President

As we know, even in 1944 there were concerns about Roosevelt's health and photographs of him taken at the **Yalta Conference** show a man exhausted by the tremendous responsibility of being a wartime leader.



Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin at the Yalta Conference, 11 February, 1945.

Throughout March 1945, Roosevelt struggled to keep going but on 12 April 1945 he died of a cerebral haemorrhage. As Vice President, Truman was immediately summoned to the White House where he was told the news by the President's widow, Eleanor Roosevelt. Truman offered his condolences and when he asked if there was



The Manhattan Project

This was the name given to the scientific research carried out to create the atom bomb. It began in 1942 and was carried out with the utmost secrecy at Los Alamos in New Mexico.



anything he could do to help her, Mrs Roosevelt replied, 'Is there anything we can do for you? For you are the one in trouble now.' She was not far wrong as Truman now had the onerous task of ending the war; negotiating the post-war recovery; and, although he was not yet aware of this, deciding whether or not to use a new weapon of unparalleled destructiveness. The new President learned of the **A-bomb** on 24 April, when he received a letter from Henry Stimson, Secretary of War, asking for a meeting to discuss a 'highly secret matter'. It was only now that Truman was brought into the small circle of people who knew about the **Manhattan Project**.

An average man

How did America regard its new President? Margaret Truman's biography, *Harry S. Truman* records how the *Kansas City Star* described her father as 'an average man'. This was soon followed by an article in *Time* magazine that stated, 'Harry Truman is a man of distinct limitations, especially in experience in high level politics... In his administration there are likely to be few innovations and little experimentation'. Roosevelt had been a towering presence not only in the US but in world politics and his successor would surely find it challenging to be his equal in charisma and in experience. Even so, Dean Acheson, the Assistant Secretary of State at the time, wrote to his son, 'The new President has done an excellent job [...] He is straightforward, decisive, simple, entirely honest [...]. I think he will learn fast and will inspire confidence' (Chace).

On 30 April, just a week after Truman had learned about the A-bomb, Hitler committed suicide in his bunker in Berlin. A week later, on 8 May 1945, Germany would sign an unconditional surrender ending the war in Europe. Amid the celebrations, there were concerns not only about how to address the recovery of a devastated Europe, but also how to end the war against Japan.

Was Truman the 'hardliner' who caused the Cold War?

Roosevelt appeared to get on well with Stalin and there is some speculation that their seemingly warm relationship could have continued after the war. Truman, however, is often described as a strongly anti-communist 'hardliner' who changed the dynamics, worsening relations and leading to the Cold War.

In her biography of her father, Margaret Truman argued that the first stirrings of the Cold War were evident at the Yalta Conference where Roosevelt had reluctantly made concessions to Stalin only because he needed Soviet support in the war against Japan. When Averell Harriman, the US Ambassador to Moscow, complained that relations with the Kremlin were difficult, Margaret Truman said that 'Roosevelt banged his fists on the arms of his wheelchair and said, "Averell is right, we can't do business with Stalin. He has broken every one of the promises he made at Yalta"'.

This would suggest that US–Soviet relations were tense even before Truman became President.

Activity 2



Thinking and self-management skills

In describing Roosevelt's response to Harriman, Margaret Truman wrote that she was told of this incident by Anna Rosenberg Hoffman, a mutual friend who also said, 'these were the exact words. I remembered them and verified them with Mrs Roosevelt not long before her death'.

With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Margaret Truman's biography of her father for historians studying Truman's presidency.



Truman and Molotov

When looking into the origins of the Cold War, historians often give quite a lot of importance to the first meetings on 22 and 23 April between Truman and Vyacheslav Molotov, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union. Molotov was on his way to the opening of the UN in San Francisco and, as a matter of courtesy, stopped off in Washington and called in at the White House. Edward Stettinius, then Secretary of State, advised Truman to discuss, in particular, the question of **Poland** where, it was suspected, Stalin was not adhering to agreements made at Yalta. For some revisionist historians, this was the crucial meeting when relations between the US and the USSR took a downturn. Martin Walker, for example, describes this as the moment when *'the balance in American policy began to shift away from Roosevelt's wartime trust to Truman's post-war suspicion'*.

In an interview, Walter LaFeber, a revisionist historian, described the meeting in this way:

“ He [Truman] then walks into the room with Molotov and has a very, very tough conversation in which he tells Molotov that the Soviets are not carrying out their agreements on Poland. And Molotov says, 'We are.' And according to Truman's record of this, 'I then explained to him in words of one syllable... exactly why they were not.' Molotov apparently said, 'I have never been talked to like that in my life,' and Truman said, 'Carry out your agreements and you won't be talked to like that.' Truman then walked out of the room, saw a top State Department aide and said... 'I just gave him a straight one-two to the jaw.' ”

Margaret Truman had a different interpretation:

“ Not once throughout this labyrinth of evasion did Dad lose his temper. He reiterated that he desired the friendship of the Soviet government, but it could only be on the basis of, 'mutual observation of agreements and not on the basis of a one-way street.' ”

Huffily, Mr. Molotov said. 'I have never been talked to like that in my life.'

'Carry out your agreements and you won't get talked to like that.' Dad replied.

Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Ambassador to Washington, also attended the meeting and in his memoirs he describes Truman's demeanour as being cold and that, on 23 April, he broke off the meeting.

According to Geoffrey Roberts, a British historian, official Soviet reports reflect a much more even-tempered meeting and suggests that if Stalin had been informed that the meetings with Truman had not gone well, Molotov may have been blamed. This is supported by Vladislav Zubok, a Russian historian, who states that, according to Gromyko, Molotov feared that *'Stalin might make him a scapegoat in this business'* and so decided *'to let the episode pass unnoticed: his record of the conversation with Truman bore no trace of the president's pugnacity and Molotov's ignominious exit'*.



Post-war **Poland** had been the subject of discussion at the wartime conferences in Tehran (1943) and Yalta (1945). Although it had been agreed among the Allies that Poland should have free elections for a new government after it was liberated, Stalin had already put in place the Lublin Government (named after the town in Poland where it was established). This was composed of pro-Soviet Poles, many of whom had returned from Moscow with the Red Army. Stalin had promised that the *'London Poles'*, who were the Polish government-in-exile, would also be represented in the post-war government but on their return to Poland, many ended up in prison or executed.

Activity 3



Social, thinking and communication skills

1. You have several contradictory sources here. Working in pairs, list what each source says about the meeting and then evaluate the origin, purpose, value and limitation of each one.
2. In groups, discuss how historians deal with the issue of contradictory evidence and how this affects the way history is told.

At **Potsdam**, the line-up of leaders had changed with Truman having replaced Roosevelt and, although Churchill was present at first, his political party lost the British general election which was won by the Labour Party. Its leader, Clement Attlee, became Prime Minister and he replaced Churchill at the Potsdam Conference.

Front row: (L-R) Attlee, Truman, and Stalin at the Potsdam Conference, 1945. Back row: (L-R) US Admiral William Leahy, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, US Secretary of State James Byrnes and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov.

The Potsdam Conference – Truman and the bomb

In July, Truman had to prepare for the **Potsdam Conference** in Berlin although Margaret Truman noted her father's reluctance as he thought the American people disliked '*seeing their presidents cavorting abroad at state dinners in royal palaces*'. He was also concerned about when and what to tell Stalin about the A-bomb, if the test was successful (Truman). Alternatively, Stone and Kuznick state, '*Truman's principal reason for going to Potsdam, he claimed, was to make sure the Soviets were coming into the war [with Japan] as promised*'. At Potsdam many of the points already raised at Yalta were discussed again as the time had now come to put them into practice.

The timing of the conference was pushed back by two weeks to allow for the testing of the A-bomb and when news of its success came through, Churchill noted how Truman's demeanour changed as he became far more confident in his dealings with Stalin.



Truman decided to inform Stalin that the US had developed '*a new weapon of unusual destructive force*', but was a little taken aback when Stalin barely reacted. According to Gaddis, '*The Soviet leader showed little surprise... when Truman gave him the news [about the bomb] at the Potsdam Conference, after all he had known about the bomb long before the new American president had done so*'. What Gaddis meant by this was that Soviet spies had kept Stalin well informed of what was taking place at Los Alamos while Truman had not been told anything until he became President.

The atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on 6 August and Stalin concluded that this was not meant to end the war so much as to demonstrate US might to the Soviet Union. '*Knowing that the bomb was not needed to defeat a nation already on life support, they [the Soviet leadership] concluded that the Soviet Union was the real target*' (Stone and Kuznick). Zubok also quotes Yulii Khariton having said that the Soviet leaders viewed this as '*atomic blackmail against the USSR*'. Another interpretation, however, is that Truman used the bomb to save Allied lives. Meeting with advisers in May 1945, Truman was told an estimated 500,000 Allied troops might be killed if the main islands of Japan

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

ATL

Thinking skills

It is claimed that when Churchill was informed of the result of the 1945 election, he responded, '*That is why we fought the war*'. What did he mean by this? Do you think the quote is a reliable? Give reasons for your answer.

were invaded (Margaret Truman). Even though, a month later, in a paper prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a much lower estimate of 193,500 Allied casualties was given, the losses would be considerable. Maldwyn Jones asserts that, 'The military and civilian leaders who took the fateful decision did so... to save Allied lives and to end the war at a stroke'.

Activity 4

ATL Thinking, communication and research skills



The crew of the *Enola Gay*, the name given to the B29 bomber that dropped the A-bomb over Hiroshima. The plane was named after the pilot's mother.

1. How useful would this photo be to a historian writing about the A-bomb? What does it tell us about US attitudes towards the A-bomb in August 1945?
2. Read through the reasons given for dropping the A-bomb and list the arguments that support the use of the bomb to a) end the war and b) send a warning to the USSR.

Historians' perspectives


Views of the bombing of Hiroshima

Orthodox	That the bombing of Hiroshima was necessary to end the war against Japan. If the A-bomb had not been used the Allies would have had to invade the main islands of Japan leading to huge losses. Allied soldiers would have been lost, but also the population that was expected to fight rather than surrender or even to commit suicide in large numbers rather than face defeat.
Revisionist	That the bomb was used to demonstrate US power to the Soviet Union. This is what Stalin also considered to be the main reason for the use of the A-bomb. The efforts made by Japan to negotiate a surrender in July 1945 were used as evidence by revisionist historians to demonstrate that it had not been necessary to use the A-bomb to end the war. Also, it was claimed that Hiroshima was chosen as the target not only because it was a centre of manufacturing but also because it had not previously been bombed and so the full impact of the A-bomb could be measured.
Post-revisionist	That the motivation of the US in using the bomb was both to save lives but also to demonstrate its impact to the Soviet Union. Historians also compare the use of the A-bomb on Hiroshima to the firebombing of Tokyo, where the devastation was as great but where conventional weapons had been used. The A-bomb is seen to be a cause of the Cold War as both Roosevelt and Truman kept it a secret from Stalin although, in fact, he had spies who kept him informed of developments at Los Alamos.

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

Research, communication, and thinking skills ATL

As you can see, the use of the A-bomb has been viewed differently at various times since 1945. Carry out some research to investigate this and consider what this tells us about the nature of historical knowledge.



The Bretton Woods Conference

This meeting took place near Washington in July 1944. It was attended by the Allies, including representatives of the Soviet Union. Its purpose was to provide economic stability for post-war recovery and to do so through the introduction of fixed rates of exchange and to end restrictions to free trade through protectionism. Gaddis mentions that the Russians may not have been aware that the purpose of the meeting was to 'salvage capitalism', but that their main interest was in the 'reconstruction loan' that they would so desperately need to recover from the war.

Salami Tactics

This term was used by historians to describe how Communist Party members who had spent the war years in Moscow returned home to their countries where they were often democratically elected and appointed to hold positions of authority in the new governments. Once this was achieved, they advanced the cause of their communist parties until they had political control and were able to close down other parties. The term was used to describe the 'thin slice by thin slice' approach to taking power – a little like cutting thin slices of a salami sausage.

After Hiroshima and Nagasaki

For the US, having a monopoly of nuclear weaponry brought with it immense responsibility and raised the question of whether or not the US should share its knowledge with the USSR. In particular, Dean Acheson worried that if the USSR was not included in the advances made in nuclear weaponry, the wartime alliance would be over (Chace). One proposal was to establish, under the auspices of the UN, an Atomic Development Authority to control research in the field of atomic energy as well as the mining of uranium and thorium. Chace mentions, in his biography of Dean Acheson, that Bernard Baruch, who was appointed to present a report on this to the UN Security Council, insisted on additions such as '*the immediate and sure punishment for any violations of the plan [he later said that by 'punishment', he meant 'war'] that would not be subject to veto by the UNSC*'. Also stating that the US would give up its stockpile of weapons only after a guarantee that no other nation could build A-bombs, this became known as the Baruch Plan. When it did come before the UNSC, it was vetoed by the USSR.

As 1945 came to a close, the US was in a strong economic position although it did take some time for wartime production to adjust to the needs of peacetime. **The Bretton Woods Conference** of 1944, attended by the USSR, had established the primacy of the US dollar, as well as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Gaddis).

As we can see, relations with the USSR had already shown signs of strain.

Key concepts:

Perspectives, change and continuity

1.2 The post-war world

1946 – the year of rhetoric

When we consider the events of 1946, we will see that growing fear and suspicion undermined the relationship between the US and USSR. The US suspected Stalin of wanting to expand Soviet influence. For example, there was mistrust over the withdrawal of the Red Army from its wartime occupation of northern Iran as well as concern over Stalin's use of '**salami tactics**' in Eastern Europe.

Timeline

1946	Feb	Stalin's speech fuels US fears of Soviet expansionism; the Long Telegram is sent by George Kennan to explain Soviet policy
	March	Churchill gives the Iron Curtain Speech in Fulton, Missouri; the Soviet Union withdraws its troops from Iran
	April	The United Nations holds its first meeting in San Francisco
	Sep	James Byrnes gives the Stuttgart Speech in which he calls for the economic recovery of Germany



The growing tension meant that, on both sides, every public speech was examined in an attempt to decipher the true intentions of their ideological opponents. When we look for the origins of Truman's policy of containment, perhaps its roots are to be found here.

Stalin's speech and the Long Telegram

In February 1946, Stalin gave a speech in Moscow referring to the immense sacrifices it took to win the Second World War and how there was yet more sacrifice ahead if the Soviet Union was to secure its borders. The US State Department wondered if this indicated a change in Soviet foreign policy and asked for clarification from George Kennan, a diplomat at the US embassy in Moscow (Walker). James Chace quotes Kennan's response to this request as, *'Here was a case where nothing but the whole truth would do. They had asked for it. Now, by God, they were going to get it'*. This 'whole truth' took the form of an 8,000-word summary of Russian/Soviet history, known as the Long Telegram in which Kennan summarized what the Soviet Union's intentions might be and how Stalin planned to achieve them. This document began with Kennan stating, *'At the bottom of the Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity'* (Walker). Furthermore, according to Kennan, if the opportunity arose, the Soviet Union would always attempt to expand its influence but it would back off if it met strong resistance. Walker sums up Kennan's warning as, *'The West had the physical and moral resources to resist Communism, and to outlast it, if it could only summon the political cohesion and will'*. Although Kennan did not expressly propose containment until his famous **Mr X article** for *Foreign Affairs* in July 1947, we can consider whether Truman's policy of containment began with the Long Telegram.

The Iron Curtain Speech

In March 1946, Winston Churchill was invited by Truman to visit the US and his home state of Missouri. At Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, Churchill gave his famous speech, while Truman sat in the audience. Although the original title was 'The Sinews of Peace', it became world-famous as the Iron Curtain Speech. Churchill spoke at length about the twin evils of war and tyranny; the United Nations as the great hope of the future; and preventing a new war with unity among nations. He spoke warmly of Stalin but also stated that there was nothing the Soviet Union respected more than military might. Overall, Churchill delivered a mixed message that was respectful towards the Soviet Union and its leader but also warned that *'from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent'* (LaFeber).

Friedman notes that the Fulton audience was lukewarm in its response *'except when Churchill said, "I do not believe the Soviet Union wants war"'*. Likewise, the press was *'unenthusiastic'*. Even so, the tone of the speech offended Stalin who accused Churchill of *'setting out to unleash war with a race theory, asserting that only English-speaking nations are superior nations, who are called upon to decide the destinies of the entire world'* (LaFeber).

Activity 5

ATL Research, thinking and communication skills

Churchill was a private citizen and no longer Prime Minister. Given so, why has such importance been given by historians to the Iron Curtain Speech?


To what extent does it help us to understand the origins of Truman's policy of containment?



The Mr X article

Entitled, 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct', this anonymous article, signed only 'Mr X', was published in the journal *Foreign Affairs* in July 1947. In it, he spoke of the need to prevent the further expansion of the Soviet Empire in Europe and *'that it was necessary to keep the peace while preserving the balance of power'* (Gaddis).

Later on in this chapter you will read about a CIA document, 'Soviet objectives in Latin America', published shortly before the Mr X article. This document also expresses US concern about the expansion of Soviet influence, this time in Latin America.



The Stuttgart Speech

According to Norman Friedman, Truman appointed James Byrnes as his Secretary of State because he had no Vice President and if he died, or was removed from office, he wanted someone capable of assuming the role of President and considered Byrnes to be '*eminently qualified*'. Another reason for choosing Byrnes was that Truman felt his own background in foreign policy was limited and so Byrnes would be able to offer valuable advice.

There were indications that Soviet and Allied policies regarding Germany were going in different directions, however. In the autumn of 1946, Byrnes visited Moscow and, on his way home stopped off at Stuttgart. Here, on 6 September, he gave a speech emphasizing the importance of a rapid German economic recovery. This was a clear deviation from Soviet policy, which was less keen on the recovery of Germany. Meanwhile, even within the Truman administration, there was no united approach to relations with the Soviet Union as not all leading Democrats agreed on a single stance. For example, a week after the Stuttgart Speech, Henry Wallace (who was Vice President during Roosevelt's third term in office) spoke of a need for good relations with the Soviet Union and warned, '*the tougher we get, the tougher the Russians will get...* *We have no more business in the political affairs of Eastern Europe than Russia has in the political affairs of Latin America, Western Europe and the United States*' (Chace). Furthermore, he stated, '*this was now the policy of the administration*' (LaFeber). Byrnes, however, accused Wallace of meddling in foreign policy and insisted to Truman that Wallace resign as Secretary of Agriculture. Truman agreed but, according to Acheson, did so reluctantly (Chace).

Overview of 1946

When we look back at the events of 1946, it is interesting to consider how rhetoric can influence world events. It is worth considering whether you think the reactions to Stalin's speech, or Stalin's response to the Iron Curtain Speech, were justified.

1947 – a year of action

The relationship between Truman and Byrnes was not always easy. In April 1946, Byrnes had already written his letter of resignation, agreeing to stay on only until initial discussions with the Soviet Union were complete (Chace). Meanwhile, Truman waited for General George Marshall to conclude discussions with the two factions in China, the GMD (*Guomindang*) and the CPC (Communist Party of China), and to return to the US where he took up the post of Secretary of State in January 1947 (see Chapter 2). The stage would now be set for the practical application of the policy of containment.

Timeline

1947	March	Truman addresses Congress outlining the Truman Doctrine
	April	The CIA issues 'Soviet Objectives in Latin America', an analysis of Soviet foreign policy in the region
	June	George Marshall announces Economic Recovery Programme to revive the European economy. It is also known as the Marshall Plan
	July	The Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance and Solidarity Treaty, known as the Rio Pact, is signed setting up a formal system of hemispheric defence

The Truman Doctrine

The idea of containment is often linked to the Long Telegram of 1946, but it was not until March 1947 that the Truman Doctrine was announced in a speech given to Congress.

When we consider what gave rise to containment, there was increasing misunderstanding between the two superpowers but there were also significant events in Iran and in the Eastern Mediterranean that made Truman suspect Soviet expansionism.

By 1947, there was growing concern over the Greek **Civil War** raging between the monarchists and the communists. British troops had fought alongside the monarchists but Britain, unable to afford the cost, announced their withdrawal. This alarmed Truman who believed that Stalin was financing the communists in Greece. Turkey was also of concern as the USSR wanted naval bases there and to share control of the Turkish Straits. If the Eastern Mediterranean fell under the influence of the Soviet Union, the strategic implications would be very serious for the US. Truman's response was to propose a \$400 million budget to aid Greece and Turkey. In fact, Truman had not read the situation very accurately as it was mainly **Tito**, the leader of Yugoslavia, who had been sending arms and men to the Greek communists. Moreover, in February, 1948, he was cautioned by Stalin who told him that Britain and the US would never allow the Soviet Union to extend its reach into the eastern Mediterranean and that the fighting must be brought to a halt (Dunbabin).

Josip Broz, known by his revolutionary name **'Tito'**, was the Communist leader of the Yugoslav National Liberation Army during the Second World War. After the war was over, Tito became the leader of Yugoslavia. He had good relations with Stalin until 1948, when Yugoslavia was expelled from the communist organization Cominform.

Activity 6

ATL Research, communication and thinking skills



1. With reference to the map of the Eastern Mediterranean, make a list of reasons to explain why the US was concerned about possible Soviet expansion into this region.
2. In groups, do some further research to find out about the crisis in Iran in 1946, as well as the Greek Civil War and how these influenced Truman's policy of containment.

Activity 7

ATL Research, thinking and communication skills

1. How far does the content of the extract from the Truman Doctrine echo the Iron Curtain Speech? Support your answer with reference to both speeches.
2. In order to get this bill through Congress, Senator Vandenberg of Michigan suggested to Truman that he 'scare the hell out of the American people' (LaFeber). You can find Truman's speech online. Read through the speech and consider whether Truman took Vandenberg's advice. Share your answer with the class.
3. Is it acceptable for politicians to exaggerate a threat to national security, for example, in order to get approval for policies that they believe to be in the country's best interests?

“ At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one. One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio; fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms.

Extract from the Truman Doctrine.

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

ATL

Thinking and research skills



Truman Doctrine cartoon.

'Where To?' American cartoon comment, 1947, on President Truman's request for \$400 million from Congress to defend the vulnerable countries of Greece and Turkey from communist pressure, a policy which came to be known as the 'Truman Doctrine'.

1. What is the message of the cartoon above?
2. To what extent did the Truman Doctrine represent a change in post-war US foreign policy?

Containment was a policy intended to prevent any further expansion of communism beyond its present borders. The Truman administration believed this could be applied through the military and financial support to countries threatened by communism (see the Truman Doctrine, page 15).

Getting the bill through Congress was not easy and there was opposition even from inside the Democratic Party as Henry Wallace spoke of the 'utter nonsense of describing the Turkish or Greek governments as democratic' (Stone and Kuznick). There was also concern in the Soviet Union where Stalin interpreted this policy as 'trying to extend the Monroe Doctrine to the Old World' (Stone and Kuznick).

The Marshall Plan

Following on from the Truman Doctrine came the European Recovery Programme (ERP), better known as the Marshall Plan. This came out of a growing concern that the European economy was struggling to recover from the destruction of the Second World War. European markets could not afford to buy US goods and the widespread hunger and poverty was also thought to encourage the spread of communism. For George Marshall, the answer was to dramatically increase US investment in Europe. Between 1945 and 1947, the US had already donated over \$11 billion in aid and loans to Europe, the ERP would go further and invest a proposed \$17 billion in economic reconstruction. Furthermore, it would be available to all European countries, including the USSR.

The response of the US Congress to the Marshall Plan was mixed. For a start, the sums involved were far greater than for the Truman Doctrine and would involve some belt-tightening by the American public. There were also objections that, once again, this would expand US involvement in European affairs. What was even more influential in pushing this through Congress was the communist **coup** in Czechoslovakia, viewed in Washington as evidence that if nothing were done to halt it, communism really would sweep through Europe. The Economic Cooperation Act, to give it its official title, passed through Congress on 3 April 1948 (Jones). ERP did work very effectively but it did not come without strings attached. For example, both Italy and France had strong Communist parties but it was only when communist-organized strikes in France were suppressed and the Italian Communist Party soundly defeated in the 1948 elections that these countries received Marshall aid.

In his study of the early years of the Cold War, Gaddis mentions various motives attributed to the US in funding the Marshall Plan. Was it enacted out of self-interest, humanitarian concerns, a fear of communism or all of these? Jones points out that the Marshall aid funds had to be spent mainly in the US and, in this way, it gave a powerful stimulus to the US economy. Meanwhile, Gaddis concludes that even if there were self-interest, 'it is difficult to see how a strategy of containment could have developed – with the Marshall Plan as its centrepiece – had there been nothing to contain'. For Gaddis, the US policy of **containment** was primarily a response to its fear of Soviet expansionism as well as providing the promotion of democracy through economic recovery.



Truman meeting George Marshall on his return from Europe in 1947.



The Soviet response to the Marshall Plan

According to John Lewis Gaddis, 'Stalin fell into the trap the Marshall Plan laid for him which was to get him to build the wall that would divide Europe'. Indeed, Stalin did send Molotov to the first meeting held to discuss the plan but the Soviet Union did not participate, nor did it allow any of its **satellite states** to do so. Of these, both Poland and Czechoslovakia, who had expressed a wish to be included, were forbidden to attend any further meetings. Furthermore, Molotov used the phrase 'dollar imperialism' to describe what was perceived as US encroachment into Europe. There was further division when, in order for it to be carried out effectively in Germany, a new currency was introduced. The old Reichsmark had long since lost value and was replaced by the Deutschmark, which was introduced in Trizonia (the combined zones of Britain, the US and France). Extending this to the western sectors of Berlin, however, met with opposition from Stalin who ordered a blockade to stop the free movement of goods from Western Germany into the Western sectors of Berlin. The Allied response was the Berlin Airlift that was maintained from June 1947 until May 1948. According to Zubok, Stalin had miscalculated and the blockade was 'a propaganda fiasco and a strategic failure'. What had become clear, however, was that an ideological and economic divide had emerged between the countries of Western and Eastern Europe. The Cold War was well and truly under way.




The term '**satellite state**' was used to describe countries such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia whose governments were closely linked to the Soviet Union. We can also use the term 'Eastern Bloc' to describe these countries.

Key concepts: Significance, causation and consequence

1.3 The rise of McCarthyism and its impact on domestic and foreign policy in the US

Timeline		
1948	March	A communist uprising in Czechoslovakia overthrows the government
	April	The Organization of American States (OAS) is founded with the aim of promoting regional cooperation among member states
	June	The Berlin Blockade begins, it will continue until May 1949
	Aug	At the HUAC hearings, Alger Hiss is named as a Soviet spy
	Nov	Mackenzie King resigns as Prime Minister of Canada and is succeeded by Louis St-Laurent
1949	March	The North Atlantic Treaty is signed, establishing NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization)
	May	The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is established, also known as West Germany
	Aug	The Soviet Union tests its first atom bomb
	Oct	The People's Republic of China is established; the German Democratic Republic (GDR) is established, also known as East Germany
1950	Feb	McCarthy gives the Wheeling Speech in which he claims to have a list of communist spies working inside the State Department
	June	North Korea invades South Korea giving rise to the Korean War
1952		Truman decides not to run for re-election. Dwight Eisenhower (Republican) wins the presidential election in November.



Anti-communism

The Cold War gripped the imagination of the American public and fear of another war was heightened when the Soviet Union tested its own atomic bomb in 1949. Within the US, as far back as 1945 there had been rumours of the proliferation of spy rings and communist infiltration. For example, hundreds of state documents were found in the offices of *Amerasia*, a magazine that featured articles about Asia, and a spy was uncovered who had been in the pay of the Chinese communists. According to Friedman, charges were dropped because the evidence had been obtained by the use of illegal wire taps but 'it would later be charged that the administration wanted to avoid any embarrassment by any exposure of Soviet espionage'. In the autumn of 1945, the defection of a cipher clerk from the Soviet embassy in Ottawa led to revelations about spy networks in the US and in Britain (Garthoff). In Washington, also in the autumn of 1945, Elizabeth Bentley approached the **FBI** to say that she had worked as a spy and wanted to confess and give information about others who had also gathered intelligence for the Soviet Union (Knight). Although it would take time to establish the credibility of sources and to gather evidence, such allegations led Truman to increase security checks and, in 1947, eleven members of the American Communist Party were charged under the **Smith Act of 1940**.

The Smith Act 1940

The Alien Registration Act of 1940 (named the Smith Act after one of its authors, Representative Howard Smith of Virginia) included a clause outlining the punishment of 'whoever knowingly or wilfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the United States.'

It was the Alger Hiss case, however, that really grabbed headlines in the US. In testimony given to the HUAC in 1948, Whittaker Chambers, a former member of the American Communist Party, claimed that Hiss, a Harvard Law School graduate who had worked for the US State Department, had spied for the Soviet Union. Although he sued Chambers for slander there was enough evidence to suggest that Hiss had committed perjury when he claimed he had never met Chambers. Hiss was tried in 1950 and sentenced to two years in prison (Friedman). Whether or not he was a spy is still a matter of controversy.

The HUAC

The House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) was instrumental in supporting the hunt for communists by questioning witnesses suspected of being communists or of knowing communists. Although when the committee began its investigations, its hearings were not televised but only broadcast on the radio, the impact was considerable, especially when famous film producers and directors known as the Hollywood Ten were called to testify in 1947. Having refused to say whether or not they were members of the American Communist Party, they were found guilty of contempt of Congress and sentenced to imprisonment. On their release, they were **'blacklisted'**. Many well-known figures testified against the Hollywood Ten, including Ronald Reagan, Robert Taylor, Gary Cooper and Walt Disney. Many more showed their support, however, including actors such as Humphrey Bogart and Lauren Bacall (Stone and Kuznick).

This period is sometimes referred to as the Second Red Scare, the first having taken place in 1919, or as the 'witch-hunt', because simply being mentioned as a possible communist sympathizer was enough to get people fired from their jobs and/or to be called to testify before the HUAC. Needless to say, it was very risky to criticize the HUAC as anyone who did so could be accused of having something to hide.

Blacklisted

People who should not be employed and were therefore prevented from working in Hollywood during the rise of anti-communism. Many people found themselves out of work because they had been called before the HUAC or their names had been mentioned in testimony given by others.



The National Security Act

In 1947, rising tensions about communism led to Congress passing the National Security Act that established both the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The role of the CIA was to *'collect, analyse and disseminate information'* but also to perform *'other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security'* (Stone and Kuznick). Truman also introduced a federal loyalty programme in 1947 and, *'within four years, some 1,200 federal employees were fired and a further 6,000 resigned'* (Levine and Papasotiriou).

The 1948 election

Truman completed his first term in office in 1948 and stood for re-election as the Democratic Party candidate. The other presidential candidates included Republican, Thomas Dewey and Progressive, Henry Wallace. Truman had established himself as willing to take a proactive stance towards the Soviet Union and backed this up with the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Truman's domestic policies had not been very popular, however, and in the 1946 congressional elections, the Republicans had taken control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Truman continued to press for liberal policies supporting trade unions against the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, although his veto was overridden by votes in Congress. Truman also supported legislation to promote civil rights, although this made him deeply unpopular in the southern states. He did, however, succeed in ending segregation in the army and this act was passed in July 1948. Maldwyn Jones describes Truman in 1948 as having alienated the Right through his support for civil rights and desegregation and to have alienated the Left through his foreign policy.

Democratic Party politics took an interesting turn at the party convention in Philadelphia in July 1948. Among the issues that divided the party were civil rights and this led to a split between the Liberals when a group of thirty southerners, named the Dixiecrats, held their own convention in Birmingham, Alabama and formed the States' Rights Democratic Party. The more left-leaning Democrats had already formed the Progressive Party in 1946 and at their convention, also in Philadelphia, they nominated Henry Wallace as their candidate. Their platform called for better relations with the Soviet Union, public ownership of some sectors of the economy and an end to the policy of containment (Jones). Suspected by many of being soft on communism, Wallace, according to Zubok, was secretly in communication with Stalin who wanted the world to believe the US, and not the Soviet Union, was responsible for worsening relations.

With the Democratic Party being so disunited, the 1948 election looked like an easy win for the Republicans and Jones describes Dewey's campaign as having been *'dignified, colourless, nonchalant'*. Truman, on the other hand, knowing he had to struggle for every vote, campaigned relentlessly, making over 350 speeches on a whistle-stop tour of the US (Jones). The early polls had overwhelmingly predicted that Dewey would win, but it was Truman who was returned for a second term in the White House.

A delighted Truman holds a copy of the *Chicago Daily Tribune* that had, prematurely, announced Dewey's victory.



McCarthyism and the McCarthy era: the impact on domestic policy

Joseph McCarthy was a Senator for Wisconsin and became Chairman of the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee of a Senate Committee on Government Operations in 1953 at the start of his second term as Senator. McCarthy came to prominence in 1950 when there was growing concern that the United States was not in as strong a position as it had been in 1945.

- It no longer had a monopoly of nuclear arms as the Soviet Union had tested its own atomic bomb in 1949.
- The Cold War was no longer confined to Europe as the civil war in China had ended with the victory of the communist People's Liberation Army and was now under the leadership of Mao Zedong.
- In June 1950, communist-led North Korean forces had invaded South Korea and the US had entered a 'hot war' to contain communism.

The repercussions of the Alger Hiss case certainly helped to pave the way for McCarthy's tirade against communism but just as important was the 'loss of China'. Truman had supported Chiang kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), the leader to the nationalist *Guomindang* forces fighting the communist PLA (People's Liberation Army) but the flow of aid ended in 1948, leading, according to McCarthy, to the communist victory in 1949.

On 9 February 1950, McCarthy gave a speech in Wheeling, West Virginia claiming that there were 205 spies in the pay of the Soviet Union working inside the US State Department.

Two days later, he sent a telegram to the White House in which he repeated his assertion that '*the state department harbors a nest of communists and communist sympathizers*' and that, furthermore, he had '*the names of 57 communists who are in the state department at present*'.

Meanwhile, US propaganda heightened the fear that communism could infiltrate the US by stealth and bring down the democratic political system. The fear of nuclear war was also intensified by information films produced to alert the public to the dangers of atomic warfare and how best to prepare for this by building shelters as part of their homes.

Activity 8

ATL Thinking and research skills



What does this photo tell you about how Americans prepared for nuclear war?

An American family seated in 'Kidde Kokoon', an underground bomb shelter manufactured by Walter Kidde Nuclear Laboratories of Garden City, Long Island in 1955.

Truman and McCarthy

Truman's reputation as a strong president who could protect the US had been tarnished by McCarthy's allegations about his moderate stance against communism and having spies in his administration. In 1952, he abandoned his bid for a third term as President after he was defeated in the New Hampshire primary by Estes Kefauver. George Marshall was also a subject of McCarthy's allegations and even Dwight Eisenhower, a popular Republican candidate who had immense respect for the former Secretary of State, chose political expediency rather than openly opposing McCarthy.

Eisenhower's personal and political instincts came into conflict during a campaign stop in McCarthy's home state of Wisconsin. Eisenhower was prepared to deliver a defense of Marshall, praising him 'as a man and a soldier,' and condemning the tactics of McCarthy as a 'sobering lesson in the way freedom must not defend itself.' But noble intentions gave way to political reality. Aware of McCarthy's huge base of support and not willing to risk losing votes in a crucial state, Eisenhower delivered his speech minus the defense of Marshall and the condemnation of McCarthy. It was a decision that would haunt him for the rest of his life.


American Experience, Eisenhower.

Another shock to the American public was the arrest and trial in 1950 of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg as Soviet spies who had passed secrets about the atom bomb to the Soviets.

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

Thinking and research skills ATL

When you read the extract that describes how Eisenhower responded to McCarthy's attack on General George Marshall, does this affect your impression of his presidency? Give reasons for your answer.



Anti-communism and American culture

Publicity poster for *I Married a Communist*. The film was released in 1949.



CHALLENGE YOURSELF

ATL Research, thinking and communication skills

Choose a cultural figure (an artist, musician, author, playwright, etc.) who was influenced by the McCarthy era, either by supporting anti-communism or opposing it. Do some research to find out more about how this influenced their work. Share your research with the class.

Hollywood released over 40 anti-communist films between 1948 and 1954. These had titles such as, *I Married a Communist* and *I was a Communist for the FBI*. Even Captain America, a cartoon-strip character, warned, 'Beware commies, spies, traitors and foreign agents'. The *New York Times*, in 1956, wrote an editorial that it would never 'knowingly employ a Communist Party member in the news or editorial department' (Zinn). The allegations made by Joseph McCarthy fuelled anti-communism, although, as we have seen, there was plenty of speculation to fuel the public imagination, even before he began his campaign.

Art too, was influenced by the politics of the period. Famous artists such as Jackson Pollock and Willem de Kooning were, without their knowledge, used by the CIA as examples of how the US encouraged abstract art, unlike the Soviet Union where art was more representational. Known as the 'long leash', this policy of secretly funding avant garde art, theatre and film was a way in which the US could appear to be freer and more creative than communist states.

Music was also subject to criticism. Pete Seeger, a folk musician who had been a member of the Communist Party during the 1940s, and his group, The Weavers, were blacklisted in 1953 and prevented from performing.

During this period, art also offered a platform to express anti-McCarthyism. Possibly, one of the best-known examples is Arthur Miller's play, *The Crucible*, based on the witchcraft trials of 17th-century Salem. The analogy with McCarthyism was not lost on its audience (Levine and Papatotiriou).

McCarthyism and bipartisan politics

According to Paul Levine and Harry Papatotiriou, papers released after the fall of the Soviet Union support allegations that during the Second World War, spies had infiltrated 'every major branch of the Roosevelt administration'. Indeed, this was considered to be the 'heyday' of Soviet activity. In particular, secret information was passed about the construction of the atom bomb. Levine and Papatotiriou point out that the revelation

of the Canadian spy ring in 1945 led to the uncovering of agents in the United States and, furthermore, that this led to the Soviet Union deactivating many of its agents. This suggests that the Second Red Scare actually came rather too late, after most of the spying had come to an end.

One important aspect of the McCarthy era is the way it fostered bipartisan politics. According to Levine and Papatotiriou, the Republicans in Congress were looking for a way to end the five consecutive terms of a Democrat presidency and to tarnish the reputation of the Truman administration with allegations of being soft on communism was one way to do this. *'Once the battle was joined between McCarthy and the Truman administration, it divided Congress mainly along partisan lines, with the Republican leadership in effect using him to strike at the five-term Democratic rule'* (Levine and Papatotiriou).

Dwight Eisenhower won the presidential election of 1952, beating Adlai Stevenson, Governor of Illinois, who had tried to win a sixth consecutive Democratic victory. His campaign was weakened, however, by what became known as K1C2 (Korea, Communism, Corruption).

As we saw earlier, although he dared not say so in public, Eisenhower had no time for McCarthy. Eventually, in 1954, McCarthy went too far by accusing the army of harbouring communists. At the hearings, when Joseph Welch, the attorney acting for the army, was accused by McCarthy of having hired a young lawyer from the National Lawyers' Guild, denounced by McCarthy as *'the legal bulwark of the Communist Party'*, Welch famously said, *'Let us not assassinate this lad any further Senator. You have done enough. Have you no sense of decency, sir, at long last? Have you left no sense of decency?'* (Levine and Papatotiriou). In December 1954, McCarthy was censured by the Senate for *'conduct... unbecoming a Member of the United States Senate'* (Zinn).




Senator Joseph McCarthy testifies before the Senate at the Army-McCarthy hearings in 1954. Army Counsel Joseph N. Welch sits next to him.

The impact of McCarthyism on US foreign policy

NSC-68

Compiled in 1950, the National Security Council Memo #68 (NSC-68), reflected a new approach to containment that, according to Gaddis, *'portrayed the communists as a*



co-ordinated global movement, calling for a *tripling of the American defense budget from \$13bn to \$50bn* (Walker). It was described by Truman as *'my five-year plan for peace'* because he believed that *'if he could persuade Congress to implement it swiftly, the Communists would never dare to launch an attack on a free world nation'* (Truman).

Although, according to Martin Walker, Kennan disliked NSC-68, claiming it had taken his policy of containment too far, the tripling of the military budget was considered essential if the US was to contain communism when it no longer had a nuclear monopoly. At first, Truman was not convinced and, on 1 June 1950, had stated that *'the world is closer to real peace than at any time in the last fifty years'* (Walker). Moreover, the Truman administration was convinced that, despite their common ideology, the Soviet Union and China had conflicting interests that would ensure their enmity and that this would make war with the US even less likely. Only a few weeks later, Truman was proved wrong by the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950.

Not only spy rings at home but war abroad would now strengthen McCarthy. On being informed of the invasion of South Korea by communist North Korea, Truman immediately called for a meeting of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). A resolution was passed condemning North Korean aggression and a UN peacemaking force, consisting mainly of US troops, was sent to assist South Korea. The war dragged on until 1953 and the failure to gain a quick victory turned this into what the US media termed *'Truman's War'*. Eventually communism was contained, but not before McCarthy made much of this opportunity to once again question the loyalty and determination of Truman to keep communism at bay.

Key concepts:

Causation and consequence

1.4

What was the impact of containment on Canada?

Overview

Canada in 1945, with King George VI of England as its Head of State, was one of the pillars of the British Commonwealth. Standing by Britain, with whom its foreign policy had always been closely linked, Canada declared war on Germany on 10 September 1939.

With the US as its nearest neighbour, however, it was clear that in the event of world war, their policies would have to be coherent and consistent with each other. In 1940, they set up the Permanent Joint Board on Defence allowing for closer cooperation on military matters, an initiative that became even more important when they became allies with the US entering the war.

In 1945, Canadians celebrated the Allied victory and there was great public admiration for the courage and the sacrifice of the Soviet Union. In September 1945, however, Igor Gouzenko, a code clerk at the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, approached staff at the *Ottawa Journal* and offered to hand over 109 confidential documents that he had taken from the embassy. He was motivated by his reluctance to return to the Soviet Union and hoped that the documents would help persuade the Canadian authorities to grant him political asylum. As Friedman points out, the initial reaction of the Canadian government had been to *'refuse to look at his material on the basis that it belonged to a friendly government'*. Furthermore, there was a reluctance to offend the Soviet Union



in the autumn of 1945 when post-war arrangements were still being discussed and cooperation among the Allies was of the utmost importance. This is supported by Amy Knight who describes the Canadian Prime Minister, William Mackenzie King, as reluctant *'to disrupt the cordial diplomacy that characterised Ottawa's relations with Moscow'*. Once the documents were examined and Gouzenko was given the opportunity to recount confidential conversations he had overheard, it was clear that spies working for the Soviet Union were embedded not only in Canada but also in Britain and the US. Mackenzie King instructed the Canadian secret services to pursue these leads but to do so quietly and the matter was kept quiet until February 1946 when a Royal Commission was established to investigate Gouzenko's allegations. As a result of his revelations, 20 people were put on trial, of whom nine were acquitted. In particular, Fred Rose, a Member of Parliament who belonged to the Canadian Communist Party, was tried, found guilty of espionage and given a six-year prison sentence.


Initially, Mackenzie King was reluctant to accept that Soviet spies were active in Canada. He did not believe that Stalin would have permitted such deception. However by the time he met with Truman in September 1945, and in light of the Gouzenko Affair, he inevitably considered the Soviet Union to be less trustworthy. After all, both Churchill and Roosevelt had instructed that all espionage against the Soviet Union should cease during the war and so it came as a shock to discover that this gesture had not been reciprocated by Stalin (Friedman).



A reporter interviewing Igor Gouzenko who, even after being granted asylum, always wore a hood to hide his identity when being photographed.

Significant individual: Igor Gouzenko

Igor Gouzenko and his family were hidden by a neighbour when, inevitably, officials from the Soviet embassy came looking for him. The Canadian authorities then placed the Gouzenkos in a 'safe house'. He often used the pseudonym 'George Brown' and it was this name that was used at his funeral in 1982 (Knight). In 2004, the Canadian government erected a plaque in his memory in Ottawa (Knight).



Canada and the Marshall Plan

Emerging from the war in 1945, Canada embarked on a new period of prosperity. Like the United States (except for Pearl Harbor), territorially Canada was untouched by the Second World War and its industry and agriculture were ready to provide food and goods for the domestic market. Across the Atlantic, however, its overseas markets consisted of European countries that were economically devastated and, Mackenzie King feared, open to the encroachment of communism. These concerns, of course, were shared by the Truman administration and, in 1947, were expressed by Hume Wrong, the Canadian Ambassador to Washington, who stated, *'There is truth in the paradox that, to secure the adoption of a plan for world economic recovery, it is necessary to emphasize the division of the world between the Soviet bloc and the rest'*. Bearing in mind these factors, it is not surprising that Canada was also a strong supporter of the US Marshall Plan. Like the US, Canada was short of markets for its goods but it was also short of US dollars. It eagerly accepted the proposal, therefore, that the recipients of the Marshall Plan could use US dollars to pay for purchases of Canadian wheat, as well as other goods from Canada. In this way, France, for example, could use some of its Marshall Plan money to buy goods from Canada, paying in US dollars that, in turn, would help Canada to pay for its own purchases from the United States.

From Mackenzie King to Louis St-Laurent

Until 1946, Mackenzie King had acted as his own Secretary of State for External Affairs but, in 1946, exhausted by the Gouzenko affair, he appointed Louis St-Laurent to this position in the cabinet. A French Canadian and an experienced diplomat and politician, St-Laurent would also become Prime Minister when Mackenzie King retired in 1948. A strong supporter of multilateralism, St-Laurent had been a Canadian delegate at the first meeting of the UN in San Francisco in April 1945. In the post-war period, although Canada's foreign policy was influenced by concerns regarding the spread of communism, it also wanted to find a role beyond that of its traditional isolationism but without being overshadowed by the United States. St-Laurent saw the UN not only as a forum for peace but also as a way for Canada to fulfil its role in global politics on a multilateral stage and be less in the shadow of its powerful neighbour. In this and later chapters, we will find that Canada's post-war foreign policy was closely intertwined with organizations such as the UN and **NATO** and identified with *'Pearsonian internationalism'*. Named after Lester Pearson, a Canadian diplomat and future Prime Minister, who had been an adviser to the Canadian delegation at the San Francisco conference in 1945, this would define Canada's future role as a supporter of **collective security**, liberal principles and as a peaceseeking mediator in international disputes.

Canada and NATO

Although aware of the benefits of the Marshall Plan and eager to support this plan to rescue the economies of war-torn Europe, Canada did not send planes or crew to assist with the Berlin Airlift but it did fully embrace the establishment of NATO. Indeed, Canada wanted this to be an economic as well as a military alliance and it was its influence that resulted in the inclusion of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which reads, *'They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them'*.

In 1950, when the Korean War broke out (you will read more about this in the next chapter) St-Laurent was surprised by the swift US response but pleased that it was strongly supported by the United Nations. This support, along with Canada's



membership of NATO convinced St-Laurent to send Canadian troops not only to Korea but also to Europe for the duration of the Korean War. At a domestic level, however, foreign policy did prove divisive as the French Canadian Québécois were considered to be more isolationist and less willing to support interventionist policies.

Canada, as the northern neighbour of the US, but also, of course, in close proximity to the Soviet Union, was certainly aware of the risk of an escalation of the Cold War. By 1948, Lester Pearson, who was now appointed Secretary of State for External Affairs observed, *'The chief menace now is subversive aggressive Communism, the servant of power politics. Our frontier now is not even on the Rhine or rivers further east. It is wherever free men are struggling against totalitarian tyranny'*, wherever the *'struggle of free, expanding progressive democracy against tyrannical and reactionary communism was being fought'*.

Activity 9

ATL Research, communication, thinking and social skills

Working in groups, discuss how far Canadian foreign policy was influenced by that of the United States during the following periods: 1941–45; 1945–48; 1948–52. Share your research with the class.

Activity 10

ATL Research, communication and thinking skills

Consider the following essay question:

'The impact of containment on the Americas was more positive than negative'. To what extent would you agree with this assertion?

Working individually or in groups, begin by discussing the command term, 'to what extent' and consider what this requires you to do. If you are uncertain, check the definition in the History Guide as it is important that you become familiar with the different ways in which an exam question may be asked. Next, make a list of the key words in the question to make sure that you address all the demands. Now, brainstorm by writing down all the relevant facts you can think of.

To get you started, here are some points you could mention but see if you can come up with some more:

- the end of isolationism and the emerging role of the US as a global superpower
- the economic boost provided by the Marshall Plan
- the impact of containment upon US military budgets
- the concerns it raised about communism within the US.

Also, include some discussion of the impact of containment on Canada and Latin American states. See what you can find out about this from reading this chapter and also by doing some further research.

This question is structured in a way that is quite typical for Paper 3 exam questions. It is a good idea to begin by reading the wording very carefully. Look for the **command term** and underline the key words and then proceed to write your outline. Don't forget to look back at the question from time to time to check that you have read it correctly and that what you are writing is relevant and focused on the demands of the question. In this case, the command term is 'to what extent' and so you need to consider arguments to support both 'positive' and 'negative' impacts of containment before you can reach a conclusion. Always remember to support your argument with facts and to provide context by using dates to indicate the sequence of events.





Key concept: Significance

1.5

What was the impact of containment on Latin America?

Overview

This section aims to examine the influence of some of the early events of the Cold War and the repercussions of President Truman's policy of containment on Latin America. It will also assess the impact of the Cold War on inter-American relations. Finally, it will analyse the effects of the Cold War on Latin American societies and culture.



Map of Latin America and the Caribbean.

Latin America before the Cold War

Throughout the 18th and 19th century, European nations, such as Great Britain and Spain, had significant political and economic influence on Latin America. However,



with the start of the 20th century, the United States' influence in Latin American affairs increased. As Europe focused on fighting the First World War, trade between the US and Latin America expanded considerably. New financial opportunities for US capital in Latin American mines (for example, in Peru and Chile), oil industries (such as in Mexico) and agrarian projects (Cuba and Guatemala among others) emerged.

In the inter-war period, many Latin American governments adopted import substitution industrialization policies (**ISI**) aimed at diversifying and modernizing their national economies. They wanted to become more than producers and exporters of raw materials, as this made them more vulnerable to international economic crises. The ISI policies aimed to develop national industries to increase self-sufficiency.

The development of new industries in the first half of the 20th century contributed to the expansion of cities and the emergence of new social classes: the industrial **bourgeoisie** and the urban working class. Such social developments had a profound impact on the politics of each nation as these new actors demanded greater participation and founded political parties which challenged the existing elites. As a result, populist leaders (such as Perón in Argentina) came to power, both before and after the Second World War, claiming to represent these new urban sectors. They supported nationalist measures and attacked foreign interests and the traditional elites.

During the Second World War, the United States offered Latin America economic and technical assistance to increase the production of materials necessary for the war efforts in these countries. The region was of particular importance as it was the only major raw material supplier not directly affected by the war. Many Latin American countries received US investments which enabled them to continue with their programmes of modernization and industrialization, while providing the United States with minerals and oil. Other Latin American industries, such as the textile industry, developed during the war as they lacked competition from developed countries.

At a diplomatic level, Latin American countries reacted very differently to the entry of the US into the Second World War. While Brazil, for example, provided the United States with naval bases in the north-east and contributed with troops, Argentina was determined to remain neutral.

The **ISI** policies expected to develop and strengthen local industries with the use of government subsidies and protectionist policies. Some countries in the region adopted ISI after suffering shortages of imported goods from Europe during the First World War. Others only implemented ISI in the early 1930s, as a response to the effects of the Great Depression on their economies.

Activity 11

ATL

Research and communication skills

In pairs, choose one Latin American country and research its developments between 1900 and 1945. In doing so, attempt to answer some of the following questions:

1. What were the main economic activities?
2. What governments ruled the country in the period?
3. Which were the major social and political challenges at the time?
4. What diplomatic and military actions did the country of your choice take during the Second World War?

The Cold War in Latin America (1945–52)

In order to explore the impact of President Truman's foreign policy on Latin America, it is important that you consider the events you have studied earlier in this section.

After the war, the United States became an undisputed economic and political power in the world. However, Soviet expansionism was perceived by the United States as a serious and immediate threat. In previous sections of this chapter, you have studied the policy of containment and related events in European countries such as Greece and Germany. Because of the magnitude of these challenges in Europe, US policies at the start of the Cold War did not focus on Latin America.



We could argue that this change in the United States' outlook on Latin America took the region by surprise. Many Latin American countries expected the United States to continue supporting the development of their economies after the end of the war. However, during this period, Latin America did not receive significant US public economic assistance.

Another important reason for the limited US economic involvement in the region was that, although concerned about Soviet foreign policy, Truman perceived the probability for the expansion of communism in Latin America as low. This was due to several factors.

- The geographical and technological limitations for Soviet expansion in Latin America meant that the physical distance, together with the fact that the Soviet navy and air force were not equipped for such enterprise made it highly improbable that it would threaten territory in Latin America. However, as you have seen in previous sections in this chapter, the same could not be said of Europe and Asia.
- The strong influence of the Catholic Church, hostile to **Marxism**, limited the popularity of communism in Latin American politics.
- Populist leaders, such as Perón in Argentina, weakened the appeal of communism as they satisfied some of the social and economic demands in the communist political programmes.
- The military played a leading political role in some countries and limited the activities of the communist parties.

Although the United States did not consider Latin America to be under immediate communist threat, it nevertheless monitored developments in the region and planned for long-term actions to restrict its development. In April 1947, the CIA issued a document called 'Soviet Objectives in Latin America'. This document summarized the concerns about the role of communism and served to design US foreign policy.

Activity 12

ATL Communication and thinking skills

Read the source below and answer the questions that follow.

In Latin America, in particular, Soviet and Communist influence will be exerted to the utmost to destroy the influence of the United States and to create antagonism disruptive to the Pan American system [...]. The pattern of Soviet activities in Latin America suggests, therefore, that the Soviet planners have posed their problem to themselves in the following terms: What, in the time available to us in Latin America, can we do to undermine the military potential of the Western Hemisphere as a fighting unit? Where, without assuming direct responsibility, can we channel our resources. What existing diplomatic or political situations, favorable to our long term purposes, can we exploit again without assuming direct responsibility?

Extract from the CIA document 'Soviet Objectives in Latin America', 10 April 1947.

1. According to the above source, what were the concerns of the CIA about Soviet influence in Latin America?
2. With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of the source for a historian studying Truman's foreign policy in Latin America?

'Soviet Objectives in Latin America' concluded that the expansion of communism in Latin America would be carried out by national communist parties as opposed to direct Soviet intervention. In order to control the situation, it proposed some measures.



- It proposed to monitor the local communist parties which had been identified as potential contributors to the expansion of Soviet ideology. Under direct or indirect US influence, many countries in the region outlawed their communist parties. You will read more about this later in the chapter.
- It proposed to persuade Latin American countries to cut off diplomatic relations with the USSR. By 1952, only Mexico, Argentina and Uruguay maintained official relations with the Soviet Union.
- It supported anti-communist governments in Latin America. This, in some cases, implied the endorsement of dictators. As George F Kennan stated during a visit to Rio de Janeiro in 1950, *'It is better to have a strong regime in power than a liberal government if it is indulgent and relaxed and penetrated by Communists.'*
- The CIA document also recommended the development of a Hemispheric Defense Pact in preparation for potential conflicts with the USSR.

Inter-American relations

In a context in which the United States' foreign policy moved its focus away from Latin America, it became important to set up a system of mutual defence in the region. The United States saw it as an instrument of protection against direct or indirect threats from the USSR. The Latin American countries, on the other hand, saw it more as an opportunity to create regional organizations that would act in cases of conflicts between countries in the region. They also expected these treaties would be a starting point to bring back US economic assistance to the region.

There were also diplomatic and military pacts which aimed at securing the region in the Cold War context. The Act of Chapultepec of 1945, the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed in 1947, and the formation of the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1948 are all examples of this.

These regional agreements were, to an extent, a continuity of the spirit of the **Monroe Doctrine** in that they aimed at protecting the Americas against foreign interference, only this time, a communist one.

The Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace. The Act of Chapultepec (March 1945)

This conference was held in the city of Chapultepec (Mexico) when Franklin D Roosevelt was still President. It produced a document, the Act of Chapultepec, which declared that an attack on the independence or sovereignty of any signatory would be considered as an act of aggression on them all. The act set up a mechanism for a regional military alliance that was to be completed at the end of the Second World War.

The San Francisco Conference (1945)

Shortly after Chapultepec, representatives of 19 Latin American nations attended the San Francisco Conference, at which the United Nations was founded. Latin America was a large bloc and was thus able to impose some proposals. For example, the decision to include Argentina in the United Nations, despite initial opposition from the US.




The Monroe Doctrine is one of the most important documents of US foreign policy. Announced by President James Monroe in a speech to Congress on 2 December 1823, it aimed at declaring the American continent free from European attempts to colonize it. However, the Monroe Doctrine has since been perceived in Latin America as a justification for US involvement in the affairs of Latin American states.

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

Research, communication and thinking skills 

In groups, carry out research on the reasons why the US resisted the incorporation of Argentina into the United Nations. Focus on the relationship between these two countries during the Second World War.



The Rio de Janeiro Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security. The Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (July 1947)

This conference, held in the Brazilian city of Rio de Janeiro, was attended by 19 Latin American countries and the US. It aimed at building on the aims included in Chapultepec by setting up the mechanisms for a regional collective security system. It maintained that an act of aggression against one American state by either another American state or a foreign nation was to be treated as an act of aggression against all members.

The treaty condemned the use of war. Member states were to submit international controversies between them to methods of peaceful settlement. A two-thirds majority would resolve the collective action to take against aggressors. No nation would be asked to use force without its consent.

The conference was attended by President Truman, who delivered a speech to the delegates of the 19 Latin American nations present.

The treaty, known as the Rio Pact, was criticized in Latin America. The view was that while Latin American countries were increasing their obligations towards the United States, Truman was making it equally clear that there would be no 'Marshall Plan' for Latin American economies.

Activity 13

ATL Communication and thinking skills

Study the source and answer the questions that follow.

Insofar as the economic problems common to the nations of North and South America are concerned, we have long been aware that much remains to be done. We have been obliged, in considering these questions, to differentiate between the urgent need for rehabilitation of war-shattered areas and the problems of development elsewhere. The problems of countries in this hemisphere are different in nature and cannot be relieved by the same means and the same approaches which are in contemplation for Europe. Here the need is for long-term economic collaboration. This is a type of collaboration in which a much greater role falls to private citizens and groups than is the case in a program designed to aid European countries to recover from the destruction of war. You have my solemn assurance that we in Washington are not oblivious to the needs of increased economic collaboration within the family of American nations and that these problems will be approached by us with the utmost good faith and with increased vigor in the coming period.

Speech by President Harry Truman at the Rio de Janeiro Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, September 1947.

1. According to the source above, in what ways would Latin America be economically assisted by the US?
2. *'The problems of countries in this hemisphere are different in nature.'* Using your own knowledge, explain the nature of Latin American problems at the start of the Cold War.

The Bogotá Conference. The Charter of the Organization of American States (1948)

The Charter of 1948 created the Organization of American States (OAS), a regional organization within the United Nations system, and became the Constitution of the inter-American system. It set in place a system of diplomatic consultations and military cooperation among member states but, however promising this seemed to be



at the time, there were deep differences between what the US and Latin America saw as priorities for the region at that time.

While the United States considered the inter-American system a valuable protection from communist expansion, Latin America continued to hope it would obtain US financial assistance for the development of the region. However, US foreign policy argued that Latin America should focus on attracting private investment to promote the economic development of the region rather than depend on US government assistance.

Latin American politicians, on the other hand, explained that it was highly unlikely their countries could benefit from private investments for **infrastructure** and development if political instability persisted. They argued such political instability was a result of regional economic and social problems.

- These problems were rooted in trade agreements with the US which, they claimed, favoured the US and did not promote Latin American industrialization and self-sufficiency.
- In their perspective, it was impossible for Latin American living standards to improve in any significant way as long as foreign companies continued to play a major role in the local economies. The treatment of workers by US multinational corporations and the return of revenues to the US were seen as contributing factors to economic and political instability.
- They claimed that private companies did not invest in the infrastructure of the countries, and showed little interest in improving the living standards of those nations in which they operated.
- Latin American critics of the role of the US claimed that as long as the region was treated only as a supplier of raw material and did not receive aid to develop its infrastructure and industries it would remain underdeveloped and poor.




Anti-US expressions were not limited to Latin American arts. On 1 November 1950, two members of the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party, Griselio Torresola and Oscar Collazo, attempted to murder President Truman. They wanted to make a political statement against US control of Puerto Rico, which their party blamed for the poverty and unemployment levels. They never got close to Truman. In the attempted murder, the police killed Torresola. Collazo was sentenced to death, but was later pardoned by Truman and his sentence commuted to life imprisonment.


The social and cultural impact on Latin America

As you have previously read, the US policies in Latin America between 1945 and 1952 were largely a result of the Cold War developments. The US belief that Latin American development should not be a policy of state – like the Marshall Plan had been for Europe – but rather the result of private investments led to great disappointment, not only among politicians but also among intellectuals and artists. Soon, **anti-US** propaganda and literature became popular.

Significant individual: Pablo Neruda

Pablo Neruda (1904–73), the son of a railroad worker, was a Chilean poet, diplomat and politician. In 1945, he was elected Senator for the Communist Party (PCCh). Two years later, under the Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy, the party was banned and Neruda was expelled from the Senate. He lived underground until 1949, when he left the country. His work, *Canto General* (1950), was first published in Mexico but was banned in Chile at the time. Some of the poems included are openly anti-US and criticize the role of multinational corporations, such as the United Fruit Company, in Latin American politics and society. Neruda was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1971.





Many artists reflected these views in their works. We will now look at one example of the way in which poetry was used to voice anti-US views in the early years of the Cold War. Activity 15 contains an extract of a poem by Chilean poet, Pablo Neruda. The poem was inspired by Neruda's visit to Colombia and shows how he believed US multinational corporations exploited Latin America. This is one example of many artistic manifestations against US influence in these years.

Activity 14

ATL Thinking, Communication, Social skills

Read the following extract from a poem and answer the questions.

“ *Among the bloodthirsty flies,
the Fruit Company disembarks,
ravaging coffee and fruits
onto ships that spirit away
like serving trays
on submerged lands' treasures.
Meanwhile, in the seaports,
Sugary abysses,
Indians collapse, buried
in the morning mist.
A body rolls down, a nameless
thing, a fallen number,
a bunch of lifeless fruit
dumped in the garbage heap.*

'United Fruit Company' by Pablo Neruda in *Canto General*, Part Five: 'The Sand Betrayed', 2011.

1. In groups, discuss the ways in which the poem is a critical portrait of the role of foreign companies in Latin America.
2. In pairs, look for information about the United Fruit Company. Find out where it was formed, what its main economic activities were and which countries it operated in during the Cold War years. You may also decide to take note of the conflicts it faced in different countries during the Cold War years.
3. To what extent do you think the poem reflects the tensions between the United States and Latin America in this period?
4. In pairs, find one other example of artistic opposition to the United States in these years from a different country. Have you been able to find artistic material in support of the Soviet Union in the country of your choice?



Essay planning



Communication, thinking and research skills

Consider the following question:

Evaluate the cultural impact of the Cold War on the Americas between 1945 and 1952.

Working in pairs, plan an answer to this question. In order to do this, you should first discuss what exactly the question asks.

- Underline the **command term** of the question. Find the definition of 'evaluate' in the glossary included in the History Guide. In what ways does considering this definition help you plan your answer more effectively?
- What areas of culture will you focus on? Some areas you may consider are literature, cinema, anti-communist or anti-US propaganda, the impact of McCarthyism on culture. However, feel free to include any other relevant argument. Don't try to cover everything you know but rather aim at selecting some issues and treat them in more depth. In order to decide which arguments to include, think of which ones you feel more confident with.

Once you have discussed what the question asks you to do and you have a clear focus, discuss the following.

- Is there any information you should include to put the question in context? For example, what is the significance of 'between 1945 and 1952'? In your introduction, you could make a brief reference to the context of the end of the Second World War and Truman's presidency.
- How will you organize the arguments of the essay? You may, for example, structure your essay by regions: the impact of the Cold War on the US, Latin America and Canada. You could alternatively look at short and long-term impact. Can you suggest other ways to organize your argument?
- Now make a list of the key issues you are likely to discuss for each argument. Go over the chapter to find relevant material and useful examples. Add more information from your own knowledge and from class discussions.



Examiners do not expect you to address questions in any one particular way. There are no set answers. However, it is very important that you address the specific question rather than write everything you know about culture between 1945 and 1952. If you decide to make reference to a particular author, for example, then you should show how the topics he wrote about were influenced by Cold War politics.

Also, for questions like this one, which give you specific dates, you must make sure the material you include is from within this period.



02

The Korean War

This chapter will focus on the Korean War, which lasted from 1950–53. This conflict is often described by historians as a ‘proxy war’ because, although it was limited to the Korean peninsula and the main **belligerents** were North Korea and South Korea (which also makes it a civil war), the war was an ideological conflict with the US and the USSR supporting different sides. We will examine why the US became involved in the conflict, as well as the political and diplomatic outcomes. We will also look at what President Truman hoped to gain, how the war was fought and the impact it had upon the Americas.

Communist prisoners held by US Marines, September 1950.


Essay questions:

- Examine the reasons for the participation of the United States or Canada in the Korean War.
- ‘Technological developments were the main factor that influenced the outcome of the Korean War.’ To what extent would you agree with this assertion?
- Discuss the political outcome of the Korean War upon the United States.

Timeline

1945	The USSR and the United States agree on a division of Korea at the 38th parallel
1948	Elections are scheduled to choose a government that will reunify Korea but these are held only in the south
1949	The Communist Party of China wins the civil war and establishes the People’s Republic of China (PRC); the USSR test an A-bomb
1950	25 June North Korea invades South Korea; Truman calls for a meeting of the UN Security Council. Resolution passed to condemn the invasion and to demand a withdrawal
	15 Sep UN forces land at Inchon and push the North Korean army back across the 38th parallel
	15 Oct China enters the war in Korea
1951	4 Jan Chinese forces take Seoul
	15 March UN forces retake Seoul
	15 April General MacArthur is dismissed as Commander-in-Chief of the UN forces
	10 July Peace talks take place at Kaesong
	25 Oct Peace talks resume, this time at Panmunjom
1952	4 Nov US presidential elections are held and won by Dwight Eisenhower (Republican)
1953	5 March Stalin dies
	27 July The armistice is signed, ending the war in Korea

A map of Korea in 1945 showing the division of the peninsula at the 38th parallel.



Key concepts:

Causation and consequence

2.1

Korea after 1945

Korea was a colony of Japan from 1912 to 1945. When the Second World War in Asia was drawing to a close in 1945, the Soviet Union joined in the war against Japan on 8 August and its forces crossed the border into Manchuria, where they fought the Japanese army. Soviet forces also entered Korea and, as noted by Peter Lowe, *'the US would be dependent on Soviet goodwill at first, since US forces were not immediately available to occupy South Korea'*. In Korea, Japan surrendered to the Soviet forces. The Soviet Union and the United States then drew a border across the peninsula at the **38th parallel**. This neatly divided Korea into approximate halves, an arrangement that was agreeable to both the Soviet Union and the United States.

The south was given over to US occupation on 8 September 1945. It was more densely populated and its economy was predominantly agricultural. The north was less populated but more industrialized, as it was here that the Japanese colonizers had invested in factories and infrastructure, linked to their occupation of neighbouring Manchuria (Lowe), which had taken place in 1931.

As in Europe at this time, the occupation forces tended to influence the ideology of the government in their zones. In the north, the Soviet Union was keen to consolidate the rule of the Korean Communist Party, although this included many different factions during the colonial period. In 1945, along with the Soviet forces came Kim Il-sung, a young communist and fervent nationalist. We do not know a lot about his past because this was rather obscure until he became the leader of North Korea.

Activity 1

ATL Research, thinking, self-management and communication skills

During the post-Second World War period, there were several countries/regions that were divided into zones of occupation by the Allied forces. Working in groups, choose an example (other than Korea), answer the following questions and present your findings to the class.

1. For what reasons was the country/region divided?
2. Was reunification planned? Did it take place? Why/why not?
3. What influenced the decisions made over how countries should be divided (e.g. ethnic, geographical, economic – these are just some possible reasons)?
4. Did division bring peace or further conflict?

Significant individual: Kim Il-sung

Kim Il-sung was a **nom de guerre** for Kim Song-ju, who was born in Korea in 1912. His parents migrated to Manchuria where Kim attended school. In the 1930s, the Japanese authorities reported Kim's links to the Communist Party and he later became closely associated with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and so was well placed to return to Korea with the occupation forces in 1945.

Lowe states that after the surrender of Japan, Korea was in a state of upheaval, eager to embrace independence after decades of harsh colonial rule. To some extent, this was reflected in the emergence of 'people's committees' that sprang up in both the north and the south after the defeat of Japan and before occupation could be imposed. These were spontaneous forms of local government, often led by representatives chosen because they had not cooperated with the Japanese. Lowe argues that the US misunderstood the nature of these committees, assuming they had been infiltrated by communists.

In charge of the US military occupation from 1945–48 was General John Reed Hodge, described as '*vehemently anti-communist, to the point where any unrest or dissent might be regarded as a sign of communist activity*' (Lowe). The US occupation in the south was tainted by its reliance on officials and police who had previously worked for the Japanese. Along with the Americans came Syngman Rhee, who was made interim head of a provisional government. A fervent nationalist who had gone into exile rather than live under Japanese rule, Rhee had spent much of his life in the United States and, according to Lowe, '*Rhee never doubted that he was destined to lead Korea and acted with a strange mixture of arrogance, duplicity, cunning and tenacity to establish his power*'. For General Hodge, Rhee was a certain opponent of communism and, despite his authoritarian methods and eagerness to unite Korea under his rule, he was supported by the US. Even so, Gaddis states that the decision to withdraw US troops in 1949 was made in part because they feared '*the unpredictable Rhee might "march north" and thus drag them into a war they did not want*'.

In the late 1940s, there was some concern over how post-war Korea would be administered as the US and the Soviet Union were growing suspicious of each other. In this way, the situation in Korea echoed concerns in Europe where the US suspected the Soviet Union of expansion. In 1947, it was proposed by Dean Acheson, the Undersecretary of State, that a budget of \$600 million, spread over three years, should be provided for the eventual **containment of communism** in South Korea (Lowe).

Meanwhile, the US proposed to the UN General Assembly that the occupying forces be withdrawn from Korea in 1948 and elections be held to reunify the country under a democratic government. The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCK) was given the task of supervising the elections. Its members included India, China, El Salvador, the Philippines, Syria, France, Canada and Australia (Ukraine was appointed but refused to join). North Korea had made it clear it would not allow

Kim Il-sung as a young man.



Syngman Rhee with his American-born wife.



The containment of communism

This was President Truman's policy, as demonstrated through the Truman Doctrine of 1947. The US would provide military and financial support when necessary to support countries threatened by the spread of communism.

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

ATL

Research and thinking skills

Working in pairs, see what you can find out about UNCTOK and why, for example, North and South Korea were not represented. Why were they excluded? Also, do some research into the role of the United States in the UN at this time to find out how influential it was in the decision-making of the UN Security Council.

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

ATL

Thinking, research, communication and self-management skills

Korea has often been described as a proxy Cold War conflict. Find out what is meant by this and if it is an accurate description of what took place between 1950 and 1953. Support your answer with factual evidence.

In groups, choose other examples of proxy wars that have taken place and research the causes of the outbreak and the impact of the outcome on regional and/or global politics. Share your research with the class.

Activity 2

ATL

Thinking skills

Can we use the term 'inevitable' when writing history? To what extent could you argue that the Korean War was 'inevitable'?

UNCTOK to observe the elections and, although they were held in South Korea in May 1948, Canada and Australia argued that these partial elections could not be considered as a valid basis for reunification (Lowe).

By 1949, the US determined that Korea was of little strategic interest but, on the other hand, also realized that it could not be abandoned to communism. General Hodge resigned as, despite their mutual hatred of communism, he did not get along with Rhee. The withdrawal of occupation forces led to more frequent border conflicts and these prompted a UN resolution to set up UNCOK (United Nations Commission on Korea) and observation posts to be built along the border between South and North Korea to report any clashes *'that could give rise to war'*.

By the end of 1949, hostility between North and South Korea was plain to see and the risk of war breaking out was increasing (Lowe). Any hope of reunification was fading unless this was to be achieved through force.

Key concepts:

Causation, perspectives and significance

2.2

Events leading up to the outbreak of war

We often divide the causes of wars into long-term and short-term. This helps us to organize information about events that seem significant for the outbreak of wars. Short-term causes can include 'triggers' such as an assassination or the failure of negotiations. Often these stem from longer-term tensions or enmity that can be traced back to an earlier conflict or the failure of peacemaking.

The long-term causes

We could say that the long-term causes of the Korean War go back to 1945 when the decision was made to divide the country into two ideologically different halves. With the breakdown of the wartime alliance, worsening relations between the US and the Soviet Union were bound to affect relations in Korea. Furthermore, both Kim Il-sung and Syngman Rhee had very different aims for a reunified country and both had ambitions to become its sole leader.

The short-term causes

Stalin and Korea

In 1949, Kim visited Stalin to ask for support for an invasion of South Korea. Initially, Stalin refused as he did not want to risk a clash with the United States. He changed his mind in January 1950, however, and according to Vladislav Zubok, a Russian historian now working in the United States, *'Stalin authorized the Korean leader, Kim Il Sung, to prepare for the war for national reunification and pledged full military assistance'*.

Gaining access to Soviet archives after the fall of the Soviet Union has enabled historians to examine documents that show why Stalin changed his mind. Zubok refers to historian Evgeny Bazhanov, who gave the following reasons.

- Stalin was buoyed by the successful testing of a Soviet A-bomb in 1949 and this gave the Soviet Union some equivalence with the United States, even though there was still a gap in capability over delivery systems, for example.

- Intervention in Korea was unlikely to imperil future cooperation with the United States as the establishment of NATO and worsening relations in Europe already made this unlikely.
- Truman's decision to end aid to the Nationalists in China, leading to victory for the Communists, encouraged Stalin to conclude that the US would be unlikely to intervene in a Korean conflict.
- **The Defense Perimeter Speech** of January 1950 indicated that Japan and the Philippines would be defended by the United States but not Korea or Taiwan and this was seen as further evidence that the US would not get involved in Korea.

The Defense Perimeter Speech

This was a speech given by Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, on 12 January 1950. Perhaps without meaning to, this proved to be one of the most important policy statements on US foreign policy in 1950 and Gaddis calls it *'well-intentioned but carelessly worded'*. In his speech, Acheson indicated that South Korea and Taiwan were not considered to be within the US *'defense perimeter'* in the East Pacific region. Why did he do this? Gaddis argues that Acheson was, in fact, indicating to Mao and Stalin that the US did not intend to get involved in conflicts on the Asian mainland and, furthermore, did not intend to get involved in the Chinese Civil War. Finally, he meant that South Korea and Taiwan could, if necessary, 'lean' on the United Nations rather than the United States. Could we say that where Acheson meant to send a message of peace, in fact, it led to war?

Gaddis reaches a similar conclusion as to why Stalin changed his mind and notes the importance of the Defense Perimeter Speech, *'Stalin read... very carefully – as well as (courtesy of **British spies**) the top secret National Security Council study on which it was based'*.

When Kim Il-sung visited Moscow in April 1950 to discuss plans for war, Stalin was supportive although he emphasized that the USSR *'would not intervene directly, especially if the Americans sent troops to save South Korea'* (Zubok). This, again, suggests that Stalin was somewhat of an opportunist, ready to spread further the borders of communism, but he was not prepared to do so at the risk of direct conflict with the United States.

Nevertheless, Stalin gave *'the green light'* to Kim Il-sung, who claimed that the war could be *'won in three days'* (Gaddis).

Activity 3

ATL Thinking and self-management skills

Read through the reasons given for Stalin's response to Kim Il-sung and write a short paragraph on what these tell us about Stalin's attitude towards the United States in the period up to the outbreak of war in Korea. Is there evidence here to suggest that Stalin's aims were expansionist, as Truman feared? Did Stalin fear the United States? What does this section tell you about the relationship between Stalin and Kim?

Mao and Korea

Mao Zedong established the People's Republic of China (PRC) after defeating the Nationalists and claiming victory in October 1949. Having convinced Stalin to support his plan to invade South Korea, Kim went to meet with Mao Zedong in Beijing. Stalin had strongly encouraged Kim to do this and Mao, in turn, wanted to show support for Kim as he hoped that Stalin could also be persuaded to back a Chinese invasion of Taiwan where the Nationalists had retreated after their defeat. With the support of both Communist leaders, Kim Il-sung was now all set for an invasion.

Unlike Kim Il-sung, and despite his best efforts, Rhee had not succeeded in gaining US support for an invasion of the north. On 25 June 1950, however, when North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea, the US was quick to respond.

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

Thinking, research and communication skills ATL

Working in groups, see if you can think of other instances in the 20th century when statesmen were misunderstood (deliberately or not) with disastrous consequences. Support your arguments with evidence.

The **'British spies'** referred to by Gaddis were Guy Burgess, Kim Philby and Donald Maclean. Recruited by Russia at Cambridge University in the 1930s to act as double agents, all three had become senior government officials, and Kim Philby had even been appointed the British liaison officer attached to the CIA.

Truman and Korea

Although Stalin had not anticipated US intervention, President Truman acted immediately when informed of the invasion of South Korea and, according to Gaddis, *'The unexpected attack was almost as great a shock as the one on Pearl Harbor nine years earlier'*.

Why did the Truman administration act so swiftly to demonstrate its determination to stop the invasion? We can list the reasons for US involvement as follows.

- The Truman administration had already ended the traditional policy of US isolationism and replaced this with the '*containment of communism*', already in place in Europe. When, in 1947, the Truman Doctrine set out the case for military aid to Greece and Turkey, the United States was now ready to apply containment in Asia.
- The Marshall Plan aid for the economies of Western Europe in 1948 and the establishment of NATO in 1949 consolidated American influence in Europe and ensured that it had strong allies if it did go to war.
- The Soviet A-bomb, successfully tested in 1949, as well as the Communist victory in China, were seen as potentially tipping the balance of power against the United States and so any further expansion had to be resisted.
- Senator Joseph McCarthy alleged that the Truman administration had '*lost China*' because it was '*soft on communism*', and failure to intervene in Korea could be used as further evidence of this.
- Before the outbreak of the Second World War, the **League of Nations** had failed in its mission to guarantee '*collective security*' against aggressor states. A quick and decisive response by its successor, the United Nations, to North Korean aggression would demonstrate that the new organization would be different and Truman wanted to support this.
- NSC-68, a report on US security, was sent to Truman in April 1950. It described the Cold War as the struggle between '*freedom and slavery*', and '*to intervene militarily against further communist expansion anywhere in the world*' the US had to triple its defence budget (Levine and Pappasotiriou). US intervention in the Korean War would provide the impetus for Congress to give its approval.
- Last, but not least, Truman had signed an agreement with South Korea on 26 January 1950 that assured the continuation of US military and economic aid (Margaret Truman).

NSC-68

With senior cabinet officials and national security advisers as its members, the National Security Council was set up in 1947 to give advice to President Truman on foreign policy and matters of national security. In April 1950, the council wrote a report on how the United States could best prepare for conflict against the Soviet Union. The proposal was to triple the defence budget to \$50 billion to increase US capability in both conventional and nuclear arms. For Truman, the report presented '*a new burden – the need to view the security of the free world as synonymous with America's security*'. Truman also hoped, however, that if the US could demonstrate its full military might through this huge programme of rearmament, it would also ensure peace because no other country would dare attack it and so Truman referred to NSC-68 as '*my five-year plan for peace*' (Margaret Truman).

Activity 4

ATL Thinking, communication and research skills

Read the source and then answer the questions that follow.

None of us got much sleep that night [25 June 1950]. My father made it clear from the moment he heard the news, that he feared this was the opening round of World War III. Large Bulgarian and Rumanian armies were massed on the border of Yugoslavia, which had broken with Stalin the previous year and asked for our support. There was a huge Russian garrison in East Germany. Iran and Turkey were, we knew, equally threatened by powerful Russian forces just across the border.

Margaret Truman (1973). *Harry S Truman*, p. 455.

1. What consequences did Truman fear might result from a war in Korea? Do some research to find out more about the key points mentioned here.
2. According to the origin, purpose and content, what are the value and limitations of this source?

Key concepts:

Causation, consequence and change

2.3

The US response to the outbreak of war

Truman's immediate response on 25 June was to call for a meeting of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and a resolution to demand:

- 'an immediate cessation of hostilities'
- the withdrawal of forces to beyond the 38th parallel
- that no assistance should be offered to North Korea.

This was passed 9–0, with only Yugoslavia abstaining. On 27 June, the US reported to the UNSC that the North Korean forces had not withdrawn and another resolution was prepared, calling for support to be sent to South Korea to repel the invasion. This resolution was passed 7–1, with Yugoslavia voting against and without the participation of India and Egypt as these representatives had not received instructions from their respective governments on how they should vote. A US State Department memo reflected that this action by the US was met with approval from such countries as Britain, France, Belgium and Norway and that the Secretary General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, also expressed his approval.

The USSR and the veto

By using its veto in the UNSC, the Soviet Union could have prevented the passage of both resolutions. As instructed by Stalin, however, Jacob Malik, the Soviet Ambassador to the UN, was absent from the UNSC as a protest against the UN's refusal to recognize the People's Republic of China, rather than the Nationalists now in Taiwan, as the representatives of China in the UN.

Historians have puzzled over why the Soviet Union failed to return to the UNSC once a resolution against North Korea had been introduced. Was it by accident or by design that Stalin did not instruct Malik to return?

The orthodox view to explain the absence of the Soviet Union, which always seemed irrational, was that it was an error; Stalin did not appreciate the importance of the UN resolution and its consequences. Vladislav Zubok argues, however, that

Stalin deliberately did not send the UN Soviet delegation back when the resolution was debated. In a message to Klement Gottwald, the President of Czechoslovakia, Stalin stated that the absence of the Soviet Union and, therefore, the passage of this resolution had been intentional, to ‘... get the US entangled in the military intervention in Korea’, in which the US would ‘... squander its military prestige and its moral authority’ (Zubok).

This interpretation is supported by Gaddis, who argues that although Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, wanted Malik to go back to the UNSC, Stalin believed that if it got involved as part of a UN force, this would not be a solely US action and so the risk of a direct conflict between the US and the USSR would be reduced. Also, the UN called this a ‘police action’ and so the US was not officially at war with any country.

CHALLENGE YOURSELF



Thinking and research skills

Why do you think it was so important to use the phrase ‘police action’ here? What did this actually mean? How was it different from saying ‘war’? Can you think of other words that have a very emotive impact and so must be used very carefully by diplomats and politicians? (Hint: One example could be ‘genocide’ – do some research into when and how this was used, most recently in Rwanda and Kosovo.)

Historians' perspectives

One of the most conspiratorial interpretations explaining the Soviet absence from the UNSC is mentioned by Lowe. Based on the account given by the Yugoslav representative on the UNSC, Malik did not return to the Security Council because Stalin wanted relations between the US and the Chinese Communists to deteriorate to the point that they would never get their seat in the UN. This rather complex scenario suggests that Stalin was not eager for the PRC to be given representation in the UN, possibly because he wanted the Soviet Union to be its only ‘voice’ of communism. Given that by the end of the 1950s, the Sino-Soviet split was already evident, this interpretation may not be so far from the truth.

Activity 5



Research, communication and self-management skills

Go back over the causes of the Korean War and divide them into long- and short-term causes. Then, using a table like the one below, compare and contrast the long-term causes with another war you have studied. Some possible themes, such as economic and ideological, have been inserted here, perhaps you can think of some others. When you have completed this, do the same for the short-term causes. This is a useful exercise for Topic 11 of Paper 2, where you may be asked to ‘compare and contrast’ various aspects of the causes and effects of wars.

Long-term causes of the Korean War and (another war)	Comparisons	Contrasts
Economic		
Ideological		

Key concepts:


Causation and consequence

2.4 The war

Stage 1: The invasion of South Korea

As they moved south across the 38th parallel, the North Korean troops (the Korean People’s Army, KPA) had many advantages over the South Korean forces (the Republic of Korea armed forces, ROK).

- They were equipped with 120 Soviet T-34 tanks (Carter Malkasian).
- North Korea had an air force consisting of 180 Yak fighter jets and Ilyushin bombers (Malkasian).



This map shows how far south the South Korean forces had been pushed within a few months of the start of the war.

- An estimated 50,000–70,000 ethnically Korean soldiers who had fought alongside the Communists in the Chinese Civil War were sent back to Korea in 1949, along with their weapons. They provided a battle-hardened core for the North Korean army (Chen).
- The South Korean forces were poorly equipped, poorly led and, when confronted with the North Korean army, had retreated in confusion (Lowe).

Even when US troops were rapidly deployed from Japan where they were part of the occupation force, they were unable to stop the rapid North Korean advance down to Pusan.

Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the US occupation of Japan, was given command of the UN forces although he is quoted as saying, '*I had no direct connection with the UN whatsoever*' (Walker), suggesting that, for all its claim to be a UN police action, it was US-led. Norman Friedman goes further and suggests that much of what was to follow in Korea during the remainder of 1950 was the result of MacArthur's '*grandiose ambition*'.

Stage 2: The Inchon landings

On 15 September, MacArthur took the bold action of landing troops on the coast at Inchon, to cut the supply lines of the North Korean forces. The planning for this attack was kept highly secret as it was a bold strategy with many obstacles to overcome, such as the mudflats that made access difficult at low tide and an island that obstructed the narrow access to the harbour. Even so, the plan worked brilliantly (Friedman). Following the landings at Inchon, a '*hot pursuit*' of the retreating North Korean forces was anticipated when UN forces (made up of soldiers from 14 countries representing six continents) and South Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel. This was risky, however, as it might prompt Soviet or Chinese troops to enter the war

and assist North Korea. Even the slightest chance of this happening, MacArthur was warned, would require that the UN forces halt their progress and await further instruction (Friedman). This suggests that the UN was nervous about any the possible consequences of its police action.

This map shows how the UN forces were able to cut off the supply lines of the North Korean army by landing at Inchon.



The UN forces landing at Inchon.



Activity 6


ATL Research, communication and thinking skills

1. What do you think could have been possible reactions within the UN to the entry of China or the Soviet Union into the war? Discuss this in groups and give reasons for your answers.
2. As we have already seen (with the Defense Perimeter Speech, for example) actions often have unintended consequences – or do they? With regard to the UN forces under the command of General MacArthur, what do you think was the expected political outcome of the Inchon landings?

The successful landings at Inchon led to the liberation of Seoul on 28 September (Friedman) and a rapid movement of UN forces up to the 38th parallel. MacArthur had already told the US Chief of Staff, General Lawton Collins, that *'he would destroy the North Korean Army rather than pushing it back across the border'*. According to Friedman, MacArthur saw the Korean War as an opportunity to shift the focus of the Cold War from Europe to Asia and, as we shall see, to take the war to China.

Stage 3: To the Yalu River

The objective of the UN resolution had been achieved with the forced withdrawal of the North Korean army and, by the end of September 1950, it looked as if the war had been won. Peace terms were being drawn up to demand the surrender of all North Korean forces, the occupation of key points in the north and the holding of UN supervised elections (Friedman). In reality, this upswing in the fortunes of the UN forces after Inchon only made China's involvement more likely, however, and Kim Il-sung, fearing total defeat, asked Stalin for immediate aid. Stalin responded by pressuring Mao to intervene. Martin Walker states that Mao thought that a US victory in Korea would be damaging for the Chinese Revolution and would *'arouse dissatisfaction towards us among the national bourgeoisie and other segments of the people. They are very afraid of war.'* Also, for Mao, the prospect of US troops on the Yalu River border between Manchuria and Korea was unthinkable.



The northernmost point reached by the UN forces.

On 2 October, **Mao** sent a message to Stalin to say that a Chinese People's Volunteer Army would be formed (Malkasian), and that same day Zhou Enlai publicly warned the US that China would intervene if US forces pursued North Korean forces beyond the 38th parallel (Freidman).

Mao asked for air support from Stalin, who offered air cover for China to defend itself but not for advancing Chinese troops (Friedman). Soviet pilots were active in the war, however. Martin Walker (1994) refers to the memoirs of General Georgi Lobov, which were published in 1992, in which he referred to the '*strictly limited war*' that Stalin had insisted upon.

Furthermore, according to Lobov, around 200 Soviet pilots died in this '*limited war*' and the Soviets shot down an estimated 1,300 US planes. Walker states that the US knew about this but did not want to make it public because, according to Paul Nitze, '*we would be expected to do something about it*'.

The South Korean army proceeded to cross the 38th parallel on 1 October. The UN forces followed on 7 October after a UN resolution was passed calling for the reunification of Korea. The Soviet Union was back in the UNSC, but the resolution got the backing of the General Assembly that was now permitted to vote on matters of security which would otherwise be blocked by a veto (Malkasian).

According to Friedman, MacArthur took the new resolution as a **carte blanche** to advance northwards. Unlike MacArthur, however, Truman was nervous about taking too many risks and that, sooner or later, the Chinese would intervene. At a meeting held on 15 October at Wake Island, MacArthur gave Truman unequivocal assurance that the risk was minimal and that, anyway, US air power would easily defeat any Chinese incursion into Korea (Friedman).

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

ATL

Thinking and research skills

How important is it, do you think, that governments inform the public about every aspect of a conflict in which it is involved? Should we allow governments to decide what information is and is not shared? What are the consequences of this for a democracy?

Korean refugees fleeing south, 30 June 1950.



Stage 4: China enters the war

China entered the war on 19 October when the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) crossed the Yalu River. Over the next month, the CPV advanced and then withdrew, making MacArthur believe he had them on the run. In fact, the CPV were not on the run and the UN forces had only encountered less than half of an army that was 300,000 strong (Malkasian). The UN forces rapidly moved north, believing that total victory was within their grasp and walked into what President Truman called a 'gigantic booby trap' (Friedman).

Even confronted with a massive Chinese army, MacArthur maintained that the US could be victorious in a war against China but General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that such a conflict would be '*the wrong war at the wrong place at the wrong time and with the wrong enemy*' (Friedman). The Chinese counter-offensive on 25 November resulted in a chaotic and total retreat south of the South Korean (ROK) and UN forces (the US Eighth Army). The US Marines made a heroic stand at the Battle of Chosin on 27–28 November but although there were 20,000 Chinese casualties, the UN retreat continued.

President Truman now threatened to use the A-bomb in Korea, which led to Clement Attlee, the British Prime Minister, flying to Washington to urge caution as such an escalation would surely increase the risk of Soviet intervention, not just in Korea but also in Europe (Friedman). The UN forces retreated south past the 38th parallel and Seoul by 4 January 1951 (Friedman). Mao was keen to continue the pursuit but was advised not to in case this was a UN strategy to draw them beyond the reach of their supply lines and to encircle them, as had happened after Inchon.



A helicopter being used to evacuate wounded soldiers. The Korean War was the first time that helicopters were used extensively for transportation in wartime.

Stage 5: The war of attrition

Seoul was re-taken (for the third time in this war) on 15 March 1951 when Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway was appointed to command the US Eighth Army and his leadership, along with a halt in the Chinese advance, allowed some ground to be retaken. The mobile war, as it had been so far, now became one of attrition, known by the US soldiers as the '*meatgrinder*' (Malkasian). The UN forces once again advanced




General Douglas MacArthur (front right seat) on 3 April 1951, shortly before his dismissal. Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway, who would take over command of the US Eighth Army, is seated behind him.

past the 38th parallel but this time there was no plan to push back to the Yalu River, even had circumstances allowed.

The Commander-in-Chief of the UN forces, General MacArthur, still plotted to widen the war. Truman had had enough of MacArthur's insubordination but support for him in the US Congress made it difficult for the President to call for his dismissal, especially as the President needed congressional support for his plan to send more US troops to Europe (Friedman). Knowing of this plan, MacArthur wrote to Congressman Joseph Martin stating that Truman had '*failed in Korea*' and wanted to divert attention to Europe, but by doing this, MacArthur gave Truman the ammunition he needed to say that MacArthur had overstepped the mark and shown a lack of respect for the office of the President (Friedman). MacArthur lost support and on 11 April 1951 he was removed from his command. Meanwhile in Korea, both sides '*dug in*', with the front line established just north of the 38th parallel. This is where it would remain until the **armistice** was signed in 1953.

Activity 7

ATL Research and thinking skills



A cartoon showing President Truman (HST) and Secretary of State Dean Acheson (State Department) and General Omar Bradley (Pentagon) in the 'frying pan' being heated by the 'fire' of public opinion beneath the pan.

1. What is the message of the cartoon?
2. When it was being fought, the Korean War was known in the US as 'Truman's War'. Later, it became known as the 'Forgotten War'. How far do you think slogans such as these influence public opinion? Can you think of slogans used at the present time to gain support for political campaigns or for conflicts that countries may be involved in?

Stage 6: Ceasefire and peace talks

The UN called for a ceasefire in January 1951 when the UN forces were pushed back south of the 38th parallel. On 11 January, a UN resolution was proposed for:

- an immediate ceasefire
- gradual withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea
- a meeting of the four powers (US, USSR, China and Britain) to settle problems such as Taiwan and the discussion of PRC representation in the UN (Chen).

This was problematic for the US, because if it supported the resolution it would have to face *'the loss of the Koreans and the fury of Congress and the press'* (Chen), while opposing it might lose US support in the United Nations. Ultimately, it did support the resolution, assuming quite correctly that China would reject any peace settlement that did not immediately give them a seat in the UN and require that all foreign troops immediately leave Korea and Taiwan (Chen). Meanwhile, it was apparent that military victory was unlikely for either side as this would require an escalation that would almost certainly end in the use of nuclear weapons.

On 1 February 1951, the US sponsored a UN resolution to condemn China's involvement in Korea and, after much discussion, it was passed by the General Assembly. It named China as an aggressor and called for its withdrawal from Korea, as well as asking that member states of the UN continue to support UN forces in Korea. Naming China as an aggressor was considered risky by many UN delegates and this reflects the very careful **diplomacy** that was required to think through the implications of every action in case the war should escalate.

Another Chinese offensive was launched in April 1951, but there was no victory in sight. Peace talks were proposed and George Kennan was asked by Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, to meet in secret with Jacob Malik, the Soviet Ambassador to the UN (Costigliola). In his diary, Kennan described this meeting in detail; they discussed the withdrawal of all foreign troops, which Kennan considered enormously risky as it would lead to a renewal of a civil war. In his summary of the meeting, Kennan concluded:

“ ... a high degree of Kremlin influence will be reflected in any discussions that representatives of those two regimes [North Korea and China] may conduct and it will be up to us to figure out where one thing begins and the other thing ends.

Frank Costigliola (ed.) (2014). *The Kennan Diaries: George F Kennan*. Norton & Co., p. 293.

Activity 8



Thinking and communication skills

Read through the extract quoted above and answer the questions that follow. The extract is taken from the published diaries of George Kennan. He was not a State Department official at this time, but was working as an academic in Princeton University, so he was what we could call a 'back channel' to the Soviet ambassador to the UN. This means that he was able to meet secretly to discuss a possible ceasefire, but in a way that was unofficial.

1. What do you think was the benefit of a 'back-channel' meeting?
2. Can you find out about another time when this was carried out (check the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962)?
3. How reliable do you think published diaries are as sources for historians? What would be their value and limitations?

Ceasefire negotiations began in Kaesong in June 1951. This location within Communist-held territory proved problematic, with several serious incidents including armed Chinese 'mistakenly' entering Kaesong in August; a Chinese platoon leader was shot and it was claimed that a UN plane had bombed the site (Chen). The talks were then called off, before resuming in Panmunjom on 25 October 1951 (Chen).

China continued to insist on a seat in the United Nations and an end to US support for Taiwan. Other obstacles to peace also remained.

- Both North Korea and China were prepared to drag out the war indefinitely to secure their demands, knowing public opinion in the US was already tiring of a long, drawn-out war.
- Syngman Rhee was still looking to reunify Korea under his leadership and did not want to support any peace deal that prevented this.
- Prisoners of war (POWs) were held by both sides, but many of those held in the south did not want to return home. Lowe states that the US was aware of this problem but even they greatly underestimated the numbers who did not want to leave South Korea, suggesting that only around 5,000 out of 21,000 Chinese; 54,000 out of 96,000 North Koreans; 4,000 out of 15,000 South Koreans and 7,500 out of 38,000 civilians wished to go back either to China or North Korea. The Chinese delegates vehemently denied this and blamed the US for having 'indoctrinated' the POWs in their camps. There were also disputes over the number of POWs in custody. The US claimed that only 25 per cent of US MIAs (Missing in Action) were on the lists. North Korea and China also claimed that 44,000 names on previous lists were now missing. In January 1952, the US proposed voluntary repatriation and those who did not want to return home would be released, on condition they did not bear arms again in the conflict (Chen).
- On 28 April 1952, one of the negotiators for China, Li Kenong, pointed out:

“The Truman administration might not want to end the war at this moment for two reasons: first, in a presidential election year Truman was concerned that a soft appearance might jeopardize the Democratic Party's electoral position; second, in order to increase military expenditures in the 1953 budget, the Korean War had to be continued.
Jian Chen (2001). *Mao's China and the Cold War*. University of North Carolina Press, p. 109.

The peace talks dragged on with no resolution, despite attempts by India to intervene as an 'honest broker' and to offer suggestions on how the POW impasse could be resolved.

This photograph, taken in 1956, shows ex-prisoners of war, who had been given asylum in India, choosing to relocate to Brazil. They are being addressed here by the Brazilian Ambassador in Delhi.



President Eisenhower: 'I will go to Korea'

The presidential election in 1952 was fought between Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic candidate, and Dwight Eisenhower, the Republican candidate, hero of the Second World War and first military commander of NATO. During his campaign, Eisenhower promised that he would go to Korea to assess the situation for himself and, with his military experience, this pledge suggested to the voters that he could end the war. The Republican victory, after 20 years of Democrats in the White House, was overwhelming.

It was not only in the US, however, that there was a change of leadership. Stalin suffered a debilitating stroke and died a few days later, on 5 March 1953.

Although there had been a constitutional amendment to prevent presidents from serving over 10 years in office, Truman was excluded from this as the amendment had been passed during his presidency. In Chapter 1 you can see how the war in Korea impacted Truman's popularity and that of the Democratic Party. The level of dissatisfaction with the war in Korea harmed Adlai Stevenson's campaign and boosted that of Dwight Eisenhower – the Republican candidate whose military career resonated with the voters, many of whom thought he was better suited to deal with a conflict that seemed intractable.

Eisenhower won in 39 states and received 55.2 per cent of the popular vote. Truman had not thought much of Stevenson's chances as a presidential candidate, having said in November 1951 that he hoped the Democratic Party would 'be smart enough to select someone who could win'. He explained that he did not think that the voters would choose an 'Ivy Leaguer' who had graduated from Princeton.

Eisenhower believed that it was his threat to use the atom bomb in Korea that finally ended the war, 'When asked years later why the Chinese accepted an armistice in Korea, Eisenhower responded bluntly: "Danger of atomic war"' (Gaddis). Gaddis counters this, however, by pointing out that while the war was still being fought, there was little talk of using the atomic bomb and that this came during and after the armistice. Furthermore, the Chinese later claimed that they had never been aware of US threats to use the bomb in Korea. Gaddis concludes, 'Why, then, did the Korean War end? Because Stalin died, or so it now appears', stating that Stalin had been in no hurry to end the war and that it was the Soviet Council of Ministers who, after his death, indicated that there should now be a change of policy and that they were ready to make peace, conveying their decision to China.

The armistice

On 27 July 1953, an **armistice** was signed at Panmunjom. The signatories of the armistice were the two military leaders who had attended the talks. General Nam Il represented the Chinese-Korean force and General William Harrison, the UN forces. Neither Kim Il-sung nor Syngman Rhee were present.

The terms of the armistice stated that all hostilities would cease and that a 4 km-wide demilitarized zone (DMZ) would be established along the border between North and South Korea. You can see from the map below that the armistice line did not quite follow the 38th parallel. Also known as the Kansas Line, the border was now drawn along the last point of contact between the two enemy forces. Other terms of the armistice included the exchange of all prisoners of war and that a peace conference should commence within three months of the signing of the armistice. The talks were meant to lead to a peace treaty but, as of 2017, this still has never taken place.



A button badge distributed to supporters of Eisenhower during the 1952 presidential campaign. 'I like Ike' became a famous slogan. In 1956, the same badge would read, 'I still like Ike!'

The Korean War armistice

Find the Wilson Center Digital Archive online, and search for 'Korean War armistice'. The site provides a wealth of primary sources regarding the armistice negotiations between 1950 and 1953.


A map of Korea showing the armistice line.

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

ATL

Thinking and research skills

The Korean War was also known in later years as the 'Forgotten War'. Why do you think it was forgotten and how is it remembered today in the United States? Carry out some research to answer these questions.



Key concepts:

Results and significance

2.5

Diplomatic and political outcomes of the war

The Korean War meant that by the end of his second term Truman had lost popularity, and even though he wanted to serve a third term in office, he did not get beyond the primaries. His failure to end the war decisively gave a boost to the Republican candidate, Dwight Eisenhower, who named 'Korea, Communism and Corruption' as the three weaknesses of the Democratic administration. This was also known by the formula 'K1C2' (Smith).

The Korean War was the first to be fought by a US army that was not racially segregated. The policy of racial segregation in the armed forces officially ended in 1948, but it was slow to be put into practice and it was not until 1952 that black soldiers were allowed to fight alongside white soldiers in the US Marine Corps. Undoubtedly, this had an impact on the civil rights movement in the United States which picked up considerable momentum in the 1950s.

Nuclear weapons were not used in Korea because of the risks of setting off a third world war. As Gaddis explains, *'The gap between the power of such weapons and their practical applications was so great as to render them useless...'*, although he also argues that without them, the Korean War would not have stayed limited. Mao described the A-bomb as a *'paper tiger'*, meaning that it looked more threatening than it actually was, but Khrushchev argued that this was sheer bravado as Mao was *'afraid of war'*. Eisenhower, knowing the huge gap between the number of nuclear weapons that the US possessed in relation to the few in the possession of the Soviet Union, claimed that

even the Soviet leadership must be 'scared as hell' (Gaddis). This gives us an interesting perspective on nuclear weapons, which held the world in thrall during the Cold War, but may have been more useful as a deterrent as long as they were never used.

Military strategy was influenced by the US experience in Korea. On becoming President in 1953, Eisenhower asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to suggest ways in which defence costs could be reduced and a consensus emerged that the build-up of nuclear weapons would be a cheaper and more effective deterrent than a large conventional army. This was known as the 'New Look' policy and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced in January 1954 that the US response to further Soviet aggression would be '*massive nuclear retaliation at a time and place of our choosing*' (Friedman). This strategy was known as 'brinkmanship' and meant that a crisis would be escalated by the US until the Soviet Union backed down or took the huge risk of a nuclear war. Astonishingly, the Eisenhower administration adopted this strategy without knowing, fortunately for the US, that it did indeed have superior nuclear capability. (You can read more about this in Chapter 3.)

The creation of SEATO (the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) in 1954 was an extension of the policy of containment intended to provide security that would be equivalent to that offered by NATO to Western Europe. Furthermore, West Germany joined NATO in 1955 and, in response, the Soviet Union formed the **Warsaw Pact**. In this way, the Korean War led to a strengthening of military alliances and further preparation for what seemed an increasingly likely future stand-off between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Activity 9

ATL Research, communication and thinking skills



The Korean War memorial in Washington DC. It shows a platoon on patrol and was completed in 1995.

1. Find out what this memorial is meant to represent. The Korean War ended in 1953, why did it take so long, do you think, to build a memorial to the soldiers who died? As an additional task, see if you can find more about this memorial and what it consists of.
2. Do some research on other war memorials, either in your own country or in the United States. Compare them to each other and discuss how they are similar and how they are different. What do they tell us about why and how wars are remembered? You could consider the following questions:
 - Are some wars remembered more triumphantly than others?
 - Do countries remember wars they lost?
 - Is memorializing some wars considered to be politically incorrect?
 - What do war memorials tell us about the societies that built them?

Key concepts:

Causation, consequence and significance

2.6

What was the Canadian involvement in the Korean War?

Following the end of the Second World War, Canada had reduced the size of its military and focused on the defence of its own borders. According to the Canadian military website, the army was now limited to 'three parachute battalions, two armoured regiments, a regular regiment of field artillery and a few basic supporting units such as signals and engineers'. In other words, Canada could not send many troops to Korea without leaving its own borders weakly defended. The first contribution to the UN force was three naval destroyers, the *Cayuga*, *Sioux* and the *Athabaskan* and an air force squadron of transport planes that flew between Washington and Tokyo. In addition, Canadian pilots flew missions with the United States Air Force. This initial contribution later increased as it became clear that the Korean War would not end soon.

The Canadian Army Special Force (CASF)

As Korea demonstrated, the United Nations could be called upon to send an army into zones of conflict and the CASF was set up as a volunteer force to enable Canada to contribute to such peacemaking actions. Shortly after the Inchon landings had turned the tide in Korea, it seemed that there would be a quick victory for the UN forces and that the Canadian contribution would be quite limited. Troops from the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade (**Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry** or PPCLI) were sent to train in the US to form part of the post-war occupation of Korea. These troops were shipped from Seattle to Korea in November 1950, arriving a month later when the tide of war had turned once again and the Chinese onslaught had pushed the UN forces back beyond the 38th parallel. The Canadians then became part of the 27th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade, fighting alongside British, Australian and New Zealand troops as well as a medical unit from India.

The Battle of Kap'yong

The Battle of Kap'yong took place in February 1951 with British, Australian, New Zealand and Canadian forces holding the line against a force of 6,000 Chinese soldiers. US presidential citations were awarded for the remarkable resilience and show of bravery.

In February 1951, a decision was made to send additional forces to Korea and the remainder of the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade was dispatched. On its arrival in May, it too joined the 27th Commonwealth Infantry Brigade. We can see how Canadian participation in Korea increased significantly, as early hopes of a quick victory were shattered in what became a war of attrition. Overall, Canada sent over 26,000 troops to Korea, forming the third largest contingent of the UN army.

Princess Patricia was the daughter of the Duke of Connaught and the granddaughter of Queen Victoria. As a young woman, the princess lived in Canada from 1911–16 when her father was Governor General. Popular with the Canadian public, she was appointed Colonel-in-Chief of **Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry**.



2.7

What was the involvement of Latin America in the Korean War?

In an attempt to obtain Latin American assistance in the Korean War, the US requested the Organization of American States (OAS) to declare North Korea an aggressor and join the war. However, only Colombia agreed to send troops to fight in Korea.

You have previously read about Latin American countries questioning the Truman administration's reluctance to contribute to the economic development of the region. For example, in 1946 and 1947 US Congress did not approve military aid packages to Latin America because the region was not considered to be under the direct threat of communist expansion. The refusal of Latin American countries to engage in the Korean War in support of the US confirmed that Truman's foreign policy had led to the deterioration of inter-American relations. You may therefore wonder why Colombia agreed to provide troops for Korea. By joining the war, it aimed to promote a closer relationship to gain US political and economic support. The war also presented Colombia with an opportunity to train its armed forces and to obtain US military assistance. This was of particular importance at the time, since President Laureano Gómez faced strong criticisms for having enforced cuts in the national defence budget. Finally, the war could serve to distract the population's attention from internal political problems.

Between 1951 and 1954, Colombia contributed both military and naval forces. In that period, 5,100 soldiers were deployed to Korea. The battalions, formed by volunteers, fought as support to US infantry divisions. The country also sent naval support. The role of Colombian forces in the fighting was praiseworthy. For example, at the Battle of Old Baldy in 1953 they contributed to preventing the Chinese forces breaking the lines of resistance.

Brazil recognized the government of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and also supported US condemnation of the People's Republic of China. However, it did not offer military assistance. The refusal to fight in the war came as a surprise. The US counted on Brazil's example to influence other Latin American nations to join. In February 1951, Truman sent Assistant Secretary Miller in person to negotiate terms for Brazilian participation. But, having to finance the war, the US could only offer Brazil limited resources. When justifying their refusal to join, the Brazilian Foreign Minister said:

“Brazilian present position would be different and our cooperation in the present emergency could be probably greater if Washington had elaborated a recovery plan for Latin America similar to the Marshall Plan for Europe.

Stephen G Rabe (2011). *The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America*. OUP, p. 34.

However, after the outbreak of the Korean War, the US approved a Military Security Program for Latin America and signed bilateral mutual assistance treaties with several countries in the region. Among other clauses, these treaties offered strategic materials to the US in exchange for military equipment and services.

Key concepts:

Significance and perspective

2.8 Overview

This chapter has given an overview of the Korean War from its outbreak in 1950 to its outcome in 1953. We have seen why the US chose to extend its policy of containment to Asia, a decision it made in response to what it perceived as a Moscow-backed invasion of South Korea. The war was a long, drawn-out conflict, lasting far longer than either side anticipated. In some ways it can be compared to the Vietnam War, as both drew in superpower involvement, with the US once again sending troops to Asia and becoming embroiled in a conflict that failed to maintain the support of the US public.

When you have read the chapter on Vietnam, you could draw up a list of comparisons and contrasts between the different aspects of these two wars.

Activity 10

ATL Thinking, communication and research skills

When we want to describe different types of wars, we can use the following terminology:

- a limited war
- a total war
- a proxy war
- a civil war
- a guerrilla war
- a conventional war.

1. Define each of these terms and then decide how far you could use each one to describe the war in Korea. Support your answers with knowledge from this chapter.
2. When you have completed this task, find examples of other wars that would fit each of your definitions. Justify your choice of wars and discuss them with the class.


Essay writing

Answer the following exam-style essay question:

'The United States participated in the Korean War because it wanted to uphold the authority of the United Nations.' To what extent do you agree with this assertion?

Your first task is to look at the command term – in this case, it is 'to what extent'. This means that you need to read the assertion carefully and think about how far it can be considered an accurate judgement. You then need to consider whether or not you agree. In this case, would you agree that the US participated in the Korean War because it wanted to support the UN? Or would you argue that it may have been partly for this reason, but other factors may also have been as, or more, important?

Do not be afraid to disagree with an assertion like this one. Remember that there is no correct answer to a question like this. This question is asking about the reasons for US involvement, so you could begin by reading through the relevant parts of this chapter and perhaps do some additional reading. After you have gathered together the relevant facts, you can then plan your answer before you start to write.



03

Eisenhower and Dulles

Eisenhower chats informally with John Foster Dulles in New York in June 1952, before Eisenhower had officially announced his campaign to run for President.

This chapter will examine the policy of the Eisenhower administration (1953–61) known as the 'New Look'. It will consider the nature of this policy and how it was applied. There are also case studies of the Berlin Crisis of 1958–60, as well as Guatemala in 1954. We will investigate the following topics: What was the New Look? How did it change US foreign and defence policy? How was Eisenhower's New Look different from Truman's Containment?

Essay questions:

- To what extent was Eisenhower's application of the New Look policy a success?
- Evaluate the claim that the New Look policy was introduced mainly for economic reasons.
- Examine the repercussions for the Americas of Eisenhower and Dulles's New Look policy.

Timeline

1953	20 Jan	Eisenhower is sworn in as the 34th President of the United States. He defeats Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic candidate, by winning 55 per cent of the vote
	5 March	Josef Stalin, the leader of the Soviet Union, dies in Moscow
	27 July	The Korean War comes to an end and an armistice is signed at Panmunjom. A demilitarized zone is set up and prisoners of war exchanged.
	19–22 Aug	A CIA-led coup in Tehran overthrows the government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh
	8 Dec	At the United Nations in New York, Eisenhower delivers his 'Atoms for Peace' speech to promote the peaceful development of nuclear energy
1954	8 May– 21 July	The Geneva Conference is held to discuss peacemaking in Korea but the focus turns to Indochina when the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu falls on 7 May. The Geneva Accords temporarily divide Vietnam at the 17th parallel with the proviso that elections to unify the country be held in 1956
	June	Operation PBSUCCESS overthrows President Jacobo Árbenz in Guatemala
	8 Sep	The Southeast Asia Defence Treaty (SEATO) is signed
1955	28 Jan	Congress gives its approval to US forces being available, if necessary, to defend Taiwan (Republic of China) against communist aggression
	7 Feb	The Chinese Offshore Islands crisis ends with the US Seventh Fleet assisting in the evacuation of the Tachen Islands
	15 May	The 'Big Four' foreign ministers (USSR, US, Britain and France) sign the Austrian State Treaty restoring sovereignty to Austria and ending its post-war occupation
	18–23 July	A Four-Power Summit conference is held in Geneva; Eisenhower proposes a plan known as 'Open Skies' to allow inspection flights over US and Soviet military installations



1956	19 July	After hearing of the purchase of arms from Czechoslovakia by the Egyptian government, the United States says it will no longer help finance the construction of the Aswan Dam in Egypt. This leads to President Nasser announcing the nationalization by Egypt of the Suez Canal
	Oct–Nov	Suez Canal Crisis. At a secret meeting in Sèvres, France, between the Foreign Ministers of France, Britain and Israel, it is planned that Israel will invade the Sinai Peninsula and British and French forces will attack Egyptian bases around the Suez Canal. Eisenhower strongly criticizes this and condemns the actions of Britain and France The Hungarian Uprising demands greater independence from the Eastern Bloc and for Hungary to leave the Warsaw Pact. This is suppressed by Soviet armed forces
1957	9 March	The Eisenhower Doctrine Bill is signed. This authorizes US forces to assist any allies if they are threatened by Communist aggression. It is intended to apply specifically to the Middle East
	29 July	The United States ratifies the establishment of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) to share atomic resources for peaceful use
	19 Sep	The first underground nuclear test takes place in Nevada
	4 Oct	Sputnik, the Soviet satellite, is launched. This leads to concerns that the US is being left behind in the technological race and to pressure to catch up with the Soviet Union in the areas of defence and technology
1958	31 Jan	Explorer I, the first American satellite, is launched
	15 July	Due to concerns about infiltration from the UAR (the United Arab Republic that was composed of Egypt and Syria) and in response to a request from President Camille Chamoun, Eisenhower orders US Marines into Lebanon
	29 July	Eisenhower signs a bill establishing NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration)
	Nov 1958– May 1959	Khrushchev states that he intends to sign a peace treaty with East Germany to hand over control of Berlin to East Germany. He demands that the US, Britain and France also withdraw their forces from West Berlin
1959	1 Jan	In Cuba, Fidel Castro's guerrilla forces overthrow the Batista regime and take power
	15–27 Sep	Khrushchev makes an official visit to the United States
1960	1 May	A U-2 reconnaissance plane is shot down over the Soviet Union and its pilot, Gary Powers, is taken prisoner
	16 May	The Paris Summit meeting barely starts before it ends when Khrushchev demands an apology from President Eisenhower for authorizing the U-2 flights
	8 Nov	In the US presidential election, Senator John F Kennedy, the Democratic candidate, defeats the Republican candidate, Vice President Richard M Nixon
1961	17 Jan	President Eisenhower delivers his Farewell Address to the Nation. In his speech, he warns of the social and economic dangers linked to the emergence of what he calls the ' <i>military-industrial complex</i> '

Key concepts:

Causation and consequence

3.1 Introduction

President Truman had approached Eisenhower in 1952 and told him that if he would agree to run as a Democratic candidate, then Truman would not stand for re-election (Jean Edward Smith). After much persuasion by General Lucius Clay, however, Eisenhower agreed to run as a Republican. His choice of party was influenced by his having voted only once (after he had retired from the army in 1948) when he had supported Thomas Dewey, the Republican candidate. Both Democrats and Republicans wanted Eisenhower as their nominee as his status as a military hero would gain a lot of votes, especially when the United States was trying to bring the Korean War to an end.

In January 1953, at the age of 62, Dwight Eisenhower was sworn into office as the 34th President of the United States. He had graduated from West Point in 1915 and retired as a five-star general. He had an illustrious army career having been Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in Europe during the Second World War and appointed the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) of NATO in 1950. Having just retired from the US army, in 1948, Eisenhower had been approached as a possible contender for the presidency even though his political views were largely unknown. Both Democrats and Republicans viewed him as a possible nominee but he declined to run. In 1952, when Truman's second term was about to end, Eisenhower was again approached by both parties and, this time, was persuaded to stand as the Republican candidate.

Once in office, the main challenge for Eisenhower was to end the war in Korea. During the election campaign, he had said he would 'go to Korea', and this assurance from a very experienced military officer gained him many votes from Americans who were tired of the long, drawn-out conflict that seemed interminable. (For more information on Korea, see Chapter 2).

Eisenhower kept his promise and, as President-elect, even before being sworn into office, visited UN troops in Korea where his son, John, was also serving. Eisenhower later claimed that it was his threat to use the A-bomb that brought an end to the Korean War. According to Gaddis, when the Chinese had finally agreed to an armistice, Eisenhower answered that it was because of the 'danger of an atomic war'. This belief in the importance of nuclear threats was to have a considerable impact upon Eisenhower's policy to defend the United States in the nuclear age.

By the mid-1950s, the Cold War was global and although the threat of war in Europe was still the main concern, there was also fear of the expansion of communism in Asia. In 1946, war had broken out in **Indochina** where France was trying to retain its hold over Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam (known collectively as Indochina) and the British were also facing a challenge from ethnic Chinese Communists in Malay. This led to the outbreak of the Malayan Emergency in 1948. In both conflicts, China was known to have played a role in supporting the Communist forces and, among the Western powers, it was believed that behind China lay the influence and support of the Soviet Union.

With regard to **Indochina**, the French requested aid from the United States but Eisenhower did not want to send in US troops. Instead, the Pentagon was authorized to draw up a plan for Operation Vulture which would involve aerial attacks on Vietminh positions. This included a proposal to drop two or three atom bombs and, reflecting on this later, the Air Force Chief of Staff General Nathan Twining said:

“ You could take all day to drop a bomb, make sure you put it in the right place. No opposition. Clean all those Commies out of there and the band could play the 'Marseillaise' and the French would be marching out of Dien Bien Phu in fine shape. And those Commies would say, 'Well, those guys may do this again to us. We'd better be careful.' ”

Quoted in Oliver Stone and Peter Kuznick (2012). *The Untold History of the United States*. Ebury Publishing, p. 267.



Eisenhower now had to decide how the United States should respond, if at all, to such threats to its security and its role in the world. In particular, Eisenhower was determined that the United States should not get involved in another war like the one it had fought in Korea.

Events in the Middle East were also of concern to the Eisenhower administration. For example, Iran had become troublesome to the United States when its Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, called for the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry, so ending its control by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. This seriously threatened British interests and there were rumours that Mosaddegh was a **socialist** or even a communist. In 1953, a coup organized by the CIA was carried out to remove Mosaddegh from office and to replace his government with one supporting Shah Mohammed Reza, the young ruler of Iran who was, in turn, supported by the United States.

As we can see, for Eisenhower, combatting the spread of communism and ensuring the security of the United States were to prove formidable tasks and these would dominate the foreign policy of his administration. The following chapter will provide an overview of his major policy initiative that was known as the New Look, a name chosen to emphasize the change from the Truman era and putting in place new strategies more relevant for the 1950s. As you read through it, consider what might be the dangers of changing foreign policy. How far do you think the dangers inherent in the Cold War require a degree of stability? Was it important for each superpower to feel they had some grasp of how the other would respond to a crisis, for example, or how likely they were to use nuclear weapons? Or was it important to maintain an element of uncertainty, to prevent your adversary from knowing how you would respond?

Key concepts: Significance, change and continuity

3.2 The New Look policy

Characteristics

In this section, we will look at the way in which President Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, shifted US defence policy away from the massive build-up of conventional forces outlined in NSC-68 and towards a leaner, less expensive policy known as the New Look. In the chapter on Korea, you will have seen how President Truman believed that the United States had to increase the military budget massively to ensure that it had the capability to intervene anywhere in the world if need be, to support the containment of communism. Eisenhower did not end the policy of containment, but he did try a new, less expensive approach.

We will ask and answer the following questions.

- What was the New Look?
- What were the reasons for this change in policy?

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

Research and thinking skills



Working in pairs, see if you can come up with several reasons why President Eisenhower might have decided to avoid future US involvement in conflicts like the Korean War.



John Foster Dulles leaving the UN building in New York. He is waving a copy of the 'Atoms for Peace' speech that President Eisenhower had just delivered to the General Assembly in September 1954.

Significant individual: John Foster Dulles

A lawyer by profession, who had attended the Reparation Hearings at the Paris Peace Conference in 1920, John Foster Dulles was chosen by President Eisenhower to be his Secretary of State. Known for his determination that communism should not only be contained but '*rolled back*', Dulles supported President Eisenhower's aim to reduce defence spending by cutting the size of the military and building up US nuclear capability. He was diagnosed with cancer in 1956 and died in May 1959, only one month after his illness had forced him to resign as Secretary of State. His brother, Allen Dulles, was head of the CIA.

What was the New Look policy?

Eisenhower's new defence policy had three main aims:

- to build up the US nuclear arsenal and to keep the peace by threatening massive retaliation against the Soviet Union if it attempted to expand communism
- to use covert operations to undermine any threat to Western power and influence
- to build up alliances to ensure the safety of US allies.

What were the reasons for this new policy?

Economic concerns about overspending on defence

Primarily, Eisenhower believed that the US economy could not sustain continual increases in the defence budget. He realized that the US and the USSR were now in an **arms race** and that the Cold War was not a short-term phenomenon, but it could last until the end of the 20th century. The costs of maintaining the security of the US and its allies would increase exponentially (meaning it would go up by ever increasing amounts) and the US economy would not be able to cope with this. President Truman had believed that huge increases in spending on arms and the armed forces, as outlined in NSC-68, would have a positive impact on the US economy because government orders for arms, supplies for the army, battleships, aircraft and so on would create jobs and boost private business. Eisenhower disagreed and thought that huge government investment in the military would be bad for the economy and, eventually, would impoverish the US to the extent that it could no longer play its role as a superpower.

Truman raised taxes to fund the military and Eisenhower believed that he would have to raise taxes further and that inflation would also be a problem if the government invested so much in defence. The consequences would be far-reaching, affecting society as well as the economy.

In 1953, Eisenhower gave a speech in which he stated, '*Every gun that is made, every war ship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and not clothed*' (quoted in Levine and Papatotiriou). He argued that a strong, economically prosperous United States would demonstrate the advantages of **capitalism**, just as a weak economy unable to provide a good standard of living and unable to aid allies would make the spread of communism more likely.

Massive retaliation and brinkmanship

Eisenhower wanted to keep the United States secure, but to do so on a tight budget, and it was much cheaper to invest in nuclear bombs than in conventional forces. As Jean Edward Smith stated in his biography of Eisenhower, the President was fully supported by Dulles, who spoke to the Council of Foreign Relations in January 1954, saying that the New Look would improve the security of the United States 'by placing more reliance on deterrent power, and less dependence on local defensive power'. Dulles explained that the United States would no longer be drawn in to conflicts where the location and the timing was chosen by the enemy but, instead, prevent wars happening by 'depend[ing] primarily upon a capacity to retaliate instantly, by means and at places of our choosing' (Smith). This became known as the doctrine of 'massive retaliation'.

In other words, the message being sent to the Soviet Union was that any provocation might result in a massive thermonuclear response from the United States. This approach also became known as 'brinkmanship' because, in essence, 'it meant that the United States would deliberately escalate a crisis to the point where the Soviets would have to choose between backing down and risking incineration' (Friedman).

To stop the expansion of the armed forces

Convinced that the escalating cost of maintaining a bigger army, navy and air force was unsustainable, Eisenhower also thought that greater military capacity would make it more likely that the United States would intervene in conflicts, such as Korea, simply because it could. Eisenhower aimed to reduce the size of the army from 1.5 million to 1 million soldiers.

There was opposition to cutbacks, however. The Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces objected because they wanted to increase the budgets for their own services and they were supported by what Eisenhower would call the 'military-industrial complex'. This referred to the arms industries that prospered because of the Cold War and benefited from the need for increasing sums to be spent on the armed forces.

Activity 1



Thinking, self-management and research skills

Speaking to a national radio and television audience on 19 May 1953, Eisenhower said:

“ Our defence policy must be one we can bear for a long and indefinite period of time. It cannot consist of sudden, blind responses to a series of fire alarm emergencies'. The United States could not prepare to meet every contingency, said Ike. That would require a total mobilisation that would, 'devote our whole nation to the grim purposes of the garrison state. This, I firmly believe, is not the way to defend America.' ”

Quoted in Jean Edward Smith (2013). *Eisenhower in War and Peace*. Random House, p. 641.

1. What did Eisenhower mean by 'blind responses to a series of fire alarm emergencies'? Can you think of some possible examples?
2. What was meant, do you think, by 'a garrison state'? How would this link to Eisenhower's concerns about the 'military-industrial complex'?

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

Thinking and communication skills



Does the policy of 'deliberately escalating a crisis' seem a reasonable basis for US foreign policy at this time? What would be the risks of doing this? What were the benefits?

In a group, consider the pros and cons of 'massive retaliation' versus 'the build-up of conventional forces'. Discuss your opinions with the class.

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

ATL

Research and communication skills

Working in pairs, go through the reasons given for the New Look policy and discuss to what extent this represented a change in US foreign policy.

Eisenhower's rejection of Truman's approach to containment

Although Eisenhower supported the policy of preventing the expansion of communism, he believed that under Truman it had been too passive and the United States had always responded to Soviet expansionism, instead of ensuring that it did not happen in the first place.

Activity 2

ATL

Research, thinking and self-management skills

Read the extract and then answer the questions that follow.

“Eisenhower was convinced that containment, as it developed under Truman, was incoherent and immorally passive. According to the General's calculations, the Truman strategy had allowed 100 million people a year to slip under Communist control. As a student of strategy, Eisenhower believed in the value of the initiative, and felt that Truman had surrendered it.

Dr Steven Metz (1993). *Eisenhower as Strategist: The Coherent Use of Military Power in War and Peace*.

1. Why do you think Eisenhower considered containment to be 'immorally passive'?
2. Having read about containment in earlier chapters in this book, would you agree with Eisenhower's judgement? Support your answer with evidence.

US and Soviet nuclear capability: massive retaliation

The Soviet Union exploded its first A-bomb in 1949 and in August 1953 it tested its first 400-kiloton hydrogen bomb, known as the H-bomb. The US had already tested its first hydrogen bomb (named 'Mike') in November 1952 and had not expected the Soviet Union to catch up quite so rapidly. The H-bomb was a thermonuclear device and tremendously more powerful than the A-bomb.

Both superpowers were now on the brink of an era when they could not only destroy each other but also make the planet uninhabitable. This certainty of devastation is what lay behind what became known as Eisenhower and Dulles's policy of 'massive retaliation'. They made it known to the Soviet Union that the response of the United States to any provocation would not be a limited proxy war, as had been fought in Korea, but a thermonuclear strike that would destroy the Soviet Union. The logic (if we can call it that) behind this strategy was that no one with common sense would take the risk. Having experienced the Second World War and its consequences in Europe, Eisenhower was determined that the US should not get into another war.

Eisenhower also made it clear that he would be prepared to carry out a **first-strike attack** if he had firm knowledge of a planned attack on the West. Furthermore, in 1954, when Eisenhower was asked by a reporter if he would consider using **tactical nuclear weapons**, he responded:

“Yes of course they would be used. In any combat where these things can be used on strictly military targets and for strictly military purposes, I see no reason why they shouldn't be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.

Quoted in Oliver Stone and Peter Kuznick (2012). *The Untold History of the United States*. Ebury Publishing, p. 255.

A first-strike attack

This means that instead of waiting to be attacked, a nuclear power would be the first to use nuclear weapons. A very controversial policy, this meant that the leader was prepared to start a nuclear war. However, to say that you would never be prepared to launch a first strike would tend to undermine the deterrent value of having nuclear weapons.

Tactical nuclear weapons

These were typically smaller nuclear weapons intended to be used on a battlefield.

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

ATL

Research and self-management skills

A hydrogen bomb test was carried out in the Pacific by the US on 1 March 1954. However problems arose when the wind direction changed, blowing radioactive dust towards the Marshall Islands and contaminating Lucky Dragon No. 5, a Japanese fishing trawler that was returning to port with its catch.

Working in a group, see what you can find out about the impact of this test on:

- the Marshall Islanders
- Japan
- world opinion towards the US.

Share your findings with the class.

Key concept: Consequence

3.3

What was the impact of the New Look policy?

The arms race goes ballistic

It was not only Eisenhower who was determined to shift away from the expense of conventional forces and move to building a nuclear arsenal. Nikita Khrushchev, the leader of the Soviet Union, was developing a policy – also known as the New Look.

Significant individual: Nikita Khrushchev

When Josef Stalin died in 1953, Khrushchev was appointed General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Stalin was meant to be succeeded by not one leader but a 'collective leadership'. However, Khrushchev maneuvered his way into becoming both General Secretary and Prime Minister by 1958. He was an ebullient and rather unpredictable leader who, nevertheless, looked for improved relations with the West. He was invited on an official visit to the United States in 1959 and, famously, was dismayed by being unable to visit Disneyland because of the security risks. In 1964, he was summoned to a meeting of the *Politburo* where he was told that he must now retire. The reasons given were that he had put the Soviet Union at risk because of his reckless foreign policy and that his domestic policies had failed. He spent the rest of his life at his *dacha* (country house) outside Moscow and died of heart failure in 1970.

The two leaders, Eisenhower and Khrushchev, met in 1955 for the Four-Power Summit held in Geneva. This was the first of several summits and it was organized to discuss the situation in Berlin that was growing tenser. Eisenhower also wanted to propose his idea for 'Open Skies', as this would allow both superpowers to keep an eye on each other's nuclear arms production and so, in theory, introduce some control on what was now an arms race (Gaddis).



Nikita Khrushchev on a tour of San Francisco when he visited the US in 1959.



Sputnik being prepared for launch in 1957.

The launching by the Soviet Union of Sputnik in 1957 was the next step that truly unnerved the United States. Although this first satellite to be launched into space did no more than 'beep' as it orbited the earth, it demonstrated that the Soviet Union could launch a rocket carrying a satellite into outer space and therefore could also launch a rocket carrying a nuclear warhead.

This was the start of the technology that would produce ballistic missiles. In particular, the production of ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) meant that enemy cities or missile sites could be targeted.

Khrushchev now boasted that the Soviet Union was producing nuclear weapons 'like sausages' (Walker). However, Eisenhower had access to the technology to prove that this was untrue. Since 1957, U-2 high-altitude planes had been used to photograph the Soviet Union and it was clear that the Soviet nuclear capability was considerably less than was claimed (Walker). From 1957 onwards, the CIA had authorized U-2 flights across the Soviet Union to

gather intelligence on Soviet missile sites and although he would not have had exact numbers, Eisenhower knew that US nuclear capability was far greater than that of the Soviet Union. In fact, it was estimated that by 1960 the Soviet Union had only four ICBMs (Walker).



An intercontinental ballistic nuclear missile launched during a test at Vandenberg Air Force Base in 1975.



How would the United States defend itself against nuclear attack?

No matter how unlikely it seemed, Eisenhower had to prepare for the possibility of a Soviet nuclear attack. Even before the launch of Sputnik, there were concerns in the United States that the Soviet Union was already working on the production of ICBMs. It was estimated that these long-range rockets could hit targets in the United States within 30 minutes of being launched and that they would not be detected until 15 minutes after they had been launched, which gave a timescale of 15 minutes to respond. The response would be to instruct Strategic Air Command (SAC) to prepare bombers carrying nuclear weapons for take-off. The question remained, though, as to how many bombers could take off in that 15-minute window. One solution was to have bombers in the air at all times (Friedman).

Key concepts: Significance, causation and consequence

3.4 Case studies

Case study one: Berlin Crisis, 1953

We have looked at the reasons for the adoption of the New Look policy by Eisenhower and Dulles. In this section, we will investigate a specific example of the policy of massive retaliation to see how it was used to defuse a crisis.

The background to the crisis

Berlin was the capital of Germany and in 1945, along with the rest of the country, had been divided and occupied by the Allied powers. The US, USSR, Britain and France were each responsible for a sector of Berlin, which they administered. The city lay deep within the Soviet zone of Germany, close to the border with Poland.

You will have read about the 1948 Berlin Blockade in Chapter 1 and how this showed that Stalin wanted the US, French and British to withdraw from the city. His ploy failed, and even with the emergence of two separate German states in 1949, Berlin remained under four-power control.

Activity 3

ATL Research and self-management skills

One of the reasons why the Soviet Union wanted the Allies to leave Berlin was that it had become a base for espionage against the Soviet Union. Operation Gold began in 1954 and was a covert operation that turned out not to be quite so covert.

Visit the CIA website (www.cia.gov) and navigate to 'News & Information'. Click on 'Featured Story Archive' and select '2009', then find the page 'A Look Back ... The Berlin Tunnel: Exposed'. Use the information there to answer the following questions.

1. What was the aim of Operation Gold and how was it organized?
2. Why did it fail?
3. Make an evaluation of the value and limitations of this website.



If you are studying Topic 5: The Cold War, for Paper 2, the Berlin Crisis 1958–61 is a good example of a Cold War crisis. You can use this topic for both Papers 2 and 3.

The location of Berlin within the Soviet zone of Germany, with an inset showing each sector of Berlin administered by the Allied powers.




Causes

In March 1952, talks were held about the possibility of the Soviet Union recognizing West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany, FRG) as a state, on condition that it was unarmed. This had been rejected in May, however, when the FRG had signed the European Defence Community Treaty.

In East Germany, the leader of the SDU (Socialist Unity Party, aka the Communist Party) Walter Ulbricht, introduced rigid Stalinist policies to link East Germany (the German Democratic Republic, GDR) even closer to the Soviet Union. These policies of collectivization of agriculture, remilitarization and strict control of factory production led to food shortages and very harsh working conditions.

When Stalin died, the new Soviet regime of 'collective leadership' tried to persuade Ulbricht to slow down the pace of his policy known as 'Constructing Communism', but he increased quotas and workers had to work even harder.

Workers called a general strike on 16 June 1953 and this was followed by riots that were harshly suppressed by the Soviet military occupying the Soviet sector of Berlin (which was in East Germany, the GDR). These became known as the Berlin Riots.



Walter Ulbricht meeting East German coal miners in 1955.

Consequences

Thousands of East Germans and East Berliners fled to West Germany, adding to the numbers of refugees that had been steadily growing since the two states had been established in 1949. East Germans could travel freely to East Berlin and, as the city was still open (the Berlin Wall was not built until 1961), they could take the U-Bahn underground rail system into the Western sectors and be flown out to West Germany.

President Eisenhower, recognizing the severe hardship suffered by East Germans due to food shortages, arranged for \$15 million worth of food packages, known as 'Eisenhower packages', to be delivered to refugee centres in West Germany where East Germans were being housed. The response of the GDR was to cut road and rail transport connections to West Berlin, but refugees still found ways to escape to the West.

Activity 4

ATL Thinking and communication skills



This poster was produced in June 1953 with the slogan, '18 million Germans crying to the world'.

1. Interpret the message of this poster.
2. What do you think its purpose was?
3. What was the response of the Eisenhower administration? Do you think it was appropriate? Give reasons for your answer.



Activity 5

ATL Thinking and research skills

Source A



East German refugees are given shelter in a timber factory in West Berlin. There were refugee shelters but these were overwhelmed by the numbers escaping.

Source B

The Soviet Ambassador to the GDR, Mikhail Pervukhin, speaking in 1959:

“The presence in Berlin of an open and essentially uncontrolled border between the socialist and capitalist worlds unwittingly prompts the population to make a comparison between both parts of the city, which, unfortunately, does not always turn out in favour of the Democratic (East) Berlin.”

Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis (2005). *The Cold War*. Allen Lane, p. 113.

1. What is the message of Source A? What does it tell you about the refugee crisis?
2. Why does Pervukhin think that the comparison ‘does not turn out in favour of the Democratic (East) Berlin’? Support your answer with evidence.

Case study two: the Berlin Crisis of 1958–61

Causes

The refugee crisis worsened as thousands of East Germans packed a few belongings in a suitcase and, without making it known to their neighbours or the Stasi secret police, left villages and towns in the East and travelled to the West. Often it was the engineers, doctors and scientists who left, as they could be sure of finding work in West Germany, but as time passed, factory workers and shop assistants also migrated. By 1958, factories were having to reduce production due to a shortage of workers and shops were closing because there was no one to run them. By 1958, over 12,000 refugees were leaving the GDR every month (Fursenko and Naftali).

Since joining NATO in 1955, the West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had been keen for the FRG to obtain its own nuclear missile to help safeguard it against



the threat of Soviet expansion. In 1958, plans went ahead to purchase the US Matador missile, which could carry both conventional and nuclear warheads. This concerned Walter Ulbricht, who was aware that the GDR was rapidly losing ground to the FRG, both in military capability and economic prosperity. In fact, Khrushchev was already planning to deploy the R-5M (medium-range ballistic missiles) in East Germany by the end of 1958 (Fursenko and Naftali).

Vladislav Zubok argues that Khrushchev had several motives for challenging the West over Berlin. These included his desire to support the GDR; to test his own New Look policy by making the Western powers negotiate over Berlin; and to make a stand over Berlin that would boost the reputation of the Soviet Union in regions of the world such as post-colonial Africa and the Middle East.

The crisis

On 10 November 1958, Khrushchev delivered a speech at the Sports Palace in Moscow in which he announced that plans should be prepared for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Berlin and East Germany. Khrushchev would now sign a treaty that would allow the GDR to have control of its own borders. This meant that the Allies would have to ask permission from the GDR government when it wanted to cross its territory to reach Berlin. In other words, the safe corridors from the Western zones of Germany through the Soviet zone to the Western sectors of Berlin, as agreed at the peace conference in Potsdam in 1945, would no longer exist.

This came as a surprise to everyone except Khrushchev. Even his closest advisers were taken aback at such a potentially dangerous move. Khrushchev said that he wanted to hand over control of Berlin entirely to the GDR and to put an end to how 'West Berlin is there to be used as an attack base against us' (Fursenko and Naftali). On 28 November, Khrushchev went a step further and delivered an ultimatum that Berlin had to become a demilitarized 'free city'. If this did not happen within six months, then the GDR would be given control of all access routes that crossed its territory.

The Western response

On 1 May, six months before Khrushchev's speeches, at a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), Dulles said he would go to Berlin to clarify, yet again, that any Soviet attack on the Western sectors of the city would be considered an attack on the United States. Moreover, that President Eisenhower saw 'no alternative to the nuclear defence of Berlin' (Friedman).

West Berlin was symbolically very important as the prime example of containment and the commitment of the United States to stand firm by its allies. Also, if under attack, the French, British and US forces based in the city had no chance of fighting their way out, and so a nuclear response was a very real possibility if there were a crisis.

In November, a formal statement was issued by Dulles and the Foreign Ministers of Britain and France, saying that their governments were intent upon remaining in their sectors of Berlin. Furthermore, NATO stated that it would stand firm with its policy of collective security. Meanwhile, Eisenhower made a declaration to the effect that:

“ The United States will not... embark on any course of conduct which will have the effect of abandoning the responsibilities which the United States, with Great Britain and France, has formally assumed for the freedom and security of the people of West Berlin.

Quoted in Jean Edward Smith (2013). *Eisenhower in War and Peace*. Random House, p. 745.

On hearing of Khrushchev's speech on 10 November, 'Eisenhower was initially outraged, and told acting US Secretary of State Herter (Dulles was very sick by now) that, "if the Russians want war over the Berlin issue, they can have it"' (Taylor).

When Khrushchev escalated tension with his 28 November speech, insisting on the evacuation of Berlin within six months 'to liquidate the occupation regime', Eisenhower decided to call Khrushchev's bluff and not respond; but he did make it very clear that 'the Western sectors of Berlin remained central to American policy' (Taylor).

There had, however, been a touch of brinkmanship about this crisis as, on 14 November, Soviet soldiers stopped a convoy of three US army trucks from leaving West Berlin. When they demanded to inspect the contents of the trucks this was refused, leading to a standoff which was only ended by the arrival of US tanks; after which the trucks were allowed to proceed on their journey. In response to this provocation, the NATO Command in Paris and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the preparation of a military motorized unit travelling along the *autobahn* corridor to West Berlin to underscore the right of the Western Allies to remain in and protect their sectors of the city (Fursenko and Naftali). This proved controversial, with not all of the occupying powers agreeing that such a risky show of force was required. What was feared most was another blockade of the city and the decisions that would then have to be made about the practicality of supplying West Berlin, as had been done in 1948.

Outcome

The six-month deadline imposed by Khrushchev passed in May 1959 with no response from the Soviet Union. Later that year, the Soviet premier went on an official visit to the United States, where he discussed Berlin at meetings with President Eisenhower at Camp David. Further talks were meant to be held at a summit in Paris in 1960 but these were forestalled when an American U-2 plane was shot down over Soviet territory and the Soviets captured its pilot, Gary Powers.

President Kennedy was sworn into office in January 1961. He met with Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961. The problem of Berlin was finally de-escalated in August 1961 with the building of the wall that blocked off East Berlin from West Berlin.

Historians' perspectives

How successful was Eisenhower's foreign policy?

Eisenhower has been portrayed as an ineffectual leader who left the business of foreign policy to his militantly anti-communist Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles.

The results of Dulles's diplomacy were a distorted perception of the Soviet Union, a nuclear arms race and, as in Vietnam, ominous commitments around the world. But scholars are now challenging the notion of a passive President overwhelmed by the formidable Dulles. Instead, they write about a President who ended the Korean War, took a balanced approach towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, and worked for a nuclear test ban treaty.

President Eisenhower, they say, curbed military spending, scorned belligerent military officers, and warned of the 'military-industrial complex'. Indeed, many scholars now affirm Eisenhower's boast that 'the United States never lost a soldier or a foot of ground in my administration. We kept the peace. People ask how it happened - by God, it didn't just happen, I'll tell you that.'

This new interpretation stresses not only that Eisenhower was a strong and effective leader, but also that he knew how a president should act in a thermonuclear age. Historian Robert Divine has opined, 'The essence of Eisenhower's strength... [was]... in his admirable self-restraint'; he avoided hasty military action and refrained from extensive involvement in the internal affairs of other nations.

His successors, however, ignored the Eisenhower legacy of moderation and prudence. Presidents John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson accelerated the arms race with the Soviet Union and plunged the nation into debacles such as the Bay of Pigs Invasion and the Vietnam War. Richard Nixon recklessly widened the war in Indochina.

You can learn more about this crisis by visiting the Office of the Historian website. It contains all the telegrams, memorandums and discussions that took place among the British, French, United States and NATO during this crisis.



CHALLENGE YOURSELF

ATL Research, thinking and communication skills

1. In what ways was the response to the Berlin Crisis of 1958 different from the response to the Berlin Crisis of 1953? What do you think were the reasons for this?
2. Read through the timeline at the beginning of this chapter to see what other crises you can identify. Working in groups, choose crises from different regions of the world and, following the outline used here, research the causes and the outcome. Present your research to the class.

Key concepts: Significance and consequence

3.5 What were the implications of Eisenhower's foreign policy?

Repercussions in Canada

Canada was of strategic importance to the US during the Cold War. During Eisenhower's presidency, relations between these nations were, on the whole, cordial. Both countries shared similar views on matters of international security. Although anti-communist and supporters of the US policy of containment against Soviet expansion, Canadian officers did not necessarily see the Cold War as being caused by Soviet foreign policy alone. They believed that it was both US and Soviet policies that caused international tensions. This section will examine the impact of US policies on US–Canada relations, with particular reference to issues of nuclear armaments and international trade.

Significant individual: John Diefenbaker

John George Diefenbaker was Prime Minister of Canada between 1957 and 1963. He promoted the Canadian Bill of Civil Rights and the extension of the vote to Canada's First Nations. Although an anti-communist, his policies didn't always clearly align with US expectations, which led him to be viewed as 'anti-American'.

The North American Defense Agreement (NORAD)

In the context of the Cold War arms race, the question as to whether nuclear weapons should be placed on Canadian soil and, if so, who should control them, became central. In 1957, Canada and the US signed the North American Defense Agreement (NORAD). The aim of NORAD was to provide mutual protection of the airspace including the '*detection, validation, and warning of attack against North America whether by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles*'. As part of the agreement, forces from the Royal Canadian Air Force and the United States Air Force were stationed in Colorado (US) but responded to a joint command.

To meet the requirements of NORAD, Canada had to upgrade its military resources and technology. Diefenbaker decided to replace the ongoing Avro Arrow project (which had begun in 1953) to develop a supersonic jet fighter. So far, it had cost \$470 million, but had raised limited international interest. This meant that Canada would not be able to sell it to other nations to cover the production cost as had been originally intended. The decision to cancel the Avro project was highly criticized in Canada because it left 14,000 workers unemployed. Diefenbaker was accused of showing little concern for Canada's security.


In lieu of the Avro, and to comply with the NORAD requirements, Diefenbaker agreed to place 56 US 'Bomarc' anti-aircraft missiles in Ontario and Quebec. These ground-to-air missiles with nuclear warheads could intercept Soviet attacks on North America. Diefenbaker's decision to allow nuclear weapons on Canadian territory triggered a political debate.

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

Thinking skills



Why were nuclear weapons and international trade impacted by the Cold War?



Critics in Canada argued that Diefenbaker had been too quick to make these decisions. Howard Green, Minister of Foreign Affairs, disagreed with the plan on the grounds that it was inconsistent with Canadian foreign policy, which was opposed to the expansion of nuclear weapons. Canadian citizens wrote letters to Diefenbaker protesting against the placement of nuclear weapons on Canadian territory. Also, Diefenbaker was held to be 'indulging' US paranoia about the Soviet threat.

The development of a huge post-nuclear shelter, an underground bunker outside Ottawa, for use by the government and military also seemed to suggest that Diefenbaker was succumbing to the same sort of paranoia, and was labelled the 'Diefenbunker'. The shelter housed a radio studio, a hospital and a bank vault. Eventually the issue was put on hold, leading to tension with the US, which had expected Canada to honour NORAD.

Political scientist Denis Smith felt the problem was that Diefenbaker had accepted the nuclear warheads without any reflection, *'It was only when he realized from early 1960 on that there was a growing part of the public that didn't share that view of the importance of taking on nuclear weapons that he began to hesitate'*.

International trade

US attempts to contain communism under Eisenhower did not only rely on defence policies. Eisenhower made use of economic measures such as **sanctions** and **embargos**. When Eisenhower implemented economic sanctions against Cuba (see Case Study, page 157), pressure on other countries in the region to impose similar measures included Canada. However, Diefenbaker was reluctant to comply. Although he did not approve of Castro's early measures, such as the nationalization of foreign assets and the agrarian reform, he wanted to avoid the economic effects on Canada of a crisis with Cuba. He was concerned about Canadian investments in Cuba – which had not yet been nationalized by the revolution – if he joined an embargo.

Diefenbaker also valued Latin American markets as opportunities to diversify from an economic dependence on the US and believed that joining economic sanctions would affect relations between Canada and other Latin American countries.

Dennis Molinaro gives another reason why Canada confronted Eisenhower over Cuba, *'Diefenbaker and his minister of external affairs, Howard Green, believed that a hard-line prohibition on trade with Cuba could drive Castro further into the Soviet camp'*.

Diefenbaker objected to the principle behind the blockade and believed the US should contribute to raising the living standards of underdeveloped nations to prevent the spread of communism in the region. Jason Gregory Zorbas argues that Diefenbaker's refusal to cut political relations with Cuba or join the US embargo was inspired by other interests, *'Canada could, by virtue of its positive relationship with both Cuba and the US, exert its influence to try and ease tensions between the two countries'*.

When Eisenhower broke diplomatic relations with Cuba, he refused Canada's offer to represent US interests on the island. This revealed how the US felt about Canada pursuing an independent policy towards Cuba.

CHALLENGE YOURSELF



Thinking skills

To what extent did the 'Bomarc crisis' illustrate the difficulties of implementing a US–Canadian joint defence policy?

Activity 6

ATL Communication and thinking skills

Read the sources and answer the questions that follow.

Source A

“In short, Diefenbaker’s government supported the sale of military supplies to Batista, just as the United States did. It was also in agreement with the United States immediately after Castro’s victory in Cuba. Canadians, like Americans, were hesitant in recognizing Castro, fearful of his communist sympathies. While Canada maintained trade with Castro, this was no different from other American-supported trading relationships, such as Canada’s trade with ‘Red’ China. In short, Canada could agree with the US policy on Cuba without participating in the American-led embargo. Tactics might differ but principles still mattered. The allied front against communism was maintained by Diefenbaker in his dealings with Cuba.

Dennis Molinaro, ‘Calculated Diplomacy’, in Robert Wright and Lana Wylie (eds) (2009). *Our Place in the Sun: Canada and Cuba in the Castro Era*. University of Toronto Press, p. 88.

Source B

“U.S. concerns about Canada’s Cold War reliability seem groundless. Canada regularly voted with the American bloc at the United Nations, and despite occasional deviations on specific issues, such as Communist China, Canadian governments never embarked on dramatically different foreign policy courses from those of the United States. Militarily, the Canadian shift in the 1950s from a defense strategy based on Britain to one tied to the United States was clear and rapid. Canadian governments, Liberal or Conservative, were always sensitive to the threat to Canadian sovereignty inherent in the expansion of their military relationship with the United States during the Truman and Eisenhower presidencies. Yet despite their caution, American radar networks soon spanned Canada’s North, and Canada’s military forces were consolidated under U.S. command through NATO and NORAD and armed with standardized American weapons.

John Herd Thompson and Stephen J Randall (2008). *Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies*. University of Georgia Press, p. 174.

1. What is the meaning of ‘Tactics might differ but principles still mattered’ in Source A?
2. Compare and contrast what Sources A and B reveal about US–Canadian relations under Eisenhower and Diefenbaker.
3. Using the sources and your own knowledge, assess the strengths and weaknesses of US–Canadian relationships under Eisenhower and Diefenbaker.

Key concepts: Causation and consequence

3.6

The invasion of Guatemala: what was the impact of the Cold War on Latin America during the presidency of Eisenhower?

Background

Since independence in 1821, Guatemala, the largest country in Central America, had developed an economy based on the production and export of agricultural products, mainly bananas and coffee. Early in the 20th century, international companies arrived to invest in the country. One of these, the **United Fruit Company (UFCO)**, owned 42 per cent of the land and employed over 10,000 Guatemalans in the banana industry.

The **United Fruit Company (UFCO)** was a US-owned company, with large investments in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama. It owned vast plantations in Guatemala, as well as the telephone and telegraph systems and most of the railways.

The Eisenhower administration had links to UFCO. Allen Dulles, brother of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, was a former member of UFCO’s board of trustees and owned shares in the company. John Foster Dulles’s law firm represented the company. UFCO’s public relations work was in the hands of Ed Whitman, husband of Eisenhower’s Private Secretary, Ann Whitman.

A map of Central America, showing Guatemala in the north.



In the 1940s, the population of Guatemala was estimated at 4.5 million, of whom almost 90 per cent were landless with limited access to education and health services. After 13 years of the right-wing dictatorship of Jorge Ubico, Juan José Arévalo was elected President (1944–50). Under a new constitution based on the US model, Arévalo promoted a policy of ‘spiritual socialism’, which aimed at modernizing, democratizing and raising the living standards of Guatemala. His domestic policies included improvements in health and education, the expansion of the country’s infrastructure and a redistribution of land to solve the prevailing inequality.

Arévalo was succeeded by Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán, who intensified the nature and pace of the reforms. In 1954, the US intervened in Guatemala, ending the period of reform initiated by Arévalo and continued by Árbenz.

Guatemala under Árbenz

Significant individual: Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán

Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán (1913–71) was a retired army colonel who had served as Defence Minister under Arévalo. In 1944, he took part in the coup of young officers that overthrew dictator Jorge Ubico and became a member of the Revolutionary Junta. He won the 1950 elections with 60 per cent of the votes and became President of Guatemala between 1951 and 1954. He died in Mexico in 1971.

Reform and reaction

Árbenz intensified some of the reforms that had been initiated by José Arévalo. This fuelled the opinion, both in Guatemala and the US, that the country was threatened by communism. Although not a Communist himself, Árbenz had ties with the Communist Party, founded in 1949, and some of his advisers were party members. This encouraged opposition to Árbenz’s rule among some members of the military and the Church, as well as conservative sectors of society. They thought the Communist Party was gaining influence in the government.





The General Confederation of Guatemalan Workers was created under Árbenz's rule. For the first time in history, Guatemalan workers were given the right to bargain collectively and to strike. Although this labour organization was more concerned with gaining and consolidating workers' rights than with ideological causes, it was viewed with suspicion and accused of politically indoctrinating the workers.

Árbenz's plan to build highways and a new port threatened the interests of UFCO in Guatemala which, until then, had monopolized transport. However, it was the land reform proposed by Árbenz which raised the greatest alarm, both at home and in the US.

Land reform and the United Fruit Company

In 1952, Árbenz passed the Decree 900, expropriating uncultivated farms to be redistributed among the landless. Companies like UFCO had vast amounts of fallow land which, they claimed, was unused as part of a land preservation program. Although the Guatemalan government offered the UFCO compensation, the company argued this was insufficient. UFCO lobbied the US government who, in turn, put pressure on Árbenz to pay almost ten times what Decree 900 had stipulated.

US intervention in Guatemala was partly due to the land expropriation and the need to protect UFCO's interests. But Eisenhower and Dulles were also concerned about the example that Guatemalan land reform could give to other countries in the region. In March 1954, Dulles argued before the Organization of American States (OAS) that international communism, sponsored by Moscow, was attacking Latin America and that Guatemala was the first step. The US pressed for OAS to approve the Declaration of Caracas. This document stated that actions promoting the establishment of communist governments in the Americas should be treated as outside intervention in the region. This interpretation enabled the Rio Pact (see page 32) to be invoked and allowed military intervention in Guatemala.

However, only a watered-down version of the Declaration of Caracas was approved at the OAS meeting, and the right to military intervention was not included in the final document. This was because, for Latin Americans, US military presence in the region was a greater threat than communism. With the failure to invoke the Rio Pact, the US failed to obtain regional support for intervention in Guatemala. This led the CIA to put a covert operation into action against Árbenz.

Canada's reaction to US policy in Guatemala

Some members of the Canadian government claimed that the US was overreacting to events. They did not share the view that Guatemala was a strategic threat to the region. For example, when the US questioned a shipment of weapons which arrived in Guatemala via Sweden, the response was that the shipment could have been sent with the purpose of defending Guatemala from an imminent US invasion. Although this did not mean Canada supported Árbenz's reforms, it indicates that it did not see Guatemala, troubled with domestic problems, as a threat to the region.

Operation PBSUCCESS

Although domestic opposition to Árbenz intensified after Decree 900, it lacked the means and support to overthrow the President. The working class and sectors of the Guatemalan army remained loyal to the republic. Therefore, the opposition established contact with the US for support with an uprising.

Ernesto 'Che' Guevara

Che Guevara was a witness to the invasion of Guatemala. This radicalized his views of the US and persuaded him that a revolution could only succeed if it was uncompromising from the beginning. He felt that Árbenz had been too moderate in both the nature and the pace of his reforms, and in not having fought the UFCO more firmly. It was in Guatemala that Guevara first met Cuban exiles, who gave him the nickname 'Che', an interjection Argentinians often use in their speech.



The US was not only interested in the overthrow of Árbenz, but also wanted to send a message to the USSR that communism would not be tolerated in the Americas. However, Eisenhower wanted to avoid open US involvement in the operation. This was partly to avoid tensions with the Soviets but also to preserve relations with Latin American countries.

Eisenhower instigated an operation to overthrow Árbenz and replace him with Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas. The code name for the operation, launched in June 1954, was PBSUCCESS – 'PB' being the CIA code name for Guatemala.

In order to provide covert support, the operation consisted of different fronts:

- the organization and funding of domestic opposition under the National Anti-Communist Front (FAN)
- the intimidation of Árbenz's supporters
- an invasion by Guatemalan exiles, the Anti-Communist Liberating Front (FLA), trained by the CIA in Honduras
- a propaganda campaign to spread false rumours of Árbenz's plans to turn Guatemala into a communist state, followed at the time of the invasion by propaganda to persuade the masses that the success of the invading forces was inevitable.

Árbenz believed that the armed forces would defend the government. Two days before the invasion, he gave a speech to the nation urging citizens to resist the CIA. When the invasion began, the military refused to obey the President's orders to arm the civilians who supported him. Many members of the armed forces did not support Castillo Armas but believed the threat of communism was a more dangerous scenario. Because they believed it was time to replace Árbenz, they joined the invaders.

Although the US had initially decided it would take no part in the invasion, Dulles allowed US aerial support for the coup. US bombers attacked Guatemala City, the capital. Árbenz resigned and fled the country.

**Historians' perspectives****Why did the US intervene?**

Argentinian historian Tulio Halperin Donghi believed that the US's decision to intervene in Guatemala was not so much in response to the land reform but to Árbenz's refusal to join the US in the fight against communism. The vote of Guatemala against the Declaration of Caracas was, in Halperin Donghi's view, the catalyst for the intervention.

The US Department of State, expressing Eisenhower's Domino Theory, argued that Guatemala could be used to launch communist interventions in other countries. '*It is the projection of the Communist will from Guatemala across its borders that properly gives us the chief cause of concern*' (memorandum by Louis J Halle Jr, of the Policy Planning Staff, to the director of the Policy Planning Staff).

Gregory B Weeks, however, believed that it was the international context that led the US to intervene in Guatemala. Mao Zedong had established a communist government in China in 1949 and the USSR had successfully tested nuclear weapons. The Soviets defied the US in Berlin, while Soviet-occupied North Korea became an independent communist state, '*If the overall war against Communism must be won, then every battle must be taken seriously*'.

Luis Cardoza y Aragón, a poet who served as Ambassador of Guatemala under both Arévalo and Árbenz, claimed that Guatemalan communism posed no threat, '*[Communism in Guatemala] was full of subjectivism, of excellent desires, of self-denial, of ignorance, of petulance, of yearnings to learn, to know, to serve its people with utmost honesty. But they were on the moon.*' (Quoted in Robert H Holden and Eric Zolov (2011). *Latin America and the United States: A Documentary Reader*. OUP, p. 195.)

Results

US intervention in Guatemala had a significant impact.

- It suspended the 1945 constitution and re-established a dictatorship in Guatemala, ending ten years of social reform and dismantling peasant and worker organizations.
- It purged state institutions and closed down those departments responsible for land reform, labour legislation and indigenous studies, among others.
- It reversed most of Árbenz's land reform by returning property to the original landowners.
- It led the US to believe that the combination of psychological warfare, propaganda and overt military intervention were useful tools to fight communism in the region: '[Guatemala] became an over-glorified benchmark for future CIA adventures', such as Cuba in 1961 and Chile in 1973 (Loveman).
- It also contributed to Kennedy's Alliance for Progress as a policy to contain communism in the region.
- Finally, it inaugurated a 30-year period in Latin America in which military dictatorships dominated the political scene and led to human rights violations and the deaths of hundreds of thousands of citizens.

Essay writing

Answer the following essay question.

Assess the successes and failures of the foreign policy of Eisenhower.

You may organize the body of your essay in different ways. One option is to treat successes and failures separately. An alternative is to list the different events in Eisenhower's foreign policy and assess each one separately. Whether you decide to approach the essay thematically or on a case-by-case approach, you must provide supporting evidence to prove your argument. This means you need to show why each example used either succeeded or failed to fulfil Eisenhower's aims.



Use the introduction to put the question into context. What were the aims and characteristics of Eisenhower's foreign policy? Which specific key points will your essay focus on?

Activity 7



Thinking and communication skills

Read the source and answer the question that follows.

“The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and State Department organized sporadic and chronic bombings to exaggerate the military strength of the invasion army and thereby decrease morale in the country. The counterreformers, aided by the CIA, also started operating a clandestine radio right before the outbreak of the civil war; they exaggerated the successes of the 'liberation' forces and the defeats of the army. They also distributed flyers to incite insurrection. One flyer, for example, depicted two scrolls placed in front of the Guardia de Honor: one scroll said, 'Fight for God, Your Country, Liberty, Work, Truth, and Justice'; the other said, 'Fight against Communist Atheism, Communist Intervention, Communist Oppression, Communist Poverty, Communist Lies, Communist Police.' The flyer called for Guatemalans to 'Fight with your patriotic brothers. Fight with Castillo Armas'.

Deborah J Yashar (1997). *Demanding Democracy: Reform and Reaction in Costa Rica and Guatemala, 1870s–1950s*. Stanford University Press, p. 206.

1. What, according to the source, were the methods used by the US to incite insurrection in Guatemala?



04

The Vietnam War

The American intervention in Vietnam developed into the longest war in its history. Despite having worked with Ho Chi Minh's forces during the Second World War against the Japanese occupation, and the fact that the Vietnamese sought US support in their war of independence from the French from 1946, the developing Cold War dictated US policy. It was impossible for policymakers to view Ho's forces as nationalists seeking to throw off **imperialism** when he also espoused communist doctrine.

There is debate between historians as to when the US actually went to war in Vietnam as American political and military involvement escalated over a drawn-out period of time. There was also no direct declaration of war by the US or the Vietnamese. The reason for the intervention, given by the American government at the time, was ideological. The US was fighting against 'puppets' of the Soviets and the People's Republic of China (PRC). This stance was backed up by the rationale of the Domino Theory, which foresaw that other countries in the region would quickly follow if South Vietnam fell to communism.

Historians have broadly argued either that the US was ideologically motivated to intervene in Vietnam as a 'crusade' against communism, or they have seen the intervention as being economically motivated ('*dollar imperialist*') and highlight the number of US companies that profited from the war, as well as the need for the US to have unrestricted access to the raw materials and markets of Southeast Asia. Vietnamese historians have generally agreed that US intervention was motivated by economic greed, but also military aggression.

Essay questions:

- To what extent was US involvement in Vietnam ideologically motivated between 1954 and 1973?
- Compare and contrast the reasons for, and nature of, US involvement in Vietnam during the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations.
- Discuss Canadian non-support of US policies in Vietnam between 1961 and 1973.



A wounded Marine Gunnery Sergeant Jeremiah Purdie (with bandaged head) reaches toward a stricken comrade after a fierce firefight south of the DMZ, Vietnam, October 1966.

A map of Indochina.

Timeline		
1887		The French colonize Indochina
1940-45	Aug	Japanese occupation of Indochina
1945	April	Harry S Truman becomes President of the US after FD Roosevelt dies
	Sep	Ho Chi Minh declares the independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DVR). Under Allied agreement, Britain and China (PRC) occupy Vietnam; French troops arrive
1950	Jan	The USSR and the PRC recognize the DVR
	June	Korean War; Truman administration approves NSC-68. US-led UN forces sent to fight the communists in North Korea. US gives economic assistance to French forces in Indochina
1952	Nov	Dwight Eisenhower elected President of the US
1954	April	President Eisenhower does not support the French in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu
	May-July	Geneva Conference: Vietnam to be temporarily divided at 17th parallel until free elections can be held
	Sep	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) established. This would support anti-communists
	Oct	US to send \$100 million to Prime Minister Diem's regime in the south
1955	July	With US support, Diem rejects Geneva agreement on countrywide elections. Two-state situation in Vietnam: North and South Vietnam
1957		Communist insurgency in South Vietnam
1959		North Vietnamese enter South Vietnam via the Ho Chi Minh Trail
1960		National Liberation Front (NLF) set up by Hanoi to fight South Vietnam
	Nov	John F Kennedy elected President of the US
1961	Oct	US representatives visit South Vietnam and recommend US troops be deployed on the ground. Kennedy refuses and sends more equipment and 'advisers'
1962		12,000 US 'advisers' sent to South Vietnam
1963	Jan	Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) defeated by Communist forces at Battle of Ap Bac
	May	Diem persecutes Buddhists
	2 Nov	Diem assassinated
	22 Nov	Kennedy assassinated; Vice President Lyndon B Johnson becomes President

1965	March	Johnson sends combat troops to Vietnam; anti-war protests escalate in the US
	Dec	400,000 US troops in Vietnam
1967	Jan	Martin Luther King criticizes US policy in Vietnam
	Nov	Robert McNamara resigns
1968	Jan	Tet Offensive
	May	My Lai Massacre
	Nov	Richard Nixon elected President of the US
	Dec	540,000 US troops in Vietnam
1969	June	US troop withdrawals begin
	Oct	Huge anti-war demonstrations in Washington
1970	Feb	Secret talks between Kissinger and North Vietnamese
	April	US offensive in Cambodia
	May	Anti-war protests across the US
1971	Dec	140,000 US troops remain in Vietnam
1972	Oct	Thieu rejects concessions negotiated by Kissinger and Hanoi
	Nov	Nixon re-elected President
	Dec	US 'Christmas bombing' of Hanoi
1973	Jan	Ceasefire agreement signed
1975	April	Last US personnel evacuated from Saigon. Saigon falls to North Vietnamese forces, 30 April

Key concept:


Causation

4.1

How did Vietnamese nationalism develop in the first half of the 20th century?

When the French gained control of Indochina at the end of the 19th century, although a minority of the Vietnamese elite collaborated and profited from the new colonial rulers, the majority did not benefit politically or economically. Indeed, there was resistance to French control from the start, and the French responded to the growing nationalist movements with violence and repression. A key nationalist leader, Ho Chi Minh, returned to Vietnam in 1930 after studying in Moscow and co-founded the Vietnamese Communist Party. The party encouraged peasant revolts, but these were brutally suppressed and its leaders forced into exile.

A map showing French control in the Indochina region.



Significant individual: Ho Chi Minh

Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969) became a Communist during his stay in Paris between 1917 and 1923, where he also campaigned unsuccessfully for Vietnamese independence at the Versailles Peace Conference of 1919. He then worked as a **Comintern** agent in Asia before founding the Indochina Communist Party in 1930. During the Second World War, he formed a resistance movement – the Vietminh – against the Japanese and received secret support from the US. Following the defeat of the Japanese in 1945, he declared the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Hanoi, but then had to lead his Vietminh forces first against the French, and then the Americans. He became the symbol of nationalism, continuing to inspire the Vietnamese in their resistance against the Americans even after his death in 1969. The former capital of South Vietnam, Saigon, is now named Ho Chi Minh City in his honour.

The Second World War had a dramatic impact on the nationalist movement in Vietnam. When the French surrendered to Nazi Germany in June 1940, the Japanese military moved to expand its control into Indochina. The Vietnamese Communist Party had been renamed the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) and its leaders in the north fled to the mountains as Japanese forces advanced.

Ho Chi Minh retreated to southern China, where he established a united force to fight the Japanese. The Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi, which became known as the Vietminh, was set up in 1941 and promoted national independence and social reform.

When the Allies began to win the war in Europe, the Japanese attempted to break down the remnants of the French colonial system in Vietnam. In March 1945 Japan set up a government under Emperor Bao Dai. However, the collapse of the old colonial system left a power vacuum, particularly in rural territories and this allowed the Vietminh to move in. The Vietminh then called for a general nationalist uprising when Japan surrendered in August 1945.



The Vietminh faced little opposition during its 'August Revolution' and forced the puppet Emperor Bao Dai to abdicate. Most of the country was then under the control of the Vietminh and on 2 September 1945, Ho proclaimed the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), and called for the Allies to recognize the newly independent state.

However, the Allies gave China and Britain the role of accepting the Japanese surrender in northern and southern Indochina and occupying the territory until a 'stable' government was set up. China and Britain recognized the claims of the French in the region. When British and French troops arrived in September they attempted to drive Vietminh forces out of Saigon.

President Franklin Roosevelt's attitude towards Vietnam was rather inconsistent. To some extent, this lack of a clear policy was due to disagreements within the State Department. Roosevelt had at first opposed a reassertion of French control and supported independence for Vietnam. The US had used the Vietminh for intelligence during the Second World War and in return had supplied it with training and weapons to fight the Japanese. However, in 1942 Roosevelt suggested to the French that he would back the retention of their colonies in Indochina in an attempt to strengthen French resolve to fight Nazi Germany.

Then, in 1943, Roosevelt openly criticized French rule, asserting that it had left Vietnam 'worse off' and he recommended an international trusteeship be set up at the end of the Second World War. There was an element of self-interest in this idea, as Roosevelt understood that Indochina could offer the US important strategic naval bases. This trusteeship would include the US, the USSR and Nationalist China. However, Roosevelt seemed to change his position again, and offered the French temporary control, to oversee Indochina's path to independence.

Just before he died in April 1945, Roosevelt offered control of the territory to the Chinese Nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang turned down the offer as China itself was divided and on the brink of another civil war. Chiang also highlighted to the Americans that the Vietnamese were traditionally vehemently anti-Chinese.

Activity 1

ATL Self-management and thinking skills

What were the justifications offered by the West for intervention in Southeast Asia? Discuss with a partner how Ho should respond to these justifications.

Key concepts:

Causation and consequence

4.2

What were the reasons for, and the nature of, US involvement in Vietnam after 1945?

How was President Truman's administration involved in Vietnam?

At the **Potsdam** meeting of Allies in July 1945, the new US President, Harry S Truman, agreed with the French that they should retake Vietnam. Indeed, when the Second World War ended in August, Truman definitively shifted the US stance to support

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

Research skills

ATL

In pairs research the Vietnamese resistance to Japanese occupation during the Second World War.

The Potsdam Conference

This was the last meeting of the 'Big Three' leaders at the end of the Second World War. It took place in defeated and occupied Germany. The US was represented by Truman, the British by Churchill (and then Attlee) and the Soviet Union by Stalin. The objectives of the meeting were to establish the 'post-war order', the terms for peace and strategies to redress the effects of the war.

Churchill, Truman and Stalin,
July 1945.



French claims on the territory. As the confrontation with the Soviet Union developed in Europe and Asia, France's position as an ally in the Cold War took priority and Ho's credentials as a Communist meant the US would not support his independent DRV. Truman followed the advice of his Europe-based experts (who favoured the return of French power) over his Far East experts, who warned of unrest and violence if Indochina was denied independence. Truman advised the French that he would support their claims, with the caveat that there should be more self-government given to the Vietnamese.

Truman was in fact pursuing a combination of ideological and economic aims. The Americans had significant trade, investments and markets in the Pacific, and wanted to secure these after the Second World War. In addition, the spread of communism was seen as the main threat to US security. Furthermore, Truman had not won an election but had become President after the death of Roosevelt, and thus he believed a decisive foreign policy would secure a popular mandate. Truman was also influenced by his Secretary of State, Dean Acheson; Acheson wanted the US to adopt a firm approach to communists in both Europe and Asia.

The situation in Vietnam at the end of the Second World War was chaotic. Ho was now cynical about American motives in the region and declared that they were '*only interested in replacing the French... They want to reorganise our economy in order to control it. They are capitalists to the core. All that counts for them is business.*'

In September 1945, French troops who had been released by the Japanese in Saigon fought Vietminh forces. Ho continued to attempt to communicate with Washington, but from October 1945 the US did not respond.

The fighting escalated as the British (wanting to support their own imperialist interests in the region) brought in more French troops to take on Ho's forces. As the Chinese Civil War resumed in 1946, Chiang withdrew his forces from the north. However, fighting continued between the Vietminh and the French throughout 1946.

The French asked Truman for assistance. The Cold War confrontation was intensifying in Europe and the idea of 'monolithic communism' was taking hold in the US. The French emphasized the communist ideals of Ho and the threat of communism spreading throughout Asia. The Truman administration now agreed to help the French. American Asia analysts warned Truman that the Vietminh were not controlled by the Soviets and suggested that the situation in Vietnam was more complex. These warnings were not heeded. Acheson argued that it was irrelevant to consider whether Ho was more of a nationalist than a communist – *any* sort of communist had to be confronted and contained.

The American fear of communism spreading in Asia was cemented with the victory of Mao Zedong's Chinese Communist Party over the US-backed nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek in October 1949, and with the establishment of the PRC (People's Republic of China). American experts in Asia wrote a White Paper report on events in China that concluded that Mao was not a stooge of the Soviets. However, the US refused Ho's offer of neutrality in the Cold War in exchange for official recognition of the DRV, and so the Vietnamese approached the USSR and the PRC. Both communist states recognized the DRV in January 1950. In response, Acheson persuaded Truman to give French forces in Vietnam more financial assistance.

As you will have already seen in Chapter 1, from February 1950 the United States was gripped by a 'Red Scare' that envisioned a communist 'fifth column' within the US itself. This period of anti-communist hysteria was unleashed and championed by Senator Joseph McCarthy. It was in this environment that NSC-68, a report by the National Security Council, was produced in 1950.

The historian Walter LaFeber sees NSC-68 as '*one of the key documents of the Cold War*' because it suggested that all communist activity could be traced back to Moscow. It advised the US government to increase military strength and spending to \$50 billion. The key significance of NSC-68 was that it encouraged military and economic aid to be given to any country perceived by the US to be resisting communism. NSC-68 passed Congress when, in June 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea.

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

Thinking and research skills




In pairs, investigate the final years of the Chinese Civil War. Explore the role of the US and the Soviet Union in determining the outcome.

Activity 2

ATL Self-management and thinking skills

1. In pairs read through the chart below. Add details to each heading to provide evidence to support the point.



2. In pairs, discuss the extent to which you agree that US intervention in Vietnam was ideologically motivated during the Truman administration.
3. In pairs, discuss the nature of US involvement in Vietnam up to 1952.

As you have read in Chapter 2, the US-led United Nations forces then fought communist forces in the Korean War. Within this context, the Truman administration decided that Vietnam could not be allowed to fall to the communists.

The French attempted to gain American assistance by linking their role in the Cold War confrontation in Europe with their commitment to fighting in Vietnam. However, some US officials were concerned with the nature of French control in Vietnam. The French had set up the puppet Emperor Bao Dai as head of an 'independent Vietnam' but controlled the army, economy and foreign policy. A Defense Department report warned the Truman administration in November 1950 that the US was getting '*dangerously*' involved and that these '*situations... have a way of snowballing*'. Indeed, Truman gave \$2 billion in aid to French forces in Vietnam and \$50 million in economic aid '*for the Vietnamese people*'.

Key concepts:

Causation and significance

4.3

Did President Eisenhower's administration commit the US to involvement in Vietnam?

When Dwight 'Ike' Eisenhower became President in 1953 he found that the US was already supporting the deeply unpopular French-backed regime of Bao Dai. Eisenhower's officials in Vietnam briefed him that Ho was genuinely popular with the masses and that Bao Dai's regime would not last.

In November 1946, the Vietminh officially declared war on the French in Vietnam. It used guerrilla warfare tactics against the superior weapons of the French. This type of warfare was highly effective as the Vietminh could perpetrate ambushes and hit-and-run attacks and use their knowledge of the local geography to disappear into the jungle and mountains.

The Vietminh had high levels of morale and commitment as they fought for their independence and freedom. They were also capably led by General Vo Nguyen Giap and had begun to receive modern military equipment from the PRC. Giap's plan was to wear down France's will to fight using guerrilla tactics before reverting to more conventional warfare once the enemy was sufficiently weakened. By 1952, having emphasized the role of the peasants, Giap had a militia of nearly 2 million people and a regular army of a quarter of a million soldiers. These troops were strictly disciplined and were not allowed to abuse the peasants. Ho won over the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese by promoting land redistribution and healthcare programs.

Eisenhower decided to give the French \$385 million worth of arms and equipment for a massive offensive against the Vietminh and the French had agreed to give Vietnam greater independence in return. There was fierce debate within the Eisenhower administration over what policy to pursue in Vietnam: some questioned whether Southeast Asia was key to US security interests; others questioned whether the best policy was to support the French forces or to intervene with UN support. Eisenhower viewed Vietnam as vital to US interests. He believed the best policy would be to give aid to the French rather than risk American lives by sending in US forces directly. As French troops struggled to take on the Vietminh in 1954, Eisenhower declared, '*We must not lose Asia*', and agreed to send 200 technicians along with bomber planes. By this point the US was funding 80 per cent of the war.

However, French forces had been concentrated at Dien Bien Phu and by March 1954 their position was bleak. Dien Bien Phu was in a valley and Giap's forces had the French surrounded and bombarded from higher ground. The French desperately pleaded with Eisenhower to send in US airstrikes.

Activity 3

ATL Social and thinking skills



Eisenhower's dilemma

It is 1954 and the French have urgently appealed to you, the Eisenhower administration, for military assistance at Dien Bien Phu. You are tasked with writing a report to advise President Eisenhower on whether to militarily intervene in Vietnam. Read through the following bullet points and, in groups, discuss the pros and cons of intervention. Then, one member from each group should join another group. In your new mixed groups draft a policy statement to Eisenhower on how the President should address the French request to intervene.

◀ Former Second World War general, and US President between 1953 and 1961, Dwight D Eisenhower.

FOR more direct involvement:

- Eisenhower believed that a communist Vietnam would change the balance of power in the region.
- Eisenhower espoused the Domino Theory and articulated this in a press conference in April 1954. He feared that if one country fell to communist forces it could trigger a falling domino effect in the region.
- Eisenhower did not want the Soviets to gain more ground.
- Eisenhower had rejected the idea of containment promoted by the Democrats in his election campaign and he had promised to 'liberate' countries from communism.
- Eisenhower did not want to lose Vietnam. He had seen how the loss of China had undermined Truman.
- Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had declared in a broadcasted speech that the PRC was a key threat in Indochina and was training, arming and organizing the Vietminh.
- French military strength and international credibility was being severely damaged in Vietnam and Eisenhower needed France as a strong ally in NATO to defend against Soviet expansion in Europe.
- The French threatened to be uncooperative in Europe if they did not get assistance.
- The French warned that they would quit Indochina without further US aid.

AGAINST further involvement:


- Vietnam was too small a country to trigger a domino effect in the region.
- Some defence and military advisers did not see clear and achievable military objectives in Vietnam.
- Limited use of air and sea power would be insufficient to win the war.
- Eisenhower, when commander of NATO himself, had warned that the use of ground forces in this sort of environment would be costly and ineffective.
- Eisenhower was reluctant to commit forces in Asia when he had just gained public support for pulling US troops out of Korea.
- The New Look defence policy emphasized the use of its nuclear weapons over conventional forces.
- The administration was reluctant to become too tied to the French cause in Vietnam, and the French did not want to fight under a US commander.
- Eisenhower did not want to replace French colonialism with American colonialism.
- The British refused to support American military intervention, and Eisenhower would need this to get congressional approval.

The Geneva Conference, May 1954

Eisenhower decided not to intervene and the French were decisively defeated at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu on 7 May 1954. The very next day, representatives from France, Bao Dai's regime, the Vietminh, the US, the USSR, the PRC and Britain met at Geneva to discuss the end of the war in Indochina.

Primarily, the US wanted to contain the spread of communism in Indochina, and to establish a unified non-communist Vietnam. However, US intelligence had found that Ho would win free elections in Vietnam by a huge majority. US aims clashed with other representatives, as you can see in the chart below.

Differing aims at the Geneva Conference.



Despite these differing aims, in May 1954 the Geneva Accords were drawn up which agreed that:

- the French would withdraw from Indochina
- there would be a temporary division of Vietnam at the **17th parallel**. Ho Chi Minh would control the north of the country
- there would be 'free elections' to unite Vietnam in 1956
- there were to be no foreign bases
- Laos and Cambodia would be recognized as independent states.

Although Ho seemed to have been forced to retreat from his key goal of a unified independent Vietnam, he had to accept the agreement – at least for the moment. He needed time to consolidate his control in the north, and he also needed Soviet support in any future conflict with a regime in the south. The Soviets had wanted the peace deal. The accords also promised free elections in 1956 and Ho knew that he would win them.

Significantly, the US did not sign the Geneva Accords. Eisenhower merely said that he would 'respect' the agreement. After the agreement, the US attempted to strengthen the area south of the 17th parallel, supporting a non-communist government that would be able to resist an invasion from the north.

In response to the Geneva Accords, the US also formed SEATO (the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), which was joined by Australia, Britain, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand. These countries agreed to meet if there was an armed attack on one of them and, if agreement was unanimous, to take action. In



A map of Vietnam after the Geneva Accord ceasefire agreement in May 1954.

defiance of the Geneva Accords, which said that Laos and Cambodia should remain neutral, SEATO included South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as its 'protected areas'. SEATO thus became a legal basis for future US action in Vietnam. The US was determined to defend the 'two-state' solution established as temporary in 1954.

The regime of Ngo Dinh Diem

The man that the United States backed to lead the government in the south was Ngo Dinh Diem, a Catholic who had been educated in the US. As most nationalist, non-communist leaders had been killed by the French or the Vietminh, there were few alternatives. In fact, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles admitted that they backed Diem only because there was 'no one better'.

In October 1955, Diem proclaimed the establishment of the Republic of Vietnam (also known as South Vietnam) with himself as President. Eisenhower sent millions of dollars in aid to Diem. He also began US military involvement in the south by sending personnel to train the South Vietnamese Army.

Although the United States pressed him to carry out reforms, Diem turned out to be a ruthless leader who, along with his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, the chief of police, crushed opposition brutally. Land reforms were not implemented, and the Catholic faith was promoted, even though most Vietnamese were Buddhists. Soon it became clear that an unpromising family dictatorship was emerging in South Vietnam and despite the violence of Ho's regime in North Vietnam, many in South Vietnam remained secretly loyal to him.

At first Ho had abided by the Geneva Accords to consolidate his position, while Diem systematically executed thousands of communist suspects in the south. However, in 1960 Ho decided that the time was ripe to move from consolidation towards

unification. Ho's supporters in South Vietnam, the National Liberation Army (Diem called them the Vietcong, or VC), escalated their insurgency against Diem's regime. Eisenhower could not take more direct military action as he lacked support for this from Congress and Britain, but he was also aware that direct military action would be difficult and perilous.

Thus, Eisenhower had inherited the situation of limited US involvement in Vietnam but went on to increase American intervention. He had invested heavily in supporting French attempts at a military solution (although he rejected the 'atomic' option mooted by some during Dien Bien Phu), and subsequently in the unpopular Diem regime. By the end of his presidency, Eisenhower had sent almost 1,000 Americans to South Vietnam as military 'advisers', and Diem had received \$7 billion in aid. His actions had the full support of his Vice President, Richard Nixon, and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. As Arthur M Schlesinger writes, 'President Eisenhower, after rejecting American military intervention in 1954, set in motion the policy of support for Saigon which resulted, two Presidents later, in American military intervention in 1965'.

Activity 4

ATL Thinking skills

Review the material on Eisenhower's administration, read the sources below and answer the questions that follow.

Source A

Extract from President Eisenhower's press briefing, April 1954.

"You have the possibility that many human beings pass under a dictatorship that is inimical to the free world. You have the broader considerations that might follow what you would call the 'falling domino' principle... You have a row of dominos set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have the beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences... You are talking about millions and millions of people.

Quoted in Stephen Ambrose (1990). *Eisenhower: Soldier and President*. Simon & Schuster, p. 361.

Source B

A cartoon by Herblock, May 1964.



1. What, according to Source A, was the Domino Theory?
2. What is the message of Source B?

Activity 5

ATL Self-management skills

In pairs, create a mind map or a spider diagram of the reasons for, and nature of, US involvement in Vietnam between 1945 and 1960. You must ensure that your diagram reflects the multiple reasons for US involvement, and the varied nature of the intervention.

Key concepts: Significance and consequence

4.4 How did Kennedy's administration escalate US involvement in Vietnam?

“ Let every nation know... that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foes to assure the survival and the success of liberty.

John F Kennedy's inaugural address, 1961.

Even though Eisenhower had committed more economic assistance to Vietnam than Truman, it was only under President John F Kennedy that Vietnam moved towards centre stage in US foreign policy.

Kennedy was elected President in November 1960, and took office in January 1961. He adopted a new strategy for fighting communism; he wanted to have a 'flexible response'. He had given speeches on the dangers of the domino effect in relation to Vietnam, and during his election campaign he had criticized Eisenhower for losing the initiative in foreign policy. Indeed, his whole campaign had been based on strongly anti-communist rhetoric. In addition, he believed and feared that communism would triumph in the developing world through wars of national liberation.

Kennedy was eager to seize the initiative and was frustrated by the slow pace of the State Department and by professional diplomats. He preferred to work with a small, trusted group, and he was influenced by his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara. McNamara was a 'statistics' man, and his department promoted military solutions to the problems in Vietnam. Kennedy's Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, also believed in expanding the US role in Vietnam. Rusk and McNamara both told Kennedy that an American withdrawal from Vietnam would result in a loss of US credibility internationally and signal a lack of commitment to other areas of Cold War confrontation.

Kennedy was also motivated to increase US involvement in Vietnam due to his recent humiliation over the failed invasion of Castro's Cuba (see Chapter 5 and Case Study). The US had sponsored a force of Cuban exiles to land at the Bay of Pigs, trigger an uprising against Castro and overthrow his regime. It had ended in catastrophe; Castro's forces had captured the invaders and later returned them to the US in exchange for materials and medicines.

In addition, Kennedy initially focused on Laos, in Indochina, rather than Vietnam, fearing a Soviet-backed Communist victory there. In a news conference in March 1961, Kennedy alluded to the idea that there might be a military intervention in Laos. However, this did not transpire, as the failure in Cuba held Kennedy back. The administration then, working with the Soviets, agreed to 'neutralize' Laos by setting up a coalition government in the summer of 1962. Much to Kennedy's frustration, the communists in the government proved uncooperative and the regime continued to allow Vietcong members to move through its country on trails into South Vietnam.



President John F Kennedy in 1963.



Kennedy was determined to take a firm stance against the communists in Vietnam following on from his humiliation in Cuba and the unsatisfactory outcome of his Laotian 'stalemate'. Indeed, Kennedy became convinced that Vietnam was where he could restore his credibility. He worked closely with McNamara's team, which included several generals, and he sent General Maxwell Taylor to assess the situation in Indochina in October 1961. Taylor agreed with Kennedy's conclusion that a 'counter-insurgency force' would be effective against the communists.

Kennedy approved a significant increase in military 'advisers' and by 1962 there were 11,000 in Vietnam. He also sent more aid, including helicopters and US pilots. Kennedy assumed, as had Eisenhower, that the US had to back Diem. Vice President Lyndon B Johnson had commented to a reporter on a visit to Saigon in 1961, '*Diem's the only boy we got out there.*'

Significant individual: Robert McNamara

Robert McNamara was US Secretary of Defense between 1961 and 1968, under the presidencies of John F Kennedy and Lyndon B Johnson. He held this position for eight years, making him the longest serving Secretary of Defense. He introduced 'systems analysis' into public policymaking and was one of Kennedy's most trusted colleagues. With Kennedy, McNamara proposed a policy of 'flexible response' as opposed to Eisenhower's 'massive retaliation'.

McNamara was a member of EXCOMM during the Cuban Missile Crisis (see Case Study) and played a key role in the resolution of the crisis. His speciality was in statistics, and he had analysed the efficiency of bombing raids on Japan during the Second World War. He subsequently advised the Kennedy and Johnson administrations on how to maximize the effect of defoliants and bombing in the war in Vietnam. McNamara is seen as a key player in increasing the US commitment to, and intervention in, Vietnam.

See also the documentary with McNamara, *The Fog of War* (2003).

Kennedy continued to increase US involvement up to his assassination in November 1963. This expansion included the following:

- supporting Diem and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)
- increasing the number of US military 'advisers' in South Vietnam (there were 17,000 in Vietnam by the time of Kennedy's death)
- starting counter-insurgency operations against communist guerrillas in the south. This included 'search-and-destroy' missions against the Vietcong and the spraying of defoliants, such as **Agent Orange**, in order to destroy the jungle that gave them cover
- supporting the Strategic Hamlets Program, which consisted of the resettlement of villagers into fortified villages where they could be kept 'safe' from the communists
- introducing a new US military counter-insurgency force, the Green Berets, trained in guerrilla fighting
- encouraging Diem to introduce social and political reforms.

Agent Orange is a chemical defoliant. The US used it as part of the 'herbicide warfare' programme in Vietnam, in an attempt to destroy the jungle and vegetation that the communists would retreat into. Agent Orange has long-term environmental effects and can cause significant health issues in people exposed to the chemical.



Activity 6

ATL Research skills

In pairs, briefly research Agent Orange. Discuss why the use of Agent Orange was controversial.

None of these measures succeeded in limiting the success of Vietcong attacks on South Vietnam. In fact, measures such as the Strategic Hamlets Program and the spraying of Agent Orange only alienated the local peasant population further. The 17,000 US advisers also failed to improve the ARVN.

Meanwhile, rather than winning support by carrying out a reform programme, Diem's unpopular actions continued to generate mass discontent. This led to increasing criticism of his regime in the US (although the press focused on Diem's political and military ineptitude rather than on challenging the rationale of American involvement and tactics). Relations between the US and Diem became more strained.

There was even a suspicion that Diem might attempt to find a resolution with Hanoi that cut out the US.

The American Ambassador to Vietnam was Henry Cabot Lodge and he sent a highly critical report to the State Department on the failings of Diem in January 1963. He argued that there was no overall planning between the civilian and military efforts and that what was needed was *'to give authority to a single, strong executive, a man perhaps with a military background but who understands that this war is essentially a struggle to build a nation out of the chaos of revolution'*.

In addition, opposition to Diem within South Vietnam reached a peak in August 1963 with a crisis over his anti-Buddhist policies. When laws were passed banning the celebration of Buddha's birthday, the Buddhists organized mass protests. These included rallies, hunger strikes and even self-immolations. This unrest caused an international reaction, especially when the response of South Vietnam's First Lady, Madam Nhu (Diem's sister-in-law), was, *'Let them burn and we shall clap our hands'*.



Thich Quang Duc's self-immolation in Saigon in June 1963. This Buddhist monk was 73 when he set himself on fire in protest at anti-Buddhism laws enacted by the Diem regime.

Kennedy's government now started to cut off its aid to Diem's regime. On 2 November 1963, Diem and his brother were assassinated in a coup perpetrated by members of the ARVN. Diem's removal, as General William C Westmoreland asserted, '*morally locked us into Vietnam*'.

Kennedy himself was assassinated on 22 November 1963, within three weeks of Diem. Madame Nhu declared, '*The chickens have come home to roost.*' His administration had significantly escalated US intervention; by the end of 1963 there were 17,000 American 'advisers' in Vietnam, and the removal of Diem had 'obliged' the US to commit to his successor. Although historians have suggested that just prior to his death Kennedy was reviewing US policy in Indochina, many of his closest associates, including his brother Bobby Kennedy and his Vice President, Lyndon B Johnson, claimed that he had no intention of withdrawing.

Activity 7

ATL Thinking and social skills

Prepare your class for a debate. Divide into two main groups, one group in favour and the other against the following resolution:

The US could have left Vietnam in 1963.

You will need to review the reasons for, and nature of, US involvement in Vietnam up to 1963, with particular focus on Kennedy's administration. Reasons for involvement could include ideology, domestic politics, popular opinion, belief in the significance of the developing world in the Cold War, the role of advisers, and the impact of outside events in Laos, Berlin and Cuba. The nature of the involvement could include economic assistance, military support and attempts to encourage reform through non-military US personnel.

Historians' perspectives

According to the American historian Fredrik Logevall, Kennedy had no intention of reducing US involvement in Vietnam, and he highlights the fact that even when he had the excuse to get out (during public outrage at Diem's refusal to reform and his treatment of Buddhists), Kennedy did not. Whereas, the British Professor of War Studies, Lawrence Freedman, suggests Kennedy would not have escalated US involvement any further, and draws this conclusion from how Kennedy handled the Berlin Crises, the Cuban Missile Crisis and Laos.

Essay writing

To what extent was America's involvement in Vietnam ideologically motivated between 1954 and 1963?

Command term: To what extent.
Concept: Causation.
Theme: US involvement in Vietnam between 1954 and 1963.

Essay plan

Introduction: Set down key points that support the idea that US involvement was ideologically motivated during Eisenhower's and Kennedy's administrations. Also address the command terms of the question by offering a counter-argument: for example, economic interests or domestic political considerations.

Paragraph 1: *Ideological commitment to Vietnam up to 1954...* (add dates, events, details and examples).

Paragraph 2: *Ideological motivation of Eisenhower's administration in Vietnam...* (add dates, events, details and examples).

Paragraph 3: *Ideological motivation for Kennedy's escalation of US involvement in Vietnam...* (add dates, events, details and examples).
However, ...

Paragraph 4: *Economic interest motivated US involvement in Vietnam...* (add dates, events, details and examples).

- Paragraph 5:** *Traditional strategic considerations led to US involvement in Vietnam...* (add dates, events, details and examples).
- Paragraph 6:** *Domestic political considerations led to US involvement in Vietnam...* (add dates, events, details and examples).
- Conclusion:** Based on the weight of evidence and analysis presented in your essay, answer the question clearly and concisely. Does your essay support the assertion? Was intervention ideologically motivated or were other reasons more important? Did the motives for intervention change over time?

Key concept: Significance

4.5 To what extent was Vietnam 'Johnson's War'?

Vice President Lyndon Baines Johnson became President after Kennedy's assassination in November 1963. He inherited a weak and unstable government in South Vietnam, while the strength of the Communists was increasing. He also inherited Kennedy's advisers. Johnson was as determined as his predecessors to win the 'war against Communism' and prevent the domino effect. Johnson believed in America's military capability, and as Vice President he had strongly supported fighting the communists in Southeast Asia.


In 1963, the Democratic Senate leader had suggested working towards a united and 'neutralized' Vietnam, but Johnson rejected this as he thought it would lead to a communist takeover. On 20 April 1964, Johnson publicly declared his commitment to the south and deployed a further 2,500 personnel to South Vietnam. But as the situation deteriorated further in 1964 – 200 Americans had died there by this point – Johnson decided that he needed to increase US commitment. However, he also needed justification for this in order to obtain the support of the US public and Congress.

The 'excuse' for the United States to step up its military intervention in Vietnam came with the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. The CIA had been covertly sending sabotage missions into North Vietnam, and in early 1964 Johnson approved gunboat raids on the North Vietnamese coast. Espionage was also conducted in the Gulf of Tonkin.

On the night of 2 August 1964, the American naval destroyer *Maddox* was fired on by North Vietnamese patrol boats while it was patrolling and gathering intelligence in the Gulf of Tonkin (see map above). Two days later, on 4 August 1964, the US destroyers *Maddox* and *Turner Joy* were allegedly fired on. Ship radar apparently showed that they were under attack, but there was much confusion and no physical evidence of an assault was found. Nevertheless, Johnson called this attack 'open aggression on the high seas', and as a result the United States immediately bombed North Vietnamese installations.

The next day, Johnson addressed the US Congress and asked it to pass the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which authorized the president to 'take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression'. The resolution passed with a large majority. Robert McNamara said that the language of the resolution 'gave the President the authority to take the nation to war'. Indeed, for the next

Map showing the US Navy's explanation of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident.



six years, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was used as the legal basis for the US war in Vietnam.

Once the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution had been passed, the US could take the war to North Vietnam. When Johnson sent US planes to bomb the north his approval ratings soared from 42 to 72 per cent, and in November 1964 he won the presidential election. Now with his own mandate as President, Johnson escalated US involvement by:

- launching a sustained campaign of bombing in North Vietnam, which was known as Operation Rolling Thunder
- sending 100,000 ground forces to South Vietnam in 1965. Led by General Westmoreland, US soldiers carried out search-and-destroy missions. By 1968, there were 520,000 troops in Vietnam
- bombing targets in the south to provide support for ground troops and to attack the enemy supply routes and bases
- dropping large numbers of rockets and bombs, plus **napalm**, on South Vietnam, with devastating effects on the local population.

The first combat troops arrived in Vietnam on 8 March 1965. By May, over 75,000 troops had been deployed. The role of this force changed from defending bases to 'active defence', which meant troops were sent out on search-and-destroy missions. The US public was not informed of this change for several months. The US ambassador in South Vietnam had cautioned against sending combat troops in, as it might undermine the will of the south to fight. However, Johnson sided

Napalm is a mixture of gasoline and a gelling agent. It is highly inflammable and can be used against buildings, installations and forests as an incendiary weapon. However it is mainly used as an 'anti-personnel' device as it sticks to the skin and leads to severe burns.



with General Westmoreland and gave him authority to pursue his own policies in Vietnam. Westmoreland's view was that the situation demanded more troops on the ground.

The arrival of combat troops significantly changed the nature of the US involvement and led to the south's forces being degraded to secondary players in the war. It also meant that the Vietcong could portray the conflict clearly as a war against the foreign US imperialist invaders.

General Thieu was made Head of State in South Vietnam in June 1965, and Air Vice Marshall Cao Ky became Prime Minister. Johnson had hoped the arrival of combat troops would strengthen the regime. However, Ky's government continued to lose control of territory to the VC. Despite the fear that more US troops would further undermine the ARVN's will to fight, in June 1965 Johnson increased the number of troops to 125,000. Westmoreland continued to ask for more and by the end of 1965 there were almost 200,000 US soldiers in Vietnam.

Although there was agreement that the US should be in Vietnam, there was a lack of consensus within the administration regarding what the strategy of its forces should be. Bombing raids on the north had failed to force Hanoi to negotiate and there was doubt that sending in more and more ground troops would bring about victory.

However, the US strategy of search and destroy failed as the Vietcong simply retreated into the jungle, and the use of bombs and napalm on 'suspect' areas did not separate the VC from the peasantry. Most of America's firepower, including cluster bombs, napalm and white phosphorus, was used on the south in an attempt to destroy the VC, and these tactics totally alienated the local population. The aims of Operation Rolling Thunder, to attack the north and cut off supplies to the **Ho Chi Minh Trail**, also failed.

Activity 8

ATL Thinking skills

Read the sources below and answer the questions that follow.

Source A

President Johnson's address at Johns Hopkins University: 'Peace Without Conquest', 7 April 1965.

The contest in Vietnam is part of wider pattern of aggressive purpose [...]

Why are we in South Vietnam? We are there because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every American president has offered support to the people of South Vietnam. We have helped to build, and we have helped to defend. Thus over many years, we have made a national pledge to help South Vietnam defend its independence. And I intend to keep that promise. To dishonor the pledge, to abandon this small and brave nation to its enemy, and to the terror that must follow, would be an unforgivable wrong. We are also there to strengthen world order. Around the globe from Berlin to Thailand are people whose well-being rests, in part, on the belief that they can count on us if they are attacked. To leave Vietnam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in the value of American commitment, the value of America's word. The result would be increased unrest and instability and even wider war. We are also there because there are great stakes in the balance. Let no one think for a moment that to retreat from Vietnam would bring an end to conflict. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite for aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next. We must say in South East Asia as we did in Europe, in the words of the Bible: 'Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further'.

Source B

An extract from a memorandum from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to President Johnson outlining recommendations for involvement in Vietnam, 20 July 1965.

Options open to us. We must choose among three courses of action [...]

A) Cut our losses and withdraw... almost certainly... humiliating the United States and very damaging to our future effectiveness on the world scene.

B) Continue at about the present level, with the US forces limited to say 75,000... a course of action which, because our position would grow weaker... would later confront us with a choice between withdrawal and an emergency expansion of forces, perhaps too late to do any good.

C) Expand promptly and substantially the US military pressure against the Viet Cong in the South and maintain the military pressure against the North Vietnamese... This alternative would stave off defeat in the short run and offer a good chance of producing a favorable settlement in the longer run...

1. Discuss with a partner how Johnson alludes to the broader context of the Cold War and the Domino Theory in Source A?
2. With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Source B for historians studying US involvement in Vietnam during the 1960s.
3. What options are outlined for US involvement in Vietnam in Source B?
4. In pairs, discuss how Source B supports the ideas presented in Source A.

Activity 9**ATL Research and communication skills**

Divide your class into three groups. Group A will research the NLF Army/VC, Group B will research the ARVN and Group C will research the US Army in Vietnam.

Each group needs to develop a report that includes information and examples of the following:

- motivation
- leadership
- morale
- weapons
- tactics
- peasant support
- urban support

Now get into groups of three, made up of one A, one B and one C representative, and share your findings to the other two in your group. Discuss what conclusions might be drawn about why communist forces were not defeated in South Vietnam by 1968.

By 1968, the war had reached a turning point. The ARVN suffered from poor leadership, a lack of morale and a desertion rate of more than 20 per cent. General Westmoreland's policy of attrition had not succeeded in defeating the NLF and at home the anti-war movement was gaining momentum, fuelled by the growing number of US casualties. Nevertheless, Johnson had told the public at the end of 1967 that there was 'light at the end of the tunnel', that is, the United States was starting to win the war.

Then, early on the morning of 30 January 1968, during the Vietnamese New Year (known as 'Tet'), 70,000 Communists launched a surprise attack. It was the sheer scale of the assault that was most shocking. The Communists attacked more than 100 cities in South Vietnam. It took 11 days for the US and ARVN forces to regain control of Saigon. Even more intense was the battle for the beautiful city of Hue; half the city was destroyed and 5,800 civilians were killed. The Communists were gradually pushed back from all the other cities after the use of massive firepower against them.

This 'Tet Offensive' was a military failure for the Communists. The popular uprising in the south they had hoped to trigger did not happen. They failed to hold on to any of the cities gained at the outset of the offensive and it is estimated that they had casualties of over 40,000.

However, Tet was also a propaganda disaster for the US and for Johnson, who had claimed that the Americans were winning the war. Johnson's presidency was fundamentally undermined. On 31 March 1968, Johnson addressed a stunned US television audience and announced that he would not be standing for re-election in the coming November election.

Activity 10

ATL Self-management and thinking skills

1. Review the material in this chapter and complete the following grid.

	Reasons for involvement	Nature of involvement	Impact
Truman			
Eisenhower			
Kennedy			
Johnson			

2. In pairs, discuss the content of your grids. Identify the similarities and differences between the actions of the presidents.

Historians' perspectives

The reasons for US involvement in Vietnam

During the 1950s the motive of helping its ally, France, was emphasized in the United States. However, during the 1960s the need to establish democracy and freedom in Vietnam was presented as the main reason for involvement. The American historian Guenter Lewy argued, in his book *America and Vietnam*, that the US was ideologically motivated in Vietnam. The Americans, he concluded, intervened to fight communism. This view was supported by the historian William Chafe (1999):

Without question, the central precondition for American involvement in Vietnam was the set of assumptions that underlay and shaped the entire history of the Cold War. Once committed to the view that the communist world was one, and systematically involved in a worldwide conspiracy to subvert freedom, any effort in other countries that could be interpreted as hostile to the United States automatically became defined as that worldwide conspiracy.

The Unfinished Journey. Oxford University Press, p. 298.

Whereas, the American historian Arthur Schlesinger argued in favour of the Quagmire Theory and suggested that the war was like a marshland or swamp in to which the US was drawn further and further. The more it intervened, the more it sank into the muddy marsh. The historians L Gelb and R Betts, in *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked*, outlined the Stalemate Theory, which suggested that each successive president understood that the war was unwinnable but did not want to be the first president to lose a war. The escalation in intervention was ultimately motivated by domestic political considerations.

However, the Canadian Marxist historian Gabriel Kolko argued in his book, *Anatomy of a War*, that US involvement was primarily motivated by economic self-interest.

Activity 11



Thinking, communication and social skills

In small groups, discuss the role of the following in motivating US intervention in Vietnam:

- ideology – to fight communism
- containment – to contain Soviet and PRC influence
- strategic – balance of power in Asia
- economic self-interest
- expansionism, aggression and militarism
- fear – the Domino Theory
- the Quagmire Theory
- to assist its ally, France
- domestic politics – elections/Congress/advisers and institutions/public opinion.

Activity 12



Thinking and communication skills

Discuss which of the US motives was the most important for its intervention. To what extent did US motivation for intervention change over time?

Essay planning

In pairs, using the information you have collated in your grids from Activity 10, draft an essay plan for the following question.

Compare and contrast the reasons for, and nature of, US involvement in Vietnam during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, 1961–68.

Command term: Compare and contrast.

Concept: Causation and consequence.

Theme: Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

Remember that for 'compare and contrast' questions you need to identify thematic similarities and differences. For this essay, you could adopt one of the following structures:

EITHER

Paragraph 1: Similarities in reasons for involvement in Vietnam...

Paragraph 2: Differences in reasons for involvement in Vietnam...

Paragraph 3: Similarities in nature of involvement in Vietnam...

Paragraph 4: Differences in nature of involvement in Vietnam...

OR

Paragraph 1: Similarities in reasons for involvement in Vietnam...

Paragraph 2: Similarities in nature of involvement in Vietnam...

Paragraph 3: Differences in reason for involvement in Vietnam...

Paragraph 4: Differences in nature of involvement in Vietnam...

Conclusion: Based on the weight of evidence and analysis presented in your essay, answer the question clearly and concisely. Does your essay suggest that there were more similarities or differences between the two administrations? Were the reasons for intervention similar, whereas the nature of involvement more different?

Key concepts:

Change and continuity

4.6

How did President Nixon end US involvement in Vietnam?

Richard Nixon was elected President of the United States in November 1968. In his inaugural address, he declared, *'The greatest honor history can bestow is the title of peacemaker'*. He wanted American withdrawal from the war, but he was not prepared to accept

peace at any price. Nixon, like his predecessors, did not want to be the President who lost the war. Rather he wanted 'peace with honor'. There was no way that the United States could merely withdraw from South Vietnam or seem to have been defeated.


Nixon wanted an agreement that would guarantee the south a reasonable chance of survival. He wanted a Korean-style settlement, where an armistice would preserve two separate Vietnams. The problem was how to achieve this outcome. Nixon did not believe this could be achieved by invading the north, and he favoured the approach Eisenhower had taken in pressuring the USSR and the PRC to obtain the armistice in Korea in 1953. However, Nixon's methods took another four years, during which time 300,000 Vietnamese and 20,000 Americans died.

Significant individual: Henry Kissinger

Henry Kissinger was National Security Adviser and then Secretary of State in the Nixon and Ford administrations. He was a highly influential figure in US foreign policy between 1969 and 1977. He argued for a policy of **realpolitik** in superpower relations and was pivotal in guiding the US into a period of detente with the USSR and a rapprochement with the PRC. His role in the Paris Peace Accords that brought an end to the Vietnam War led to his receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973. Kissinger defended his role in Vietnam, arguing:

We could not simply walk away from an enterprise involving two administrations, five allied countries, and thirty-one thousand dead as if we were switching a television channel... As the leader of democratic alliances we had to remember that scores of countries and millions of people relied for their security on our willingness to stand by our allies [...] We would not be able to move the Soviet Union toward the imperative of mutual restraint [...]

Quoted in David Fromkin and James Chase, 'What are the Lessons of Vietnam?' in Walter Capps (ed.) (1991). *The Vietnam Reader*. Routledge, p. 97.



Activity 13

ATL Thinking skills

In pairs, consider the huge loss of life for the Vietnamese in this conflict, and consider how they might respond to Kissinger's defence of the war.

To achieve 'peace with honour', Nixon attempted to apply both military and diplomatic pressure. He selected Henry Kissinger as his key Foreign Policy Adviser. Kissinger was prepared to use force to get the north to reach a peace agreement. A covert 14-month bombing campaign was begun along the Ho Chi Minh Trail inside neutral Cambodia. In addition, 300,000 US and ARVN forces moved into south-western Cambodia.

This did not force the north to agree to peace terms. Diplomatically, Nixon suggested in April 1969 that there should be secret Washington–Hanoi negotiations, which would appeal to the north as it excluded the south. However, negotiations with Hanoi were stalling in Paris, and Nixon then threatened Hanoi with a 'dramatic' response if the north did not accept a compromise. Hanoi responded that Thieu would have to accept a coalition government. Nixon attempted to gain leverage via the Soviets and offered them detente in return for their assistance in ending the war.

Nixon also introduced a policy of 'Vietnamization' – the gradual withdrawal of US troops and handing the war over to the South Vietnamese government. From 1969 to 1973 US troop numbers were steadily scaled down. In June 1969, he issued the Nixon Doctrine, which represented a move away from the policies followed in Asia since Truman. It stated that nations were responsible for their own defence:

“The nations of Asia can and must increasingly shoulder the responsibility for achieving peace and progress in the area with whatever cooperation we can provide. Asian countries must seek their own destiny for if domination by the aggressor can destroy the freedom of a nation, too much dependence on a protector can eventually erode its dignity. But it is not just a matter of dignity, for dependence on foreign aid destroys the incentive to mobilize domestic resources – human, financial and material – in which the absence of which no government is capable of dealing effectively with its problems and adversaries.

The nature of US involvement under Nixon was continued military action, sustained bombing of the north, expansion of the war into Cambodia and concentrated diplomatic pressure to bring about a resolution. By the end of 1971, Nixon's policies had not achieved their aims, Hanoi had not been cowed by military pressure, nor had diplomatic pressure forced them to compromise.

Activity 14



Discuss with a partner the similarities and differences between Nixon's policies in Vietnam and his predecessors'. Why did these policies fail to achieve their aims?

Key concepts: Consequence and significance

4.7

What were the domestic effects of the Vietnam War on the US?

The economic cost

The cost of fighting the war in Vietnam soon brought inflation to the US, and by 1967 the war was costing \$2,000 million per month. Johnson attempted to conceal this from the American public and claimed the cost was around \$800 million.

The war that Johnson really wanted to fight was actually at home: a war against poverty and social injustice. He called his programme the 'Great Society'; it involved improving civil rights, eradicating poverty, increasing access to healthcare and education, and creating a cleaner environment. A 'credibility gap' developed as the difference between what the Johnson administration told Congress and what was actually happening became clear. Lyndon Johnson himself admitted later that he did not want to make the hard choices, nor did he want any debate on policy priorities. Referring to Congress, he remarked, 'I knew that the day it exploded into a major debate on the war, that day would be the beginning of the end of the Great Society' (Jeffrey W Helsing).

Opposition to the war on the grounds of economic cost grew. The US deficit increased from \$10 billion to \$30 billion and inflation continued to rise after 1968. There was widespread criticism that the government was spending millions each day to 'save 16 million people in South Vietnam' while it left 20 million poor Americans destitute. When the Nixon administration entered into negotiations for a peace settlement, the government was running out of money for the war.

The political impact

Anti-war protests

America's youth become more politically aware and active in the early 1960s. President Kennedy was seen as being one of their own generation and a leader who promised real change. Young people were actively involved in the Peace Corps (see page 124) and the civil rights movement. Vietnam became the focus for much hostility towards the government and society. Large protests against the war had begun at US universities in March 1965. When Johnson sent combat troops to Vietnam, 25,000 people protested.

The introduction of the 'draft', where young men were called up to fight, led to more social tension as only college students could defer their draft. This benefited the middle classes, and meant that most of those sent to fight were the black and white working-class poor.

The anti-war movement used different methods of protest – sit-ins, draft card burning and attempts to disrupt transport. In 1967, the group Vietnam Veterans Against the War was formed, and in October 10,000 troops held back a huge veterans' march from the Pentagon.

The impact of the Tet Offensive, 1968

In addition, public opinion turned decisively against the war after the Tet Offensive in 1968. The American public was sickened by what it saw on television. During what was the first televised war, people were able to watch images in their own homes of the US embassy being attacked by the VC, and they also saw a South Vietnamese police chief execute a VC prisoner in the street. All this seemed to indicate to the American public not only that they were not winning the war, but that they were also supporting a regime that flouted basic human rights. Anti-war protests in the United States reached a new peak.

The aftermath of the Tet Offensive resulted in a significant change of strategy for the US. Bombing of the north was halted and peace talks were initiated. At the Democratic Party Convention in Chicago in August 1968, opponents of the war came together. They had wanted the Democrats to select an anti-war candidate. Chicago's Mayor sent in the police to break up what he termed a '*lawless group of terrorists*'. Ultimately, Hubert Humphrey won the nomination and was an advocate of Johnson's policies on Vietnam. He lost the election to Richard Nixon.

During Nixon's inaugural address thousands of anti-war protestors chanted, '*Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh, the NLF is going to win*'. Vietnam had destroyed Johnson's presidency and Nixon had won the election on the promise of ending the war. It could be argued that the secrecy and paranoia of the Nixon administration was in fact due to the fear of the anti-war movement. When the Watergate Scandal that brought down Nixon occurred, his Chief of Staff, HR Haldeman, argued, '*without the Vietnam War there would have been no Watergate*'.

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

Research skills



In small groups, research the Kent State shootings. Examine the events that led up to the shootings and the response of the US media to this event.

The Chief of the National Police shoots a Vietcong officer on a street in Saigon, February 1968.



Activity 15

ATL Thinking skills

Discuss with a partner why the Vietnam War had such a negative impact on President Johnson's administration. Why did the war continue to undermine Nixon's administration?

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

ATL Thinking and research skills

In pairs, look at the three photos and identify the different anti-war protest themes they represent. Investigate the US anti-war movements, find images, protest songs and clips to create a mini-exhibition piece, or create a photo-essay examining the nature and impact of the US anti-war movements.



4.8

How did the war come to an end?

The Paris Peace Talks

At the peace talks, which officially opened in Paris on 13 May 1972 and dragged on until January 1973, Henry Kissinger negotiated with the North Vietnamese, who were also determined to achieve 'peace with honour'. Neither side was willing to compromise; the north demanded representation in the government of the south, and all sides continued to try to win an advantage at the negotiating table by achieving the upper hand on the battlefield. For the Americans, this meant again using airpower to put pressure on the communists – even bombing targets in the north that had previously been considered too sensitive. Their other strategy of pursuing detente with the Soviet Union was extended to a rapprochement with the PRC. This unprecedented shift in US foreign policy, fostering better relations with the Soviets and the Chinese, was primarily focused on forcing North Vietnam to agree to a peace settlement.

Finally, the Paris Peace Accords were signed on 27 January 1973. All American troops would withdraw from Vietnam and both north and south would respect the dividing line of the 17th parallel. Prisoners of war were exchanged and the last American troops withdrew from Vietnam two weeks after the agreement was signed. The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) was not required to leave the south but had to agree not to increase their numbers there. Thieu remained President, but the new Committee of National Reconciliation included communists.

However, peace did not come to Vietnam. The north took the initiative, and by April 1975 it had taken Saigon. By the end of 1975, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos had all fallen to Communist forces. The dominoes of Indochina had fallen.

Historians' perspectives

Was US involvement in Vietnam a complete failure?

The image of dominoes falling (see the cartoon on page 94), first used by President Eisenhower in 1953, became a reality. It certainly seems obvious that the Vietnam War failed categorically to contain communism in Indochina. Indeed, as a case study and in isolation, the Vietnam War is America's biggest and most overt failure. In its attempt to stop communism spreading from the north it indirectly fostered the growth of communist regimes in Cambodia and Laos.

However, some historians have seen that, in a broader context, the Vietnam War was not a total failure for the United States in terms of containment of communism. Jim Rohwer, in his book *Asia Rising*, writes, 'The broader aims of America's effort in Vietnam were to keep the Capitalist semi-democracies of Southeast Asia from falling to Communism', and Vietnam allowed other countries in the region, such as Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore – all of whom faced communist threats – the breathing space they needed.

Furthermore, Nixon and Kissinger had engaged in detente with the Soviet Union (from 1968) and had engineered a rapprochement with the PRC (from 1971). Part of the rationale for these highly significant diplomatic shifts was to gain leverage in the peace talks with the North Vietnamese. Thus, ultimately, the Vietnam War led to major changes in superpower relations in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

Thinking and research skills



In pairs investigate the victory of communist forces in Laos and Cambodia in 1975. Discuss with your partner the role of foreign influence and intervention in these victories.

Activity 16



Thinking, social and communication skills

Discuss in small groups the reasons for the US withdrawal from Vietnam. Focus your discussion on which factor was most significant – military failures, the shift in Cold War strategy and relationships, or domestic opposition? Present your position to the class, giving evidence to support your position.

Key concepts:

Causation and consequence

4.9

What was the nature of Canada's non-support of the war?

Canada had been consistently supportive of the US during the early stages of the Cold War. Indeed, as you have read in Chapter 2, it made a large-scale military commitment in the Korean War, and 400 Canadians were killed in the conflict. However, Lester Pearson, the Canadian Foreign Minister at the time, had attempted to be a restraining influence and opposed US plans to advance into North Korea and had encouraged ceasefire negotiations.

After the French withdrawal from Vietnam, Canada was made a member of the International Control Commission (ICC) that oversaw the 1954 Geneva Agreements, along with India and Poland. The Canadians saw their role on the ICC as a global peacemaker, whereas the US expected Canada to act as its pro-Western ally on the commission. In its role on the ICC, Canada attempted to prevent the US escalating its involvement in the south. However, the ICC had very little impact on events, and lacked funding from 1968. It officially dissolved in 1973.

Significant individual: Lester B Pearson

Lester B Pearson was a prominent Canadian politician and statesman. He was Secretary of State for External Affairs between 1948 and 1957. He also held the position of President of the United Nations General Assembly in 1952. Pearson was leader of the Liberal Party and led the opposition until he became Prime Minister of Canada in April 1963, a position he held until April 1968. Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his role in resolving the Suez Canal Crisis. Pearson also established the United Nations Emergency Force and he is considered internationally as the founder of the modern concept of 'peacekeeping'.

US–Canadian relations soured during the administrations of Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker and President John F Kennedy. Pearson's role as leader of the opposition (1958–63) was important as he challenged Kennedy's handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis and was reluctant to support US policies in Vietnam.

Then, in April 1963, Pearson was elected Prime Minister. His election victory was partly based on his international credibility and success in brokering a settlement during the 1956 Suez Crisis, for which he had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Pearson openly disagreed with the US view of the strategic importance of Vietnam, and he did not believe the US could achieve its goals in Southeast Asia. When Pearson was informed of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident and of the US intention to retaliate, he recommended that retaliatory action should not be in '*excess of that which the circumstances required*'. Pearson strongly opposed Johnson's deployment of thousands of ground troops in Vietnam and believed that Johnson had drawn the US into a war it could not win.



The disagreement over Vietnam came to a head when Pearson gave a speech at Temple University in Philadelphia in April 1965, in which he stated, 'A settlement is hard to envisage in the heat of battle, but it is now imperative to seek one'. He also called on Johnson to halt bombing and called for negotiations. This speech made the rift between Canada and the US over involvement in Vietnam public. The Canadian journalist Linda McQuaig has suggested that the speech was significant and an important factor in the growing pressure on the US to withdraw its forces.

Indeed, Johnson saw this speech as a betrayal; he was incensed not only by the content but also the timing and location of the speech. He called Pearson to meet with him at Camp David the following day and there followed an infamously angry exchange, during which Johnson allegedly stated, 'Don't you come into my living room and piss on my rug'. Pearson returned to Ottawa, and Canada officially pursued its position as 'an independent peacekeeping nation'.

As the ICC proved to be nothing more than a 'debating society', Pearson pursued diplomatic alternatives. However, his negotiation initiatives (including one, code named 'BACON', in which Canadian diplomats were sent to talk to Hanoi) all failed. These initiatives were ostensibly backed by the US. However, their failure was used as propaganda by the US, evidence of North Vietnam's intransigence, and used to justify an escalation in bombing of the north.

Activity 17



Thinking skills

In pairs, read Sources A and B and answer the questions that follow.

Source A

Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson went to Temple University in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to deliver a foreign policy speech. He had been awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1957 and was a popular speaker on the subject of world peace. After acknowledging American motives in Vietnam as 'honorable – neither mean nor imperialistic', he suggested that the bombing raids ordered by President Lyndon Johnson in the north would probably only harden the resolve of the North Vietnamese to continue the war. Pearson told the college audience that if the United States suspended its bombing raids unilaterally, it might bring the North Vietnamese to the bargaining table [...]

Charles Ritchie, who was the Canadian ambassador to the United States at the time, described what amounted to a bitter dressing down of the Nobel Prize winner by the president [President Johnson] the following day. Ritchie... said that Pearson asked Johnson what he thought of his speech. 'Awful,' said the president. Then he took Pearson by the arm and led him out onto the terrace... according to Ritchie, Johnson's unsuccessful attempt to force Pearson into seeing things his way made a lasting impression that probably affected the Canadian open-door policy toward American war resisters in the early years of the war.

James Dickerson (1999). *North to Canada: Men and Women Against the Vietnam War*. Praeger Publishers, p. 128.

Source B

In fact, Vietnam is of crucial importance in understanding the lengths to which quiet diplomacy was practiced by the Canadian government [...]

In May 1967, Pearson claimed, in reference to his Temple University call for a bombing pause, that he had spoken publicly when he thought that was of value. "But this does not

mean and will not mean... that we shall join that chorus which has denounced the United States for being in Viet Nam at all.' Paul Martin [Canadian Secretary of State for external affairs 1963–68] defended quiet diplomacy [...]: 'Diplomacy, unlike war, is a quiet art devoted to the reconciliation of conflicting interests.' Throughout the Vietnam War, a quiet accommodation between the parties was sought [...] Public statements could conceivably limit the conduct of negotiation and harden positions [...]

Paul Martin's belief in quiet diplomacy was strong enough that he had threatened to resign in 1965 in an attempt to dissuade Pearson from the bombing-pause speech. His argument was that the speech would destroy Canadian credibility in Hanoi by leading the North

Vietnamese to believe that Ottawa had sacrificed its influence in Washington. Pearson's answer was that he was a political leader who had to reflect the fact that many Canadians were upset by the American bombings.

Ramesh Thakur (1984). *Peacekeeping in Vietnam: Canada, India, Poland, and the International Commission*. University of Alberta Press, p. 224.

1. According to Source A, why did Pearson call for a halt to US bombing raids on North Vietnam?
2. According to Source A, what impact did Johnson's response to the speech have on Canadian policy?
3. With reference to Source B, discuss with a partner what the term 'quiet diplomacy' means.
4. According to Source B, what was the motive for Pearson's 'bombing-pause speech'?

The Canadian anti-war movement



Anti-Vietnam War protest in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, 1968.

As US intervention escalated, so Canadian opposition to the war grew. In Quebec, the anti-war movement was encouraged and supported by the anti-American Quebec separatist group, the *Front de libération du Québec*. Also, the number of young American men avoiding the draft by fleeing to Canada increased. Indeed, much to the antagonism of the US, Canada became a safe haven for US draft dodgers.

In 1968, the new President, Pierre Trudeau, openly welcomed the draft dodgers. These men became an important part of the anti-war movement in Canada. The Toronto Anti-Draft Programme was set up to help draft dodgers and distributed advice pamphlets. During the war 30,000 American draft dodgers went to Canada. As anti-war groups smuggled material across the border (which encouraged more desertions), President Johnson and then Nixon demanded these men be arrested and sent back to the US to stand trial. Trudeau resisted this pressure, arguing that they could be prosecuted in Canada, even though he did not pursue them.



American Vietnam War evaders at the Anti-Draft Programme office in Toronto, 1967.

Did Canada support the US war in Vietnam?

It could be argued that Canada offered the US consistent support for its war in Vietnam. Professor Victor Levant argues, in *Quiet Complicity: Canadian involvement in the Vietnam War*, that even the infamous Pearson Temple College Speech actually asserted Canada's acceptance of 'all the premises' and 'almost all the conclusions' of US policy in Vietnam. The political scientist, Ramesh Thakur, writing in *Peacekeeping in Vietnam: Canada, India, Poland and the International Commission*, concurs, stating, 'The Pearson leadership never attacked the aims of the air strikes; it queried their efficacy in weakening Hanoi's resistance, and whether negotiation could begin without a permanent bombing halt'. In addition, Canadian ministers had begun to refer to 'two Vietnams' in 1965, in contravention of the Geneva Agreements. Paul Martin declared in parliament on 25 January 1966, 'Whatever the circumstances in which these dividing lines were drawn they have come to reflect political realities which it will take time to alter'.

The Canadian government allowed approximately 30,000 Canadians to volunteer to fight in Vietnam as part of the US military, and its own forces were involved in covert operations in the region. Canada actively supported counter-insurgency operations

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

Thinking and research skills



In small groups research historical Canadian press reports that covered a) events in Vietnam, b) pro- and anti-Vietnam sentiments in Canada and c) 'draft dodgers' and their supporters in Canada. Compare and contrast the views expressed in the Canadian media at the time.

in the war, some of their agents worked for the CIA and helped supply arms and personnel into South Vietnam. Pearson allowed US troops to use Canadian training facilities. Canada provided weapons testing, produced arms and was a major supplier of equipment to US forces. Its manufacturers profited from the war: 500 firms supplied \$2.5 billion worth of materials, and due to this economic commitment to the war, unemployment in Canada fell. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and its political division, the RCMP Security Service, provided the CIA and the FBI with intelligence on the draft dodgers that remained in Canada and also information on Canada's own anti-war movement. Perhaps most controversially, a report published in 1981 claimed that the American army had tested Agent Orange in Canada in June 1966. Canada had, in fact, been a producer and supplier of napalm and Agent Orange to the US during the Vietnam War.

In 1973, Prime Minister Trudeau accepted a new role in the conflict and attempted to assist the American exit from Vietnam. Ramesh Thakur (1984) concludes that the subsequent fall of Saigon in April 1975 was 'a symbolic defeat not only of the long and costly American effort, but of the long and arduous Canadian effort to preserve South Vietnam as an independent, non-communist entity'.

Activity 18

ATL Thinking skills

- In small groups, discuss Canadian non-support of US policies in Vietnam between 1954 and 1973. Focus your discussions on the following key ideas:
 - the government's reasons for non-support of the war
 - the role of popular opinion
 - the nature of Canada's non-support of the war
 - the ways in which Canada supported the war.
- Now, in pairs, plan the following essay question.

Discuss Canadian non-support of US policies in Vietnam between 1954 and 1973.

Activity 19

ATL Research skills

Research the US and Canadian involvement in Vietnam through the Pentagon Papers, an archive from which excerpts were published in *The New York Times* from June 1971.

Key concept:

Consequence

4.10

The impact of the Vietnam War on Latin America

Latin Americans identified themselves with the Vietnam conflict. It was perceived as a war waged by an overwhelming enemy to deny the people of Vietnam their freedom. To many Latin American leaders, intellectuals and citizens, Vietnam was another chapter in a history of US imperialism that Latin America knew only too well.

As the conflict escalated, the United States began to look for support for their cause in the region. But the response of Latin American governments ranged from limited support to radical protests against US intervention.



Cuban leader Fidel Castro holds up the flag of the National Front for the liberation of South Vietnam, during his visit to the region in 1973.

The political impact

It was under Johnson's presidency that the US began to look for Latin American support for Vietnam more intensively. Brazil and Argentina represent two archetypes for how Latin America was impacted by the war in Vietnam and the responses of these countries.

One case of moderate support for the US was Brazil. In 1965, President Johnson tried to persuade his Brazilian counterpart, Castelo Branco, to contribute to US efforts. Brazil was a valuable ally of the US in the 1960s. It cut off diplomatic relations with Cuba and led the motion to sanction Castro in the OAS. Despite some unofficial promises to increase US aid, Brazil only sent medical supplies and coffee.

Predictably, the strongest attacks against US intervention came from Cuba. Not only did Fidel Castro criticize US policy in Vietnam, but he became the first leader to recognize the National Liberation Front (NLF) in December 1961. A Cuban Committee of Solidarity with Vietnam was established two years later. In the opening ceremony, Castro said, *'For Vietnam, we are ready to devote our blood.'*

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

Research and communication skills



In groups, choose one Latin American country and research their relations with the US in the 20th century. Focus your research on the following issues.

- **Economic relations:** Did the US have large investments in the country? In what areas? Was it an important trade partner for the country of your choice?
- **Diplomatic relations:** Draw a timeline of the most significant events in the history between the two countries. Were there diplomatic or political crises? If so, what was their nature and their outcome?

Select an engaging way to present your findings to your class. Reflect upon the ways that researching the background of US–Latin American relations helped you understand why the Vietnam War was a sensitive issue for many Latin Americans.

In 1967, Cuba opened the first embassy in the liberated zone in South Vietnam. Castro himself travelled to Vietnam in September 1973 and offered Cuban financial assistance as well as medical care, equipment and technology. Later, Vietnamese students were granted scholarships and fully paid expenses to study in Cuba.

Activity 20

 **Thinking, communication and research skills**
Source A

In 1963–64, Soviet–Cuban relations were good, despite differences of opinion on the utility of armed struggle in Latin America. As the decade wore on, however, Cuba grew increasingly hostile to Soviet espousal of detente and peaceful coexistence. An important reason for the disenchantment was mounting Cuban apprehension over the Soviet failure to protect Vietnam from American military power. Castro, Guevara, and other Cuban leaders saw U.S. involvement in Vietnam as a threat to Cuba. They reasoned that, if the United States could attack a socialist state so distant from its borders, then Cuba, the socialist state right on the U.S. doorstep, could not be far behind.

Rhoda P Rabkin (1991). *Cuban Politics: The Revolutionary Experiment*. Praeger Publishers.

Source B

A speech by Fidel Castro broadcast in Havana on 26 July 1966.

The Vietnamese problem concerns all nations because the matter of whether imperialism has a right to unleash death-dealing attacks at will against any small nation is at issue. Nations should be concerned – deeply concerned – about imperialist aggressive policy, this imperialist criminal policy. The Vietnamese problem is no longer Vietnam’s problem alone. This problem affects all nations. During recent months and in past weeks the imperialists have stepped up the war [...] Thousands of Cubans are ready – have expressed their disposition to aid the people of Vietnam. What do we understand by volunteers? It is simple: if Vietnam asks for aid and tells us what kind of technicians they want us to send, whether tank, anti-air, artillery, infantry [applause] we will go to our military units. We will go to our well-trained military units and well [sic] will ask them – according to the kind of technicians, soldiers, or fighters the Vietnamese need. We will ask our units which ones want to go to Vietnam. We know that whole units will be ready to go to Vietnam.

1. Discuss Sources A and B with a partner. Focus your discussion on why Fidel Castro opposed US intervention in Vietnam.
2. In groups, conduct research to investigate Soviet–Cuban relations between 1963 and 1973. To what extent do you agree with the view that ‘Cuba grew increasingly hostile to Soviet espousal of detente and peaceful coexistence’? What evidence do you have to support your position?

The social impact

Civilian protests against US intervention in Vietnam took place across Latin America. They were strong among **Puerto Ricans**, both on the island as well as in the United States. The draft of Puerto Ricans into the US armed forces to serve in Vietnam was one of the triggers for such protests. Puerto Ricans opposed this under the argument that it violated the principle of 'no taxation without representation', as they had neither congressional representation nor voting rights in US elections. It is estimated that nearly 50,000 Puerto Ricans fought in Vietnam, and hundreds of them died in the conflict.

Is Puerto Rico part of the United States?

During the Spanish–American War (1898), the United States occupied the Spanish territory of Puerto Rico. After the defeat of Spain, Puerto Rico was ceded to the United States as a 'possession', or territory. This means it is not a state of the United States.

In 1917, Puerto Ricans were granted US citizenship. This was met with resistance from nationalist Puerto Ricans, who considered it was done to draft soldiers into the US army to fight in the First World War (the US entered the war that year).

Only in 1947 were Puerto Ricans given the right to elect their own governor and, in 1952, the island drafted its constitution. Puerto Rico became an autonomous territory, but it is not a US state. Consequently, citizens cannot vote in US presidential elections. They are represented in the US Congress by a resident commissioner, who is a non-voting member.

Songwriter Roy Brown, a student at the University of Puerto Rico at the time of the Vietnam War, became involved in protest groups demanding the independence of Puerto Rico. They were highly critical of the role the US played in Vietnam. Brown's song, 'Monón', depicts the US as a man who walks around digging graves and dropping bombs in Vietnam.

The Chilean folk group, Quilapayún, recorded 'X Vietnam' ('For Vietnam') in 1968. The song denounced US intervention in Vietnam and referred to the US as a 'black eagle that attacks the heroic people of Vietnam with its claws'.

Cartoons were also used to express opposition to Vietnam. Argentine cartoonist Quino drew the comic strip 'Mafalda', in which children reflected on world issues.



'Mafalda' on the Vietnam War.

Essay planning

After reviewing the material in this chapter, plan the following essay questions.

1. To what extent was America's involvement in Vietnam ideologically motivated between 1954 and 1973?
2. Compare and contrast the reasons for, and nature of, US involvement in Vietnam during the Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson administrations.
3. Examine the changing nature of US involvement in Vietnam after the Second World War.
4. 'It was the negative domestic impact of the war that forced the US to retreat from Vietnam in 1973.' To what extent do you agree with this statement?
5. Discuss Canadian non-support of US policies in Vietnam between 1954 and 1973.
6. Examine the impact of the Vietnam War on Latin America.



05

Kennedy to Carter



This chapter will examine the foreign policies of US presidents John F Kennedy (1961–63), Richard Nixon (1969–74) and Jimmy Carter (1977–81). It considers the characteristics of, and reasons for, foreign policy initiatives, decisions, actions and interventions, and the implications of US foreign policy for the region. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, Nixon's covert operations in Chile, and Carter's quest for human rights and the Panama Canal Treaty are explored in depth.

President John F Kennedy giving a speech, 1962.

Essay questions:

- Examine the reasons for, and the implications for the region of, Kennedy's Alliance for Progress.
- Discuss the impact of Nixon's covert operations and interventions in Chile.
- Evaluate the successes and failures of Carter's quest for human rights and the Panama Canal Treaty (1977).

Timeline

1960	Nov	John F Kennedy elected President
1961	April	Attempted invasion of Cuba at Bay of Pigs
	June	Alliance for Progress launched
	Aug	Berlin Wall erected
		Charter of Punta del Este establishes the framework for the Alliance for Progress
1962	Oct	Cuban Missile Crisis
1963	Nov	John F Kennedy assassinated in Dallas; Vice President Lyndon Baines Johnson becomes President
1964	Aug	Gulf of Tonkin Incident; Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
1965	March	Operation Rolling Thunder launched
1968	Jan	Tet Offensive
	Nov	Richard Nixon elected President
1969	May	Paris Peace talks begin
1970	Sept	Elections in Chile. Nixon warned that Chile could become 'the next Cuba' and sends aid to Salvador Allende's opponents
1972	Feb	Nixon visits the People's Republic of China
1973	Jan	Paris Peace Agreement on Vietnam War
	Sept	Allende is overthrown and the armed forces seize power in Chile
1974	Aug	Watergate Scandal; Nixon resigns; Vice President Gerald Ford becomes President
1975	April	Vietnam unified by Communist forces from North Vietnam
1976	Nov	Jimmy Carter elected President
1977	Sept	Panama Canal Treaty
1979	June	SALT II signed in Vienna
	Nov	Iranian hostage crisis
	Dec	Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
1980	Nov	Ronald Reagan elected President

Key concepts: Causation and significance

5.1 What were the aims and reasons for Kennedy's Alliance for Progress?

Venezuelan President Rómulo Betancourt and US President John F Kennedy at La Morita, Venezuela, during an official meeting for the Alliance for Progress in 1961.



John F Kennedy was a young and energetic President and wanted to establish a government focused on reform. He made it clear in his inaugural address on 20 January 1961 that he would pursue a closer relationship with Latin America:

“ To our sister republics south of our border, we offer a special pledge – to convert our good words into deeds – in a new alliance for progress – to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty.

The aims of the Alliance for Progress

Kennedy's **Alliance for Progress** (*Alianza para el Progreso*), a ten-year plan for Latin America, was launched in March 1961. It sought to establish closer political and economic cooperation between Latin America and the United States, with the aims of promoting democracy and economic development in Latin America. Kennedy formally announced the program in front of 200 Latin American diplomats at the White House. He emphasized that his aims for the *Alianza para el Progreso* were unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, and focused on the basic needs of the Latin American people for ‘homes, work and land, health and schools – *techo, trabajo y tierra, salud y escuela*’.

“ ... let me be the first to admit that we North Americans have not always grasped the significance of this common mission [...]

... we propose to complete the revolution of the Americas, to build a hemisphere where all men can hope for a suitable standard of living and all can live out their lives in dignity and in freedom.

To achieve this goal political freedom must accompany material progress [...]

One of Kennedy's campaign assistants, Richard N Goodwin, was responsible for coining the term '**Alliance for Progress**'. During Kennedy's presidential campaign, he came across a magazine in Spanish published in Texas, *Alianza*. He thought that was the most appropriate term to redefine US–Latin American relations. The phrase '*Alianza para el Progreso*' was first used by Kennedy during a campaign speech in October 1960.

Let us once again awaken our American revolution until it guides the struggles of people everywhere – not with an imperialism of force or fear but the rule of courage and freedom and hope for the future of man.

Address by President Kennedy at a White House reception for Latin American diplomats and members of Congress, 13 March 1961.

Eisenhower's supporters claimed they had founded the Alliance for Progress and all that Kennedy had done was add an 'appealing title'. However, Kennedy was seen as a President who would adopt a more idealist and activist foreign policy, and move the world towards economic progress and stability, setting out to improve relations through peaceful economic development and cooperation.

This was also possible because Latin America was moving towards cooperation and integration. You have, for example, read about the 1960 Act of Bogotá which, under the auspices of the OAS, provided Operation Pan America with funds for social improvement and economic development (see page 32). Kennedy had, in fact, designed a comprehensive reform package and pledged to contribute the majority of the funds necessary to achieve these aims. Latin American countries were to contribute with their own resources.

Activity 1



Thinking skills

Think back to the previous chapters that describe US relations with Latin America. Why do you think the Alliance for Progress had a strong appeal? To what extent was this a break from previous US approaches to the region?

Reasons for the Alliance for Progress

Why Kennedy proposed the alliance

There were a number of motives for Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Ideologically his administration promoted the concept of 'nation-building' by assisting countries to modernize, as poverty fostered communism. At a regional level, Kennedy became convinced that if he did not actively pursue nation-building, more revolutions based on the Cuban model would break out in Latin America. There were also broader ideological objectives in the context of the Cold War.

- **Ideological motives:** One of the principles of the Alliance for Progress was that nations that achieved higher levels of economic development became politically more stable and thus less likely to become communist. The US political theorist and economist, Walt W Rostow, who later became a member of Kennedy's administration, popularized the notion of 'nation-building' in his book, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (1960). At the heart of Rostow's thesis was the belief that poverty encouraged communism and, consequently, its reduction would contain communism. He claimed that '*modern societies must be built, and we are prepared to help build them*'. Societies that were struggling to develop needed to be stimulated by a well-funded economic assistance program.
- **The fear of the expansion of communism in the region:** Particularly after 1959, the US was urged to stop the expansion of communist ideology in the '*most dangerous area in the world*', as Kennedy referred to Latin America. He wanted to strengthen the US position in its '*own backyard*'. His policy was influenced by the US counter-revolutionary tradition and, as a power with a global position to protect, Kennedy believed that any revolutionary change in Latin America was a threat to US

interests. The failure to keep Latin America on its side would call into question the international leadership, credibility and security of the US.

- **The influence of the Cold War context:** By the 1960s, the US perceived threats to its security from both the USSR and the People's Republic of China. The dominant economic and military position the US had held after the Second World War was waning as the Soviets had gained ground in weapons technology, and were ahead of the US in terms of the 'Space Race' (launching Sputnik in 1957). Kennedy did not want to cede any influence or territory to the communists, in line with the established US policy of containment. He referred back to '*what happened in the case of China at the end of World War Two*', and argued for a commitment to stop communist activity in the region. Also, he wanted to prevent political turmoil in the 'Third World', as this could jeopardize US trade, military bases and strategic territories. He also wanted to prevent regimes hostile to the US gaining power, as this could translate into votes against US policies in international organizations such as the United Nations.

The Latin American approach to the Alliance for Progress

Like the US, Latin America had ideological, political and economic reasons to welcome the Alliance for Progress.

- **Ideological motivations:** After the Second World War, the economic theory of structuralism became a popular explanation for underdevelopment in Latin America. It argued that underdevelopment and poverty would only be solved with industrialization. Industrialization created job opportunities, which in turn led to an increase in nations' productivity. In order to promote conditions for industrialization in the region, international cooperation had to be promoted. Argentinian economist Raúl Prebisch welcomed the US proposal, '*This is the moment to act: to have a hemispheric policy toward Latin America*'.
- **Demands for a Marshall Plan for Latin America:** Since the end of the Second World War, Latin American leaders had demanded that the US devise an aid program similar to the Marshall Plan for the region. Indeed, there was some resentment towards the US for the investment and aid given to Western Europe and Asia following the Second World War, while it had shown little interest in developing a program for Latin America.
- **Political change:** The fall of many military dictatorships between 1956 and 1960 contributed to an atmosphere in which it was believed that the Alliance for Progress would produce the desired effects. Democratically elected presidents such as Rómulo Betancourt (Venezuela) and Arturo Frondizi (Argentina) became enthusiastic supporters of Kennedy's proposal. Frondizi welcomed the Alliance for Progress, saying, '*It implies a political and economic change in the attitudes of USA towards Latin America*' (Félix Luna).

Activity 2



Thinking and communication skills


Divide your class into two main groups, A and B. In your groups, discuss the challenges and opportunities the Alliance for Progress presented to both the US and Latin American countries. Group A will then give a short presentation on the challenges and Group B the opportunities of the Alliance for Progress.

The Punta del Este Conference

In August 1961, delegates from 20 Latin American countries joined a US delegation in Punta del Este, Uruguay, to officially establish the Alliance for Progress. In Punta del Este, Kennedy emphasized that the aim of the Alliance for Progress was to give '*full recognition of the right of all the people to share fully in our progress. For there is no place in*

democratic life for institutions which benefit the few while denying the needs of the many’.

However, part of the enthusiasm and support for what was meant to become a new era of US–Latin American relations had disappeared. In April 1961, the US backed the invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs. This showed that the US was prepared to break international agreements, such as the OAS Charter, in the struggle against communism. The Bay of Pigs Invasion not only harmed the US because it was a fiasco, but also because it tarnished the country’s reputation in Latin America. Cuba, still an OAS member in 1961, was represented in Punta del Este by the Minister of Industry, revolutionary leader Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara.



▲ Che Guevara speaking at the Conference of Punta del Este, in which he accused the US of promoting the Alliance for Progress to isolate Cuba and prevent the spread of the revolution.

In order to achieve the aims outlined by Kennedy, the Punta del Este Charter proposed the following:

- to increase per capita economic growth by at least 2.5 per cent per year
- to achieve price stability and limit inflation or deflation
- to foster a more equitable distribution of income and encourage the diversification of national economies and industrialization
- to encourage a comprehensive land reform to provide equitable access to land and raise agricultural productivity
- to eliminate adult illiteracy by 1970, increase life expectancy, and improve housing and health services.

The charter program promised the US would supply at least \$20 billion in a ten-year period. Latin American countries were expected to make further investments. Participating countries had to draw up detailed plans for national development and these plans then had to be submitted to an ‘inter-American’ board of experts for approval. To fund the development programs in Latin America, national tax codes had to be adjusted to tax the rich more than the poor and land reform was to be implemented.

Although Latin American countries agreed with the aims of the alliance, they voiced their disagreement with the US as to its implementation. To make their voices heard, leaders capitalized on anti-US sentiment which had resurfaced after the Bay of Pigs Invasion. The US had to make concessions.

Activity 3

ATL Thinking and communication skills

Read the source and answer the questions that follow.

An extract from the inaugural speech by Eduardo Haedo, President of Uruguay, August 1961:

“Those who think we are gathered here with a beggarly attitude are mistaken. We all feel capable of continuing to fight for democracy and the betterment of our peoples even without this Conference. Never before have the powerful nations, whose prosperity was founded in the poverty of the underdeveloped nations, had a responsibility so concrete and clear.

Quoted in Morgan Flynn (2014). ‘Theory, Principle and Diplomatic Leverage: Latin America Agency in the Founding of the Alliance for Progress’. Thesis, University of Colorado.

1. What is the message of this source? To whom is the message directed?
2. With reference to its origins, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of this source for a historian studying US–Latin American relations under Kennedy.

One of the contentious issues was the extent of the aid offered. Latin American leaders were eager to obtain specific details about US funding for the alliance. Until Punta del Este, the US had been reluctant to provide a specific aid figure. Latin American delegates argued that it was hardly possible for them to commit themselves to making drastic tax and land reforms to promote modernization unless they knew the extent of US commitment. Finally, the US explicitly committed 'at least \$20 billion in 10 years'. This was considered a major improvement from the \$1.7 billion aid for Latin America between 1945 and 1950. But, more importantly, a figure demonstrating the extent of US commitment had been set.

Another area of disagreement was the structure of the committee that was to oversee the distribution of funds and approve the projects. Argentinian President Arturo Frondizi made the case against the US's initial proposal of a 'Wise Men' Committee, all based in Washington DC. He demanded the formation of a group of experts from a variety of countries, who would be familiar with 'the true needs of our countries'. When an international nine-member committee was approved, it gave Latin America a voice and greater balance between the US and Latin America was achieved.

Latin American leaders argued that the process of approving the distribution of aid was bureaucratic and that it would take a long time before any assistance reached their countries. Again, the US gave in and approved the provision of 'emergency funds'.

By the end of the conference, Kennedy was able to get the endorsement of all Latin American states, bar Cuba, for the Charter of Punta del Este. He worked hard to further promote the alliance and visited Mexico, Puerto Rico, Venezuela and Colombia. He also met with the six Presidents of Central America in Costa Rica in March 1963.

Other initiatives under Kennedy

The Peace Corps

On 2 March 1961, President Kennedy announced the formation of the Peace Corps in a television broadcast, and it was formally established by the Peace Corps Act in September by Congress. The Peace Corps was a volunteer program that set out to help people outside of the US understand American culture, and also help Americans understand other cultures. The Act stated that the corps aimed to promote world peace and friendship through helping countries meet their needs for trained manpower.

Its main roles involved economic and social development projects. Peace Corps volunteers worked with government and non-government organizations.

Kennedy understood that Third World nationalism was a powerful force and wanted to prevent these countries from allying with the USSR. Therefore, the Alliance for Progress and the Peace Corps were initiatives to prevent revolution and to control change.

Military aid and training to Latin America

Kennedy also fostered and approved new programs to improve the coercive abilities of the Latin American armed forces by equipping and training them to fight against guerrilla groups. Kennedy responded to the perceived Soviet threat in the region and approved approximately \$77 million a year in military aid to Latin America. He also authorized the development of new training courses on riot control, psychological

CHALLENGE YOURSELF



Research and communication skills

In small groups, research the role and activities of the Peace Corps. Where was the Peace Corps effective? Where were its activities more controversial? Create a small exhibition of the cross-regional work of the Peace Corps in the 1960s.

warfare and counter-guerrilla operations. In 1962, the US paid for the training of 9,000 Latin American military personnel. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara argued that the cost and intervention was necessary to establish well disciplined and trained armed forces to support moderate leaders in Latin America. Through these means, Latin America would achieve the internal stability necessary for *'economic and social development and [ensure] the success of the Alliance for Progress'*.

The administration's actions undermined its public commitment to democracy and constitutionalism. For example, Secretary of State Dean Rusk explained the toleration of, and economic assistance to, the *'deplorable'* Duvalier regime in Haiti as the US needed its vote to exclude Cuba from the inter-American community. In addition, the administration refused to work with popularly elected left-wing parties, and gave substantial support to opponents of Chile's Socialist Salvador Allende in an attempt to prevent him winning the 1964 election.

In September 1961, Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles wrote to President Kennedy and protested about the new funding of the military and counter-insurgency programs in Latin America. He expressed doubts about how these programs would support democracy, and warned that *'we are creating armed forces capable of seizing power'*. Indeed, Alliance for Progress funds paid for counter-insurgency training and paramilitary forces. This reinforced skepticism in Latin America regarding US motives.

In funding military activities, Kennedy violated the pledge that he had made in his Alliance for Progress speech to reduce US military expenditure in the region. This undermined democracy by strengthening the role of the military and internal security forces in Latin America. This policy highlighted an important shift in US security policy, as it focused on potential internal enemies rather than on the defence from foreign interventions.

The Kennedy administration justified its actions by claiming, *'The principal threat faced in Latin America is Communist subversion and indirect attack'* (Stephen G Rabe). It was believed that Castro would attempt to spread his revolution through guerrilla warfare in the region, and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev had declared in January 1961 that the USSR would back *'wars of national liberation'*. Khrushchev suggested to Kennedy that there were a number of governments in Latin America who opposed the interests of the people. In reality, much of the violence in the region was perpetrated by *'home-grown revolutionary organizations'*.

Activity 4

ATL Thinking skills

Do you think Kennedy's actions were in line with the spirit of the alliance or did he have ulterior motives? If so, what might they have been?

Key concepts: Consequence and significance

5.2 Successes of the Alliance for Progress

- Diplomatically the Alliance for Progress fostered, in the short term, better relations between the US and Latin America. There was widespread admiration for the aims of the alliance and Kennedy's energetic leadership.

Kennedy and Colombian President Alberto Lleras inaugurate housing for the poor in Bogotá, December 1961.



- Politically, Kennedy advocated democratic states. For example, the US temporarily withdrew its diplomatic representatives in Peru following the military coup against democratically elected candidate, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, in 1962.
- Economic assistance to Latin America nearly tripled between 1960 and 1961, and the US supplied \$1.4 billion per year to Latin America from 1962 to 1967. The total amount of aid given up to 1968 was \$22.3 billion. The program saw some key economic successes, including growth per capita output in the region during the 1960s of 2.6 per cent, which exceeded the Alliance for Progress goal of 2.5 per cent. Overall, nine countries, including Mexico and Brazil, reached the program's growth target.
- The Alliance for Progress also led to some improvements in the distribution of land and farming techniques. There were changes to tax laws and the establishment of central planning agencies. These agencies facilitated improvements in financial institutions, built airports, developed water purification projects and provided housing.
- Adult literacy improved across the region, access to secondary schools increased and the number of people attending universities more than doubled. As well as new school buildings, the program distributed free textbooks and often free meals were provided for students in school. Health clinics were set up, which improved medical provisions for the poor.

Activity 5

ATL Thinking and research skills

1. Discuss the significance of the Alliance for Progress for Latin America.
2. In small groups, develop four criteria for what makes political actions significant. In the same group, apply your criteria to the five successes of the Alliance for Progress and attempt to rank them from the most to the least significant.

For Kennedy, a model regime was Rómulo Betancourt's Venezuela. Betancourt had been elected President in 1959 and was a liberal anti-communist. Betancourt was a firm supporter of the Alliance for Progress and was the first to get a presidential visit from Kennedy, in December 1961.

Another interesting example is Colombia. The country had enjoyed relative political stability since the mid-1950s; ties with the US were close and it was not threatened by communism. Yet, Colombia received approximately \$200 million during Kennedy's administration alone.

Why did Colombia become a major recipient of Alliance for Progress funds?

- Colombia was an ally of the US in its foreign policy. It played a significant role in the expulsion of Cuba from the OAS (see Case Study) in 1962.
- Colombia's economic problems were solvable and the aid could, therefore, have a positive impact.
- Success in Colombia would encourage other countries to cooperate to achieve the aims of the program.
- Kennedy needed to show examples of success to justify the Alliance for Progress at home, as well as to campaign for his re-election.

Activity 6

ATL Thinking, research and communication skills

In groups, choose a Latin American country (other than Colombia) that received aid under the Alliance for Progress.

1. Find information on the main social and economic problems by 1961 for your chosen country.
2. How much aid did the country of your choice receive? How was it distributed?
3. To what extent did the aid received contribute to the social and economic situation? What was the political reaction to the attempts to modernize the country under the Alliance for Progress?

Share your findings with the rest of the class. Once everyone has presented their case, evaluate the extent to which the Alliance for Progress fulfilled its aims for the region. Analyse the reasons why the Alliance for Progress failed to reach some targets. Now, read the following section and discuss to what extent it explains the failures you have identified in the country of your choice.

Key concept: Consequence

5.3 Failures of the Alliance for Progress

Although several nations reached or exceeded the targets set by the program, there were others that did not reach the goal. For example, Haiti had lower growth in the 1960s than it had had in the 1950s. During the 'decade of development' the overall growth rate for Latin America was just 1.5 per cent.

Some of the reforms did not have the expected outcome. The principle of setting a minimum wage to improve the standard of living often failed, as in the case of Nicaraguan workers, where it was set so low it had no impact at all on wages. It also encouraged employers to replace labour with machines, as in El Salvador, which in turn led to more unemployment. By the end of the 1960s over half the population still subsisted on an annual per capita income of \$120.18 and unemployment had risen to 25 million. Perhaps the most significant failures of the Alliance for Progress were political.

The Mann Doctrine

In 1964, Thomas Mann became President Johnson's Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and coordinator of the Alliance for Progress. The Mann Doctrine broke with the idealism of Kennedy's administration and offered a more practical approach to international relations – an approach sometimes called 'realpolitik'.

Latin American social development and the promotion of democracy were no longer priorities for the US, which concentrated on fighting communism and protecting US interests and investments. Military regimes overthrowing democratic governments were not necessarily condemned by the US if they brought political stability. This was because, under this doctrine, political stability rather than economic prosperity was perceived as the key to a Latin America free from communism.

Gradually, the Alliance for Progress lost momentum and in 1973 the OAS disbanded the committee set up to implement it.

Several reasons can help to explain why the Alliance for Progress did not become 'the revolution of the Americas'.

- **Insufficient funding:** It has been suggested that the total US funding for the program, \$20 billion, was simply insufficient to effect change. In March 1969, the US Ambassador to the Organization of American States, William T Denzer, suggested, 'One sees that not that much money has been put into Latin America after all'. Indeed, the allocation of \$20 billion was only \$10 per person in Latin America.
- **The Alliance for Progress was not a Marshall Plan:** Whereas the aid received by European nations under the Marshall Plan had come in the form of grants, Latin America paid interest for the US loans. The Alliance for Progress, therefore, increased national debt. Also, Brazilian nationalists claimed that US businesses extracted more assets from the country than were invested in the program. Indeed, five times more money left Brazil in earnings and dividends to US companies than was invested.
- **Population growth:** The US administration underestimated the extent and impact of population growth in the region, which was at 3 per cent per annum, higher than the intended 2.5 per cent growth in GDP (gross domestic product) per year. Even if some economies were growing, their populations were growing faster. For example, the Alliance for Progress health clinics built across Latin America had a limited impact on improving healthcare, as they were insufficient to meet the needs of the growing population. Despite cutting the number of children not attending school from 52 to 43 per cent, the absolute number of illiterate people increased during the 1960s.
- **Failure to understand Latin American problems:** Cultural differences between the US and Latin American nations may have been underestimated. Latin America had a heritage of planned economies and strong authoritarian central governments.
- **Resistance to change:** The traditional Latin American elites resisted reform and societies remained deeply divided by class and politically unstable. The wealthiest 10 per cent in Argentina and Brazil remained in control of the vast plantations and haciendas. There were more than 15 million peasant families living in Latin America and only 1 million benefited from land reforms. Latin American nationalists dismissed the alliance as 'yankee imperialism'. Thus, instead of promoting reformist civilian rule, the alliance fostered several conservative military coups.
- **Opposition within the US:** American business interests were more concerned about the security of their own private investments in Latin America and were uninterested in promoting social or political reform.
- **Loss of faith in the US:** As with Bay of Pigs in 1961, the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 undermined the credibility of the alliance in the eyes of many Latin Americans. Under Lyndon Johnson, the US abandoned the premise that the reduction of poverty could prevent communism and replaced it with the notion that political stability, in whatever shape it came, was the main deterrent for communist uprisings in the region. This served to justify US interventions in, for example, the Dominican Republic, leading to its invasion in 1965. It seemed clear the US was not operating without self-interest in the region. Also, President Richard Nixon commissioned Nelson Rockefeller to assess the implications of the program on Latin America, in February 1969. In his report, Rockefeller claimed that on his four trips to the regions he observed '*general frustration over the failure to achieve a more rapid improvement in standards of living. The United States, because of its identification with the failure of the Alliance for Progress to live up to expectations, is blamed.*'

Activity 7

ATL Thinking skills

Read the source below and answer the questions that follow.

“The fear of another Castro in the Americas led Kennedy to attempt to prevent such a development by bettering the lives of the population through a controlled program within the framework of private enterprise. Since most of the land and most of the wealth in Latin America is controlled by some 3 percent of the population, such a program was doomed to begin with. For land reform and tax reform – the props upon which such control is stabilized – essentially meant that the semi-feudal conditions existing in parts of Latin America would be subverted. Because the small percentage of landowners derived their wealth from inequitable tax programs and control of land, and since many of these landowners were represented in government, the Alliance for Progress would not really be supported from inside Latin America... Kennedy’s program floundered because of an unspoken alliance of Latin American landowners, who feared the program, and American businessmen, who resented the program.

Peter Schwab and Jerome Lee Shneidman (1974). *John F. Kennedy*. Twayne Publishers, pp. 130–31.

1. According to this source, what factors within Latin America hampered economic development?
2. Explain to your partner what Schwab and Shneidman might mean by the term ‘*unspoken alliance*’ between Latin American landowners and American businessmen?
3. Discuss why US businessmen might not have supported the Alliance for Progress.

Activity 8

ATL Thinking, self-management and social skills

In pairs, create an infographic that shows the key factors that undermined the objectives of the Alliance for Progress.

- Kennedy underestimated the extent of Latin America’s socioeconomic problems.
- Kennedy and his advisers erroneously attempted to apply ideas that had worked in Europe and Asia to Latin America. They confidently drew lessons from history: the US had rebuilt Western Europe and Japan in the immediate post-war years and it could do the same in Latin America.
- The Mann Doctrine.
- Kennedy’s administration underestimated the problems resulting from the population growth in Latin America.
- The political scientist, John Gerassi, suggested that the alliance’s failure was caused by its allegiance to ‘*private enterprise*’. He argues that most US businessmen were against the program, and operated in Latin America because they could control law enforcement and aimed ‘*to milk the lands dry of all their wealth*’.
- Latin American leaders were reluctant to implement wide-ranging reforms.
- The US hoped the middle classes in Latin America would lead the modernization and democratizing process, but in some countries the fear of communism led the middle classes to back dictatorships (Argentina, Brazil and Chile).
- President Kennedy ran out of time; he was assassinated in November 1963 before his program could come to fruition.
- President Kennedy’s successors did not coherently support it, and changed the nature and direction of the program.
- The Johnson administration took advice from North American businessmen such as David Rockefeller.
- The Johnson administration shifted responsibility for the failure of the alliance on to the Nixon administration which, it argued, ‘*ignored*’ Latin America.

Historians' perspectives

Peter Schwab and Jerome Lee Shneidman (1974) assert that the *Alliance for Progress... was an attempt at controlled social revolution in Latin America... the Alliance for Progress went on to become one of the greatest failures of the Kennedy administration* (John F. Kennedy. Twayne Publishers, p. 130).

Indeed, few historians have disputed the idea that the Alliance for Progress program failed, although Harvey S Perloff (1969) argues, 'Properly seen, the Alliance is a program in the making' and 'its vast and complex aims cannot be judged as failures as they were impossible to achieve in the short term'. He goes on to argue, 'The Alliance represents one of the most ambitious concepts in the history of international relations, involving a cooperative effort of 20 countries in this hemisphere' (*Alliance for Progress: A Social Invention in the Making*. Johns Hopkins Press, p. xiv).

The American historian, Arthur M Schlesinger Jr, who wrote influential biographies of Kennedy between 1965 and 2005, including his book, *A Thousand Days: John F Kennedy in the White House*, similarly argues that 'the Alliance was never really tried. It lasted about a thousand days, not a sufficient test, and thereafter only the name remained'. Schlesinger Jr also argues that during the subsequent Johnson administration the Alliance for Progress was 'put into the service of American business'.

However, Jerome Levinson and Juan de Onis argue, 'Between the overambitious idealism of its development goals and the pointless obsessiveness of its concern for security, the United States really undermined the Alliance before it could get started' (revised edition, 1977. *The Alliance that Lost its Way*. University of California Press, p. 73).

Activity 9

ATL Thinking skills

Source A

“ Although Kennedy launched the Alliance in a White House speech before congressional leaders and hemisphere ambassadors that excited hopes of dramatic change for the better, there were understandable doubts. One speech, however sincerely delivered, was not enough to convince his audience that traditional neglect of the region was at an end. Latin American representatives to the United States could not shun the belief that Kennedy's idealism was little more than a tool for combating Communism. Some derisively called the Alliance for Progress the Fidel Castro Plan.

Doubts about Kennedy's intentions toward Latin America intensified with the failure of an invasion by Cuban exiles of Cuba – at the Bay of Pigs – that was financed, trained, and equipped by the United States.

Robert Dallek (2011). *John F Kennedy: An Unfinished Life*. Little, Brown and Company, p. 25.

Source B

“ That the Alliance for Progress was a Cold War policy was never a subject of dispute... What presumably distinguished the Latin American policy of John F. Kennedy was the belief that the key to stability and anti-communism was democracy, economic growth and development, and social change. The Alliance for Progress, as one observer put it, was 'enlightened anti-communism'. An examination of the course of inter-American relations between 1961 and 1963 points, however, to the need to separate the President's words from his decisions and his Administration's deeds. Through its recognition policy, internal security initiatives, and military and economic aid programs, the Administration demonstrably bolstered regimes and groups that were undemocratic, conservative, and frequently repressive. The short-term security that anti-Communist elites could provide was purchased at the expense of long-term political and social democracy.

Stephen G Rabe 'Controlling Revolutions – Latin America, the Alliance for Progress, and Cold War Anti-Communism' in Thomas G Paterson (ed.) (1989). *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963*. Oxford University Press, p. 118.

Source C

“ Kennedy’s own readiness to visit Latin America and meet with its leaders, [was]... quite unique among American presidents. But the Alliance was slow to get off the ground. The problems it addressed were deep-rooted; implementation was hampered on the U.S. side by bureaucratic inertia and poor understanding of the societies to be rescued by this means. In Latin America it was obstructed by local power structures, anxious to protect privileges. Any political movement that seemed bent on challenging these structures could soon appear dangerously radical. Kennedy was overly conscious of Castro’s own route to power, and so he determined to deny others claiming to be non-Marxist democrats the same route... The administration worried about any government that failed to be robust enough in its opposition to Castro or was overzealous in reform, even when democratic and in such important countries as Argentina and Brazil. This right to interfere in the affairs of Latin American states was passed from one president to another, but the Cold War and the Cuban example provided a rationale for sticking with some unsavory regimes while rejecting those with honorable intentions.

Professor of War Studies Lawrence Freedman (2000). *Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam*. Oxford University Press, p. 229.

Source D

“ At the outset, administration spokesmen were excessively optimistic about what the Alliance for Progress could realistically expect to accomplish. But as the decade unfolded, both the rhetoric and the optimism sagged. Events, in the United States as well as abroad, seriously undermined the basic goals of the Alliance: simultaneous achievement of social equality, political stability, economic growth, constitutional democracy for the Latin American countries, and the strengthening of national security for the United States. Lack of enthusiasm for the program by American business, counted on for substantial private investments, hampered the prospects for success. So did the tangled and, at times, naive, bureaucratic framework charged with administering the Alliance. Also, few of the Latin American countries had governments that were fully responsive, and during Kennedy’s short term as President, seven military coups added additional strains. Generally Kennedy followed a pragmatic pattern of non-recognition and suspension of all aid programs if the new regime appeared opposed to the Alliance.

Jim F Heath (1976). *Decade of Disillusionment: The Kennedy–Johnson Years*. Indiana University Press, p. 76.

1. According to Source A, why did Latin America doubt Kennedy’s real intentions for the Alliance for Progress?
2. According to Source B, what were the implications of Kennedy’s ‘enlightened anti-communism’ for the Latin American region between 1961 and 1963?
3. Compare and contrast what Sources C and D reveal about the failures of the Alliance for Progress.
4. In small groups, look at the date of publication of each of these sources and organize Sources A to D into chronological order. Discuss the extent to which historians’ perspectives on the nature and impact of the Alliance for Progress has changed over time. What does this tell you about the notion that history is not ‘fixed, final and forever’?

Essay planning

In pairs, develop a detailed essay plan for the following question.

Discuss the reasons for, and the implications for the region of Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress.

You could use the following points to help you develop your paragraph opening points. You will need to add evidence, include dates, details and events, and where possible add a specific and relevant historian’s viewpoint.

Reasons for:

- fear of the political and social consequences of the Cuban Revolution
- strategic reasons
- broader Cold War context and the policy of containment
- success of economic programs in Western Europe and Asia
- requests for assistance from Latin America.

Positive implications:

- improved US–Latin American relations
- economic growth
- land redistribution
- healthcare and education
- stable governments.

Negative implications:

- brought increased tension between the US and Latin America
- limited or no economic growth
- limited land redistribution
- population growth meant limited healthcare and education
- military coups and dictatorships.

Key concepts:


Consequence and significance

5.4**What was the impact of Nixon's covert operations in Chile?**

“It is a sad fact that Chile has taken the path to communism... we have suffered a grievous defeat.
Edward Korry, US Ambassador to Chile, 1970.

Richard Nixon, former Vice President under Dwight Eisenhower, won the US presidential elections in 1968 for the Republican Party. The elections took place against an agitated background. The murders of Martin Luther King Jr and Robert F Kennedy; the standstill in the Vietnam War and its impact on US society all played a role in Nixon's victory. With the promise of 'law and order' and the commitment to achieve 'peace with honor' in Vietnam, Nixon was elected President of the US in 1968.

Richard Nixon was President of the US between 1969 and 1974.



In terms of Nixon's objectives towards Latin America, he wanted to prevent any other country from following the Cuban path to communism. This explains US involvement in Chile.

“ Actions approved by the U.S. government during this period aggravated political polarization and affected Chile's long tradition of democratic elections.

A White House press release, November 2000.

Although Nixon pursued improved relations with the Soviet Union and China, he remained greatly fearful of the spread of communism in Latin America. He had supported Kennedy's Bay of Pigs invasion and his handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis. When he entered office, he authorized an increase in covert operations in Cuba.

His policy towards Latin America had major differences with Kennedy's Alliance for Progress. Although aid continued to be provided, Nixon argued that trade, rather than aid, would help Latin American development. Nixon's policy was more pragmatic than his predecessor's, as events in Chile would show.

President Nixon's covert operations in Chile, the use of CIA operations to attempt to affect a national election in 1970 and its broader implications, were controversial at the time and continue to incite historical debate today. Nixon covertly intervened in Chile to prevent Salvador Allende Gossens from becoming the first popularly elected Socialist president in the western hemisphere. When this failed and Allende was elected, Nixon then authorized covert operations to undermine and destabilize his regime. In September 1973, Allende was overthrown in a military coup. He was found dead in La Moneda presidential palace. The brutal dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet replaced his democratically elected government.



Chile and its neighbouring countries.

Chile: Background

Since independence in 1810 and until the 1973 coup, Chile was a relatively stable country in terms of its political developments. However, the economy, dependent on the international markets, was less stable. During the Second World War, Chile became the world's largest supplier of copper. However, Chilean copper was processed in the US, where most of the revenue remained. After the war, international prices of copper declined. Chilean governments used foreign loans and printed money to compensate for the loss in trade. These policies contributed to inflation and economic instability.

Earlier in this chapter you studied how population growth in the 1960s became one of the factors that contributed to economic problems and to the failure of the Alliance for Progress. Chile was no exception; between 1960 and 1970 Chile's population increased by 1.5 million people.

After the Second World War, Chile had three main political groups: conservatives (who defended the status quo), liberals (the Christian Democratic Party) and radicals. Liberals promoted reforms of some areas, for example education and taxation, while radicals stood at the left of the political spectrum. They demanded nationalization of the copper industry and extensive land reforms.

One of the radical parties was the FRAP (*Frente de Acción Popular*, or Popular Action Front), a coalition of communists and socialists. Salvador Allende became presidential candidate for the FRAP in the 1958 elections, but Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez, an independent with conservative and centre-liberal support, became President.

Significant individual: Salvador Allende

Salvador Allende Gossens was a medical doctor with vast experience in politics. Before becoming President in 1970, he served as Minister of Health and was also an elected member of the Chilean Congress. Allende aimed to lead his country to the '*vía chilena*' ('the Chilean way') and transform it into a socialist state. He opposed the economic influence of the US in Latin America, such as in the Chilean copper industry where he promoted its nationalization. He was presidential candidate in 1952, 1958 and 1964, but failed to win the elections. In 1970, he became the first elected Marxist to come to power. Although he sympathized with Fidel Castro and the Cuban Revolution, Allende voiced his criticisms of the USSR's interventions in Europe and proposed an independent, non-aligned foreign policy for his country.

US policy towards Chile before 1970

In the years before Nixon became President, the US had already used a number of programs and strategies to prevent the Socialist candidate, Salvador Allende, from winning a general election. These included funding opponents' political campaigns and funding anti-Allende propaganda.

Chile under Alessandri (1958–64)

Elected President in 1958, Alessandri pursued economically laissez-faire policies endorsed by the US to solve inflation problems and reduce tariffs on foreign goods from 1959. He borrowed \$130 million from US banks, the US Treasury and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and made Chile far more dependent on North America. Although the Alliance for Progress provided Chile with a significant amount of aid, the land and social reforms proposed in Punta del Este did not materialize.

Chile had to import food to sustain the population growth and to compensate for the inefficiencies of its agricultural system. Inflation, the stagnation of the economy and the rise of foreign debt caused social unrest. Alessandri's policies were unpopular with the working classes, who called for higher wages and better working conditions. The



US was concerned that Alessandri's failings had shifted opinion decisively in Allende's favour. In this context, Allende was seen as the main contender in the 1964 election campaign. The US supported Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei Montalva in the elections of September 1964.

Chile under Frei (1964–70)

Allende was of particular concern to the US as he was a Marxist and had developed cordial relations with Castro's Cuba after 1959. He had been outspoken in his criticism of the US-backed Bay of Pigs Invasion in 1961.

The US spent millions of dollars on print and radio campaigning for Frei in 1964. It devised propaganda that related Frei and the Christian Democrats with the continuity of the Alliance for Progress. A successful anti-communist scare campaign spread the idea that only Frei's Christian Democrats could protect Chile from communism. Overall, the US sent in 100 operatives to undermine Allende's campaign and contributed around \$20 million to Frei's campaign. Frei won the 1964 election, gaining 56.1 per cent of the vote. Allende had polled 38.9 per cent.



Chilean workers marching in support of Allende in 1964.

Although there had been demonstrable CIA involvement in Chile, it is difficult to assess its political impact during these, and subsequent, elections. Chile, unlike many Latin American countries, had a history of democracy dating back to the 1930s and its people may have been less vulnerable to, or affected by, CIA attempts to shape opinion. Nevertheless, US intervention in Chile continued after the 1964 election.

The 1970 presidential elections: Allende comes to power

How was Allende elected?

In the 1970 presidential elections, Allende ran as candidate for the fourth time. He represented the UP (*Unidad Popular*, or Popular Union) coalition, which included Socialists and Communists and other small left-wing parties.

With Frei unable to stand for another mandate, there were three main contenders: Allende; former President Alessandri as an independent; and Radomiro Tomic for



Salvador Allende, 1971.

the Christian Democrats. The US, who considered Alessandri the only viable option, gave money to his campaign and contacted Chilean military officers and Senators in an attempt to prevent Allende coming to power.

The vote was evenly distributed: Allende gained 36.61 per cent, Alessandri 35.27 per cent and Tomic 28.11 per cent. With none of the candidates obtaining a majority of votes, there was no president. Under the constitution, the Congress had to choose between the two candidates who had the most votes. Allende's presidency was confirmed after a congressional vote of 153 out of 200, in which the Christian Democrats voted in his favour.

Why was Allende elected?

- Frei's government had brought economic improvement but it was considered insufficient: agricultural production levels were still low and limited progress had been made to solve the problems of the copper industry.
- The work of the Christian Democrats to improve living conditions had produced limited effects. Rural and urban workers became more attracted to the left.
- The Christian Democrats were divided over the pace of reform. Some wanted economic progress at any cost, while others, like Frei, favoured gradualism. This explains why many Christian Democrats voted in favour of Allende in Congress. Some historians, like Tulio Halperin Donghi, disagree with this explanation and claim they voted for Allende because there was a tradition in Congress to ratify the candidate who had received the most votes.
- Allende's campaign promises of a stronger state, the nationalization of the copper industry, major agrarian reform and economic and political independence from foreign nations were appealing.

How did the US react to the 1970 elections?

Nixon sent communiqués to the Chilean Congress in an attempt to get them to confirm Alessandri as the winner of the election. This was 'Track I' of a two-track plan to oust Allende. The State Department had planned to persuade the Chilean Congress via Frei (and \$250,000 in bribes) to confirm Alessandri as President. Alessandri would then resign and there would be a call for new elections. Frei could then run directly against Allende and defeat him. Indeed, on 9 September, Alessandri announced that he would resign if Congress chose him. But Congress confirmed Allende. Allende then signed the Statute of Constitutional Guarantees, agreeing to follow the constitution during his presidency.

Nixon's administration then turned to 'Track II'. The '40 Committee' – which comprised the Attorney General, Deputy Secretary of State and Defense, the CIA Director, Joint Chiefs' Chair and Assistant to the President on National Security – had devised plans to prevent Allende taking power. It now met to plan how to deal with his presidency. Nixon then ordered the CIA to covertly assist in the organization of a military coup. This became known as Project FUBELT.

Allende in power

Allende pursued a policy of '*La vía chilena al socialismo*', or 'the Chilean way to socialism', with an extensive program of restructuring to implement.

- He nationalized large-scale industries, including the copper industry. Frei's government had already acquired a 51 per cent share of foreign-owned mines and

Allende took this further. Although US owners were compensated, there was a great debate over whether it had been a 'fair and adequate compensation'.

- Allende improved the healthcare system and continued to pursue Frei's policies for developing the education system by promoting an ambitious, yet controversial, education reform.
- He also attempted to implement large-scale agrarian reform.

Activity 10

ATL Research and communication skills

In groups, find additional information on Allende's domestic policies. Discuss why you think the US was concerned about them.

Why did Nixon authorize covert operations in Chile?

Following the election of Allende, the US Ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry, reported to Nixon:

“Chile voted calmly to have a Marxist–Leninist state, the first nation in the world to make this choice freely and knowingly... It is a sad fact that Chile has taken the path to communism with only a little more than a third (36 per cent) of the nation approving this choice, but it is an immutable fact. It will have the most profound effect on Latin America and beyond; we have suffered a grievous defeat; the consequences will be domestic and international; the repercussions will have immediate impact in some lands and delayed effect in others.

Therefore, an alarmed Nixon and his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, decided to increase covert operations in Chile to destabilize this 'Marxist regime'. Kissinger noted that the US did not have to stand by and watch Chile become communist 'due to the irresponsibility of its own people'. Nixon authorized covert operations in Chile for a number of reasons.

- Nixon feared that Allende's Chile would become another Cuba. The CIA advised Nixon that although the US had no vital interests in Chile and that global military balance of power would not be altered, Allende's victory would incur considerable political and psychological costs. Nixon wrote in his memoirs:

“As long as the Communists supply external funds to support political parties, factions, or individuals in other countries, I believe that the United States can and should do the same and do it secretly so that it can be effective.

Quoted in Joan Hoff (1994). *Nixon Reconsidered*. Basic Books, p. 249.

- Nixon believed that when he authorized CIA funds to prevent the Chilean Congress from confirming Allende as President, he was merely following the policy already established by his predecessors, John F Kennedy and Lyndon B Johnson. He understood that Allende had failed to win three presidential elections prior to 1970 partly because Kennedy and Johnson's administration had spent \$4 million undermining his campaigns in Chile.
- Latin America was the US's 'backyard'. It was perceived as a strategically important area to maintain the US superpower status. Washington's prestige and influence in the region had waned by 1970 and it was, according to Tanya Harmer, 'precisely because Chile had magnified the United States' deteriorating regional position that Allende's election was treated with such alarm'. Harmer goes on to argue that it was not so much the fear of Soviet influence in the region, but more the internal developments within Latin America and Chile's perceived importance for them. Allende's election had demonstrated that 'those

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

Research skills

ATL

In groups, after you have completed Activity 10 and researched the domestic policies of Allende further, investigate newspaper reports on events and policies in Chile at this time. Attempt to include opinions from Chile and other Latin American countries, as well as North America and other regions. Discuss the extent to which there was a consensus of opinion towards Allende in a) Chile, b) Latin America, c) North America and d) Europe, Asia and Africa.

within the United States' traditional sphere of influence were rejecting Washington's prescriptions of economic and political development and opting for socialism'.

- Nixon was under pressure to act from powerful US businesses invested in Chile who feared the loss of property and revenue if Allende nationalized industry. The most significant lobbyist group was the US company International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT). ITT owned 70 per cent of the Chilean Telephone Company (Chitelco) in 1970.

Activity 11



Thinking and social skills

In pairs, discuss the reasons for Nixon's decision to authorize covert operations in Chile. Which factors do you think were most important and why?

What were the characteristics of Nixon's covert operations in Chile?

Nixon was determined to influence events in Chile. The US encouraged Allende's opponents to pressure him to resign. The CIA appropriated \$8 million to use in Chile between 1970 and 1973, and used \$3 million in 1972, the year before the coup in September 1973. The Church Committee Report (see information box on page 142) in 1975 concluded that covert involvement in Chile between 1963 and 1975 was '*continuous and extensive*'.

Diplomatically, the US would appear to be cordial towards Allende's administration. A National Security Decision Memo of 9 November 1970 stated:

“ *The President has decided that (1) the public posture of the United States will be correct but cool, to avoid giving the Allende government a basis on which to rally domestic and international support for consolidation of the regime; but that (2) the United States will seek to maximize pressures on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability to implement policies contrary to the US and hemispheric interests.*

Politically, Nixon instructed the CIA to develop clandestine activities. These included funding opposition parties, establishing close cooperation with the Chilean armed forces, and subsidizing media that was opposed to Allende. Declassified National Security Archive documents show that the CIA authorized millions in covert funds for anti-Allende newspapers, such as *El Mercurio*. There was also covert funding of labour unions and the CIA assisted in organizing strikes to further undermine the regime.

Furthermore, Nixon ordered that no new economic assistance agreements would be made with Chile, and attempted to cut off significant foreign aid to undermine the economy. He worked on getting international organizations and private companies to collude with the US in this policy to asphyxiate the Chilean economy.

Nevertheless, Nixon allowed humanitarian aid to Chile and wrote off old debts to the US of around \$200 million between 1971 and 1972. Nixon also did not invoke the Hickenlooper Amendment (an amendment to the 1962 Foreign Aid Bill which halted all aid to a country that expropriated US property). Allende was able to arrange new sources of credit, valued at around \$900 million, and received a loan from the IMF of \$100 million.

The attempted kidnap and assassination of General Schneider, October 1970

According to the CIA's 'Track II' policy, the agency planned to find military officers willing to support a coup to overthrow Allende. Nixon contacted members of the military who were opposed to Allende. As a next step, the CIA used **'false flag' operatives** and plotted to remove the Chief Commander of the Army, General Rene Schneider. Schneider was a supporter of constitutional government and would oppose any attempted coup by the military.

The CIA provided \$50,000, sub-machine guns and tear gas to assist in Schneider's kidnap. Operatives approached General Camilo Valenzuela, and colluded with the retired Admiral Hugo Tirado and the retired General Roberto Viaux. Viaux attempted to kidnap Schneider on 22 October 1970, but the general tried to defend himself. Schneider was shot four times and he died three days later. It was the first political murder in Chile in 130 years. The botched kidnap attempt shocked the Chilean public, who then rallied behind Allende and the constitutional government.

Nixon and the White House attempted to cover up CIA involvement in the debacle. A US investigation subsequently concluded that the weapons used in the attempted kidnap were not supplied by the CIA; operatives later recovered its sub-machine guns and money. Allende arrested Valenzuela and Viaux and both were convicted of conspiracy. (One of the plotters escaped arrest, asked for CIA help, and was given \$35,000 to keep silent.)

'False flag' operatives

were agents who appeared to be from Chile or other Latin American countries to disguise US involvement.

Schneider's family attempted to bring a lawsuit against former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on 10 September 2001. They accused Kissinger of arranging Schneider's murder in 1970 because he would have opposed a military coup. CIA documents were produced that proved the CIA had been involved in the plan to kidnap Schneider. However, it had not intended for him to be killed. Kissinger claimed that he had 'turned off' the operation, but the CIA claimed that no such order was ever received.

Activity 12

ATL Thinking skills

The table below shows foreign aid to Chile from US government agencies and international institutions (in millions of dollars). Look at the table and answer the question that follows.

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
US economic aid	80.8	29.6	8.6	7.4	3.8
US military aid	11.8	0.8	5.7	12.3	15.0

1. What does the source suggest about US involvement in Chile between 1970 and 1973?

Nixon feared that Allende's regime could provide an example for the region of a well-functioning socialist state. In 1971 Chile re-established diplomatic relations with Castro's Cuba and thus rejected the OAS convention prohibiting this. At the end of the year, Castro made a month-long visit to Chile and Allende took him on a tour of the recently nationalized El Teniente copper mine. The US was deeply alarmed by these developments.

Economic crisis

Chilean Economics Minister Pedro Vuskovic's policies had led to impressive short-term results. There was initially 12 per cent industrial growth, an increase of 8.6 per cent in GDP and a 3.8 per cent reduction in unemployment. Literacy rates improved and infant mortality rates decreased. The social housing project built 76,000 houses in 1971 alone.

However, the Chilean economy was still heavily dependent on the international price of copper. The price of copper fell from \$66 per ton in 1970 to only \$48 in 1971. Vuskovic devalued the currency (the escudo) and increased the amount of money in circulation in 1972. These policies increased inflation to 140 per cent and caused

food shortages and the growth of a black-market economy. Although Allende had attempted to increase wages, the standard of living for Chileans did not improve. The economy was now in serious trouble, with hyperinflation, low copper prices and a lack of foreign aid.

In October 1972, a wave of strikes and protests began, which included the transportation system, small businessmen, professionals and students. The leaders of the strikes wanted the overthrow of Allende. This 24-day national strike was the longest and most extensive one in the history of the nation and further damaged the economy. Allende attempted to appease the right wing by bringing General Carlos Prats, an army officer, into the government as Interior Minister. Prats had opposed military involvement in a coup against Allende.

Nevertheless, although there were serious economic problems for Allende's regime, it remained politically popular. In March 1973, in half-term elections it increased its Congress representation to 43.2 per cent but failed to gain a majority. By this time, the Christian Democrats, who had supported the appointment of Allende in 1970, had joined the opposition in an alliance with the right-wing National Party, and formed the Confederation of Democracy (CODE). This political opposition was able to paralyse the legislative power of Allende's government.

Political crisis

Allende increasingly feared that his opponents were plotting his assassination. His daughter, María Isabel, visited Castro and told the Cuban leader of her father's fear; Castro apparently advised Allende to maintain a good relationship with the military until local militias could be established and trained.

Political pressure mounted on Allende. On 26 May 1973, he faced a unanimous Supreme Court denouncement of his regime's failure to uphold judicial decisions and its '*disruption of the legality of the nation*'. A month later, the nationalist right-wing *Patria y Libertad* (Fatherland & Liberty) paramilitary group executed a plan to oust Allende. Later, on 29 June, the tank regiment of Colonel Roberto Souper Onfray encircled the presidential palace, La Moneda, but failed to depose the government because he lacked the open support of the armed forces under General Prats. This failed '*El Tanquetazo*' (Spanish for 'Tank Putsch') was followed by a general strike at the end of July. The strike included copper miners from El Teniente.

Allende's government seemed powerless to redress the growing crisis. On 22 August, with backing from the opposition, the Chamber of Deputies accused Allende of unconstitutional acts and called for constitutional order to be enforced by the military. It passed a resolution declaring that Allende's government aimed '*to conquer absolute power with the obvious purpose of subjecting all citizens to the strictest political and economic control by the State... [with] the goal of establishing a totalitarian system*'. It could be argued that the Chamber of Deputies had called for the military to seize power if Allende did not reform. On 24 August, General Carlos Prats was forced to resign his posts, including his role as Commander-in-Chief of the army. Prats was replaced in this post by General Augusto Pinochet.

Allende responded by stating that the declaration had damaged Chile's international credibility and would create internal '*confusion*'. He also pointed out that the resolution had not obtained the two-thirds majority required by the constitution. He challenged the fact that the Chamber of Deputies appeared to be calling for the intervention of the armed forces against a democratically elected government. He

condemned it for '*subordinat[ing] political representation of national sovereignty to the armed institutions, which neither can nor ought to assume either political functions or the representation of the popular will*'.

Allende also accused the Chamber of Deputies of preventing his government from addressing the economic crisis, and creating a political crisis. It had already paralysed his government and it now sought to destroy it. He called on '*the workers, all democrats and patriots*' to join him in defending the Chilean Constitution and the '*revolutionary process*'. However, the domestic crisis continued to worsen, and when over 100,000 women protested against the cost of food and shortages in the *Plaza de la Constitución*, they were dispersed with tear gas.

The military coup, September 1973



Chilean soldiers guard the presidential palace the day after the coup against Allende.

On 11 September 1973, the military executed a coup led by Commander-in-Chief Augusto Pinochet. The Chilean navy captured Valparaíso and strategically positioned ships and infantry on the central coast. It closed down the radio and television networks in the area. When Allende was informed of these actions he went to the presidential palace, La Moneda, with his bodyguards. Allende did not receive coherent information and believed that only a section of the navy was involved in the plot. Allende's Defense Minister, Orlando Letelier, was arrested when he arrived to investigate matters at the Ministry of Defense.

Augusto Pinochet refused to answer Allende's telephone calls and Allende still hoped that some units of the military remained loyal and the coup would fail. He was convinced that Pinochet would not be involved and that he must have been taken prisoner. When the armed forces declared control of Chile at 8.30 a.m., Allende realized the scale of the coup. Despite attempts by the military to negotiate with him, Allende stated his intention of fulfilling his constitutional duty and remaining in office.

The military threatened to bomb La Moneda, but Allende still refused to surrender or escape. Pinochet ordered an armoured force to advance on La Moneda and bomb the palace. When it fell, Allende was found dead. At first it was claimed he had died in a gunfight, but it was later confirmed that Allende had committed suicide.

The Government Junta dissolved Congress on 13 September and after an initial collective military leadership, General Augusto Pinochet was made permanent head of the Junta. The Junta outlawed parties and suspended all political activity. It also took control of all media outlets. Thousands of Chileans were imprisoned, tortured or 'disappeared'. Many went into exile to save their own lives.

Key concepts: Consequence and significance

5.5 To what extent was the Nixon administration involved in the coup?



US Secretary of State Kissinger and Pinochet, 1976.

US intelligence networks were aware of the coup plot and had regularly reported throughout 1972 and 1973 on various plots against Allende. CIA operatives were monitoring these groups. There was an increase in intelligence regarding a coup plot in the last week of June, and the number of reports peaked in August and the first two weeks of September. On 10 September, a Chilean military officer informed the CIA of the planned coup and requested US government assistance. The CIA responded that it would not intervene in an internal Chilean matter. Therefore, the CIA knew in advance – even the exact date of the coup – but it did not intervene either to assist or to prevent it. During the coup itself, the CIA limited itself to information gathering and sending situation reports back to Washington.

At the time, the Nixon administration attempted to distance itself from the coup. **The Church Committee** concluded that there was a lack of clear evidence of direct US

The Church Committee

This was a select committee set up in 1975 to investigate intelligence gathering by the CIA, the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for illegality after potential issues and abuses were revealed by the Watergate Scandal.

covert involvement. However, it also stated that *El Mercurio* and other media outlets supported by the CIA had played an important part in setting the stage for the military coup. The US clearly would not disfavour a coup against Allende. The report stated that the US 'had not always succeeded in walking the thin line between monitoring coup plotting and stimulating it'.

In addition, a CIA report called 'CIA Activities in Chile', published on 18 September 2000 and based on previously classified documents, confirmed that although the CIA 'probably appeared to condone' the military's plan and action, it had not participated in it. It stated:

“The major CIA effort against Allende came earlier in 1970 in the failed attempt to block his election and accession to the Presidency. Nonetheless, the US Administration's long-standing hostility to Allende and its past encouragement of a military coup against him were well known among Chilean coup plotters who eventually took activities of their own to oust him.

Nevertheless, the report concluded, as did the Church Committee, that there was 'no evidence' that the US participated in the coup.

Despite criticizing it publicly, the US went on to give material support to **Pinochet's** regime. The CIA also made payments to several of Pinochet's officers as 'contacts', even though many were linked to human rights abuses.

Activity 13

ATL Research skills

In small groups:

1. Research the Church Committee. To what extent do you think this committee could provide a fair and unbiased report?
2. Research the nature of General Pinochet's regime between 1973 and 1990. What evidence is there that the US supported his regime despite human rights abuses?

Activity 14

ATL Thinking skills

Read through the following sources in pairs and discuss the questions that follow.

Source A

“A policy of applying economic pressure on Chile in hopes of fomenting opposition to Allende was pursued. The administration sought the help of Harold Geneen [ITT] and other American businessmen in this effort.

After Allende took office, the 40 Committee authorized over \$7 million in covert support to the anti-Allende forces in Chile. Nixon wanted to squeeze Chile's economy until it, in his words, 'screamed'. He also wanted to give encouragement to right-wing elements in Chile's military. U.S. aid was cut off, and a 'cool but correct' public posture was assumed. But it was anything but correct, and before long, Chile's economy collapsed, opposition to Allende grew, and in September of 1973 a military coup, in which Allende was killed, took control of the government.

Arnold Toynbee, 'Foreign and Defense Policy' in Michael A Genovese (1990). *The Nixon Presidency: Power and Politics in Turbulent Times*. Greenwood Press, pp. 149–51.



The Watergate Scandal

Named after the Watergate Hotel in Washington, this complex political corruption scandal forced the resignation of President Nixon in August 1974. A burglary of the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee at the Watergate Hotel was traced back to the CIA and the Committee to Re-elect President Nixon (a Republican). The plan was to spy on the Democrats to find information that would help to get Nixon re-elected. Although he was re-elected, further investigations linking the Nixon administration to Watergate forced the President to resign.



General Augusto Pinochet

After being indicted by Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzón for human rights abuses committed during his rule of Chile, General Pinochet was arrested in London in 1998. He was returned to Chile in 2000. Stripped of his parliamentary immunity, Pinochet was charged with the kidnapping, torture and disappearance of opponents and placed under house arrest. He died, awaiting trial, on 28 November 2006.

Source B

“ [There was] consensus [...] in the Nixon administration when it came to Chile and Latin America... Although they disagreed on priorities and tactics at various points between 1970 and 1973, the president, Kissinger, Secretary of State William Rogers, the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, the Defense Department, and the Treasury Department all opposed Allende and wanted him removed from office [...]

Rather than merely opposing Allende by 1973, the Nixon administration as a whole – State Department officials, CIA operatives, Kissinger and Nixon included – had developed a clear idea of what it wanted to happen in Chile: it wanted authoritarian rule patterned on Brazil’s dictatorship and a war against the ‘Left’ as the only remedy to reverse the damage done by Allende’s presidency. Even more striking are decision makers’ fears that Chilean military leaders were not Brazilian enough, either in terms of their readiness for repressing the Left or in their ideological sense of a mission.

Tanya Harmer (2011). *Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War*. University of North Carolina Press, p. 8.

Source C

An extract from Henry Kissinger’s testimony to the Congressional Commission on the Conduct of Foreign Policy in 1975.

“ What did we do? There was a government in power in Chile of which the Communists were the more moderate element which had Castro-ites and revolutionaries to the left that was systematically squeezing the democratic parties out of office and out of control by confiscatory taxation of newspapers, radio stations, and so forth. We supported the democratic, the alternative forms, in order to be ready for the ‘76 election. As it turned out, we failed. This is why the military moved. We didn’t generate the military move. The democratic opposition proved so weak that the military felt Allende would establish a dictatorship. The argument you can make is Chile isn’t important enough for us to have done that. That is an arguable proposition, and I am not going to go into that now. All I want to say is there must be countries in the world that are so important to us that we will try [covertly] to give the democratic forces or the forces friendly to us an opportunity where we cannot do it by diplomatic means and we do not want to do it [overtly] by military means.

Quoted in Joan Hoff (1994). *Nixon Reconsidered*. Basic Books, p. 249.

Source D

“ But the Nixon administration bears primary responsibility for fomenting the coup that brought Pinochet to power and led to Allende’s death, probably by his own hand, on September 11. Between 1970 and 1973, U.S. authorities helped cripple the Chilean economy, cultivated close relations with key military officers, backed opposition movements, and collected information on the Chilean Left to be handed over to a new government in the event of a sudden shift to the right. Following the coup, Nixon expressed relief that the United States had escaped direct implication. ‘Our hand doesn’t show on this one,’ he told Kissinger, who was even less willing to take credit. ‘We didn’t do it,’ Kissinger asserted, although he acknowledged that the United States had ‘helped’ produce the coup by creating conditions ‘as great as possible’ for the Chilean military to act. Such nervousness about taking credit, the result of heightened sensitivity about political attacks as the Watergate Scandal unfolded, obscured the genuine sense of accomplishment that the two men felt about Chile.

Mark Atwood Lawrence, ‘History from Below: The United States and Latin America in the Nixon Years’ in Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston (eds) (2008). *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969–1977*. Oxford University Press, p. 278.

1. What are the main points made in these sources regarding the impact of Nixon's covert operations in Chile?
2. To what extent is there consensus between the historians' views on events leading to the fall of Allende in 1973?
3. With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of Source C for historians studying US policies in Chile during Allende's administration.

Activity 15

ATL Research and communication skills

In groups of three, investigate the following documents and archives:

- the Church Committee Report, 1975
- the CIA report, 'CIA Activities in Chile', dated 18 September 2000
- the Clinton administration's Chile Declassification Project

Discuss your findings with the class. Do these sources suggest that Nixon's administration was directly involved with the coup that overthrew Allende?

Historians' perspectives

What were the implications of Nixon's covert actions in Chile?

Historians such as Peter Winn, a specialist in Latin American history, have suggested that US support was vital for the planning and execution of Allende's overthrow and the consolidation of Pinochet's successor regime. In *La Revolución Chilena*, Winn has argued that the US imposed an 'invisible blockade that disrupted Allende's economy and contributed to the destabilization of the regime'. The US had pursued Track II, funded political opponents of Allende and fostered potential coup contacts in the Chilean military. In addition, US military aid to the Chilean armed forces was raised dramatically from \$800,000 when Allende came to power in 1970, to \$12.3 million annually in 1972 (see table, Source B, in Activity 12).

Historian Kristian Gustafson's *Hostile Intent: US Covert Operations in Chile, 1964–1974* is seen by some historians as a definitive work on this topic. Gustafson argues that the US administrations from 1958 onwards worked on the assumption that 'were Allende to win we would be faced with a pro-Soviet, anti-US administration in one of the most important countries in the hemisphere'. He suggests that in the 1960s the CIA had been quite successful in keeping Chilean politics in the hands of the 'centre-right', however in 1970 the US did not keep up with the political changes evolving in Chile. When the Nixon administration finally took note of events in Chile after the election result in September 1970, it went into 'panic mode' and the CIA did not have the time or resources to prevent the move towards a socialist government. Nixon and Kissinger's attempt at a 'back-door' coup failed and Allende became President. Gustafson concludes:

“ Rather than operating on their own, covert actions in 1964 were used to bolster overt plans such as the Alliance for Progress. Thus they acted as a force multiplier for U.S. foreign policy goals. In October 1970, covert action was separated from any strategic thinking and uselessly sent charging into the brick wall of immovable Chilean public opinion.

John Spanier, Professor of Political Science, in *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, claims that although the CIA may have contributed to accelerating the coup in Chile, the causes of the coup were mainly domestic, and by 1973 the fall of Allende was only a matter of time. He considers both the economic crisis and Allende's mismanagement of the various political crises responsible for the coup. Many of his policies antagonized the middle classes and professionals while not necessarily gaining the support of the working classes. Spanier claims that military intervention was also precipitated by the rapid growth of paramilitary organizations and their use of violence. In his view, in September 1973 the country was on the verge of civil war.

In *El Gobierno de Salvador Allende*, Luis Corvalán, former Secretary General of the Communist Party of Chile and a political prisoner under Pinochet, considered that both the economic asphyxiation of Chile and the CIA's support of the Chilean armed forces contributed to the fall of Allende. However, he also believed the Christian Democrats, who in 1970 helped Allende become President and supported the nationalization of copper, prevented Allende from developing his program, for which Allende never had Congress support. Unable to implement reforms all the way, the President's program collapsed. However, he also considered that *Unidad Popular* should have made some concessions in their proposals to gain congressional support. Their lack of flexibility was another contributing factor to the fall of Allende.

In addition, some left-wing Chilean writers have suggested that Castro's Cuba was partly responsible for the overthrow of Allende. They argue that Cuba failed to offer sufficient arms to defend the revolution and ultimately 'abandoned' Allende in 1973.

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

Communication and thinking skills

In pairs, discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the different interpretations discussed in the historians' perspectives box. Which do you consider the most important reasons for US intervention in Chile? Explain your answer fully.

Why did President Carter pursue a quest for human rights as a basis for US foreign policy?

“I would hope that the nations of the world might say that we had built a lasting peace, based not on weapons of war but on international policies which reflect our own most precious values. These are not just my goals, and they will not be my accomplishments, but the affirmation of our nation’s continuing moral strength and our belief in an undiminished ever-expanding American dream.

President Jimmy Carter, inaugural address, 20 January 1977.

Jimmy Carter campaigned for the presidency in 1976 on the promise that he would deliver substantial changes in the conduct of US foreign policy. When he announced his presidential candidacy in December 1974, he said, ‘This country set a standard within the community of... dedication to basic human rights and freedoms’, and he focused on human rights throughout his campaign. He wanted to bring a new morality to US diplomacy and foreign activities. For example, in his campaign he publicly condemned the role of the US in the fall of Salvador Allende in 1973. More in line with former President Kennedy, Carter believed US policy towards Latin America needed to be given more importance and that relations, damaged during the Republican presidencies of Nixon and Ford, had to be relaunched.

When he became President, Carter declared in his inaugural address, ‘Because we are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere. Our moral sense dictates a clear-cut preference for those societies which share with us an abiding respect for individual human rights.’ The Carter administration developed and attempted to implement a human rights strategy that would be the cornerstone of its foreign policy. Carter wanted to dramatically change the nature of US relations with developing nations. He sought to shape US foreign policy around new principles of non-intervention, in line with the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights issued in 1948.

Indeed, Carter’s victory in the 1976 election was hailed as a victory for human rights campaigners. He reaffirmed his commitment in an international broadcast after his inauguration, stating, ‘The United States alone cannot guarantee the basic right of every human being to be free of poverty and hunger and disease and political repression... the United States can and will take the lead in such efforts’. Carter’s Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, shared his commitment to promoting human rights through ‘quiet diplomacy’.

Carter’s shift in policy was in response to the deep disillusionment with the US government, institutions and agencies that had followed the disastrous intervention and war in Vietnam, the Watergate Scandal in 1974 – which had brought down President Nixon – and the Church Committee findings in 1975 on covert CIA activities. Indeed, he argued that for too many years the US had been willing to adopt the tactics of its enemies and that this approach had failed, ‘with Vietnam the best example of its intellectual and moral poverty’. He said that due to these failures the US had to find its way back to its principles.

At a press conference in January 1977, Secretary of State Vance stated that the US would now ‘speak frankly about injustice, both at home and abroad’. However, he added the caveat that the administration would not comment on every issue, but would do so when there was a clear threat to human rights.

In his first weeks in office, Carter denounced the Soviet Union and the regimes in Eastern Europe for human rights violations. He also condemned abuses in Uganda. This foreign policy line was somewhat consistent with traditional Cold War condemnations. However, Carter also held his allies responsible for human rights abuses. He made it clear from the beginning that his administration would not continue to ‘overlook’ the human rights abuses perpetrated by its allies. He intended to take a tough approach with the regimes in Iran, South Africa, South Korea and Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe).



President Jimmy Carter speaking to the General Assembly of the United Nations (UNO) on 17 March 1977. Carter declared in his speech that the US had a historical birthright to be associated with human rights.



Carter had travelled extensively in Latin America before his election and spoke Spanish. He delivered a speech in Spanish during an official visit to Mexico.

What were the methods used by Carter in his quest for human rights?

In its pursuit of human rights, Carter's administration took a series of actions.

- Between 1977 and 1978 the administration developed guidelines and institutions to facilitate the process of linking US aid and assistance to human rights records. In February 1978, Presidential Directive 30 outlined specific guidelines for US human rights policy and linked economic and military assistance to the human rights records of the recipients: countries with good records would receive consideration, while those nations with poor records would not. This directive formally defined US policy on human rights.
- The administration changed the Office of Human Affairs to the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, and this bureau was to be led by Assistant Secretary of State Patricia Derian. Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher was also appointed to lead a committee to coordinate foreign aid programs in line with a country's human rights practices. This was the Human Rights Coordinating Group (HRCG).
- In addition, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski established the Interagency Working Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance to assess each case made for bilateral and multilateral aid in relation to human rights in the country. Brzezinski had also established within the National Security Council (NSC) a Global Issues group that was responsible for overseeing human rights and arms control issues.
- Carter appointed Don Fraser as Chair of the House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements to oversee Congress and its activities, and he implemented a congressional requirement for an annual submission by the Department of State of 'a full and complete report' on human rights practices around the world. These measures combined forced US officials to be more aware of the relationship between human rights violations and America's foreign policy.
- Carter tried to link economic deals to human rights. For example, he would only authorize new trade agreements with the USSR if the Soviets permitted Jews to emigrate. The administration also, less openly, supported human rights groups in the Soviet bloc, such as Charter 77 (Czechoslovakia) and Solidarity (Poland). This policy of 'linkage' was resented in the Soviet Union.

Carter's foreign policy in the Americas

When Carter came to power, most Latin American governments were dictatorships. In this chapter, you read about the Chilean case and you will read about Cuba in the Case Study. Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Peru, Paraguay, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Haiti, among others, were ruled by dictatorships. Many of these governments violated their citizens' human rights.

Carter expressed his alarm at the human rights situation and the absence of democracy in Latin America. His policy aimed to detach the US from repressive governments. Among the measures taken, he suspended US economic assistance to many dictatorships and military aid to Latin America was cut by 75 per cent, from \$233.5 million in 1976 to \$54 million in 1979 (Kaufman). The Security Assistance Program for Argentina was reduced from \$32 million to \$15.7 million in Carter's first year.

Relations with Pinochet's Chile took a turn for the worse after Carter put these measures into effect. In 1977, in an attempt to bring about change by means of diplomacy, he spoke before the UN demanding that the organization engaged more effectively in the protection and defence of human rights. This led the UN to condemn Chile for its repeated human rights violations. Pinochet was outraged and, in 1978, he ordered a national **plebiscite** to legitimize his rule and discredit those who, like Carter and the UN, had questioned it. Under an atmosphere of intimidation, the plebiscite gave Pinochet overwhelming support (78.6 per cent), with opposition leaders accusing him of fraud.

In response to Carter's denunciations, the Argentinian military government started a campaign to show the world that Argentina was a 'normal' country. It wanted to promote nationalist pride and persuade citizens that all the accusations were part of an international campaign against the country. Despite an international attempt led by the Netherlands to boycott the tournament, the Junta used the 1978 Football World Cup and the subsequent victory of team Argentina to shift the focus of the population away from the 'dirty war' – the kidnapping, torture and murder of citizens the Junta considered terrorists and a threat to national security. The victims of the repression, a number still in dispute, included priests, journalists and teachers.

Activity 18

ATL Thinking and social skills

In pairs, compare and contrast US foreign policy under Nixon and Carter.

Key concept: Consequence

5.7

What were the successes and failures of Carter's quest for human rights?

Overall, the Carter administration was successful in raising greater awareness of human rights concerns by connecting them to the execution of US foreign policy. US pressure allowed for a limited improvement in the human rights situation in the region. For example, the US, combined with the UN, led Pinochet to dissolve the Chilean secret police, DINA.

However, Carter received criticism both at home and abroad for not applying the human rights policy consistently. Communism appeared to be strengthening in Latin America as Marxist governments were established in Nicaragua and Grenada in 1979. In response, Carter approved covert operations in Nicaragua which 'resembled the agency's destabilization campaign against the socialist government of Salvador Allende a decade earlier' (Peter Kornbluh). In 1980, Carter justified renewed military aid to El Salvador as the regime was threatened by a leftist revolution. This assistance was offered despite clear evidence that the regime abused human rights.

At a domestic level, Carter was criticized by more pragmatic politicians for undermining US interests and security in the context of the superpower Cold War struggle. His policy fostered the rise of the 'New Right' conservative movement in the US that wanted a hard-line approach to the USSR.

Activity 19

ATL Research, critical thinking and communication skills

Source A

“ [Carter's] pressure did not topple any of the military regimes. But measured in quantitative terms, violations of human rights declined. In Uruguay, the number of political prisoners dropped from as many as 5,000 in 1977 to fewer than 2,500 in 1979. General Pinochet's regime murdered or 'disappeared' fewer Chileans between 1977 and 1980 than in any other four-year period between 1973 and 1990. Both murders and disappearances declined somewhat in Argentina's Guerra social (dirty war). Prominent Argentines, like newspaper publisher Jacobo Timerman, credited President Carter and Patricia Derian [Secretary of Human Rights] for saving their lives. Military regimes undoubtedly pursued their own agendas during the Carter presidency. But US pressure may have strengthened the hands of officers within military circles who favoured the reduction of violence and the return to civic life.


American History Professor Stephen G Rabe (2011). *The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America*. Oxford University Press, p. 147.

1. To what extent, according to the source, was Carter's human rights policy in the Americas successful?
2. In groups, choose a Latin American dictatorship.
 - a) Find out about the human rights situation in that country at the time of Carter's presidency.
 - b) What were the policies implemented by Carter towards the country's human rights situation? To what extent were they successful?
3. Share your findings with the rest of the class.
4. Using the source and your own knowledge, assess the success of Carter's quest for human rights.

Activity 20

ATL Social and thinking skills

1. How consistent with former US foreign policy was Carter's approach to human rights in Latin America?
2. The US had made a series of covert interventions to prevent the spread of communism or the establishment of leftist regimes in Latin America after the death of President Kennedy. The chart below shows US interventions in Latin America between 1964 and 1973. Compare and contrast the impact of the foreign policies of Nixon and Carter in the region.



Activity 21

ATL Thinking and communication skills

Read the following passage.

Secretary of State Vance asserted in 1978 that 'Our actions can also be read as focusing on Latin America as the best theatre for human rights activity'. On those lines, US historian John Lewis Gaddis has suggested that the region was easier for the administration to take a human rights stance on as it was relatively secure and did not pose a strategic security risk to the US.

Based on the sources in this chapter and your own knowledge of US–Latin American relations, discuss how valid Gaddis' view is.

Key concepts: Change and continuity


5.8 The Panama Canal Treaty, 1977

“ Jimmy Carter was caught squarely between two fixed and immovable forces. One was the new international circumstances, which made the conclusion of a new treaty arrangement with Panama all but inevitable. The other was the domestic mood in the United States, which made the ratification of these treaties all but impossible.

Herbert D Rosenbaum and Alexej Ugrinsky (eds) (1994). *Jimmy Carter: Foreign Policy and Post-Presidential Years*. Greenwood Press, p. 320.

This question requires some careful planning before you start writing your response. You can work on a chart that lists similarities and differences between Nixon and Carter by listing all the relevant policies. This will help you avoid writing narrative, 'end-on' responses in which you write about one president and then another, rather than comparing and contrasting them.





A map showing the Panama Canal Zone.

Background

In 1880, the French had begun to build the 51-mile long Panama Canal. At the time the project began, Panama was part of Colombia. The French financed Ferdinand de Lesseps (the constructor of the Suez Canal) to begin the project. Its construction was subsequently taken over by the US.

President Theodore Roosevelt had signed a treaty with Colombia to take over the canal, but the Colombians did not ratify it. A group of Panamanian separatists took this opportunity to get support from the US to separate from Colombia in 1903 and the US signed their treaty with the newly formed Panama. The original Panama Canal Treaty, the Hay–Bunau–Varilla Treaty (1903) gave the US permanent control of the canal and a 5-mile strip of land on each side of the canal (Panama Canal Zone). In return for rights over the waterway, the US government recognized Panama as an independent state, paid Colombia \$25 million in compensation for their loss and offered Panama an annual retainer of \$250,000. Panama gained recognition of its independence and a much-needed income when the canal opened in 1914. However, opponents to the treaty in Panama argued that it relinquished national sovereignty and turned the country into a US protectorate.

The canal takes thousands of miles off the sea route between the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans (see map on page 152). This greatly facilitated trade in and around the region. In addition to its importance for trade, it was seen as strategically significant; during the First and Second World Wars the canal was a vital waterway for the US and its allies.

In 1936, the treaty was reviewed and annual payments to Panama increased, but US control continued. This contributed to anti-US riots in Panama in 1959 and 1964. When Omar Torrijos came to power in 1968, he began to campaign for international support to review the treaty. President Nixon agreed to a review of the terms.

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

Research skills



In pairs investigate in more detail the importance of the Panama Canal to the region and international trade from its construction up to 1977.

Map showing the significance of the Panama Canal for US-Latin American trade.



Significant individual: Omar Torrijos

Torrijos, a member of the National Guard, became the leader of Panama after participating in the overthrow of President Arnulfo Arias in 1968. Although he was never officially declared President, he was known as the 'Supreme Chief of Government' and 'Maximum Leader of the Panamanian Revolution'. He ruled dictatorially, controlling parliament and the press and limiting political and civil rights. His popularity was based on his charisma, his nationalist ideas and reforms. These included an agrarian reform and greater education opportunities. He died in a plane crash in 1981.

Carter and the Panama Treaty

A US report on Latin American affairs, the Linowitz Report, was published for President-elect Jimmy Carter in 1976. This document included advice on the Panama question. It stated the US government should negotiate a new and equitable Canal Treaty in order to prevent a conflict over the issue.

Carter had limited support from his own Democratic Party establishment when he entered into talks with Torrijos and only received support to engage in negotiations; he received no endorsement for the treaties themselves. Carter and Torrijos negotiated two treaties.

- The Panama Canal Treaty returned sovereignty of the region to Panama. Control of the zone and operation of the Panama Canal would be joined until the canal was transferred to Panama on 1 January 2000. Panama would be responsible for its defence.
- The Neutrality Treaty gave the US a right to defend the neutrality of the canal.



5.9

Why did Carter sign the Panama treaties?

Carter had several reasons to pursue the Panama treaties. Some of these reasons, such as the necessity to improve the US image in Latin America, were caused by the international context. However, the US domestic agenda also paved the way for the signing of the treaties in 1977.

- **Political precedents:** President Johnson opened negotiations to review the treaty after anti-US student protests had broken out in Panama in 1964. In 1974, with Nixon, both countries signed a Joint Framework of Principles to set up the conditions for the negotiation of a new treaty. Also, the Linowitz Report advised Carter to revise the treaties.
- **The image of the US:** Although Carter did not accuse his predecessors of creating a 'colonial' or imperialist situation in the Canal Zone, he did argue that the arrangements for the zone were perceived as colonialism and that this damaged the image of the US in the region and globally.
- **US–Latin American relations:** Carter contended that the treaties would not only remove a chronic negative issue in US–Latin American relations, but they would also deny radical nationalists in the region a symbol of US imperialism. He claimed, '*This agreement leads to cooperation and not confrontation between our country and Panama.*'
- **Defence:** Carter emphasized that the primary threat to the canal would be the resentment and hostility of the Panamanians towards the US if the treaties failed to be ratified. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown also highlighted that the US military would not be able to protect the canal from '*determined saboteurs*'. In addition, although opponents to the treaties claimed that the canal was a necessary part of US defences, even by the 1950s the larger US war vessels could not be accommodated by the canal and therefore its real strategic value had declined.



Carter and Omar Torrijos shake hands moments after the signing of the Torrijos–Carter Treaties, 7 September 1977.

- **Domestic support:** Carter had the backing of a major business lobby group, representing 200 major corporations that had control of 90 per cent of private investment in Latin America. Representatives from this group met with senators and published pro-treaty pamphlets. This business lobby's activities led to some concern in Carter's administration that the treaties might be seen as being drawn up to 'benefit Wall Street'.

Challenges to the treaties

The treaties were challenged both in the US Congress and in Panama. In the US Congress, it was argued that the United States had paid for the canal's construction and therefore had rights over its operation. Furthermore, there was concern that if a pro-Soviet regime took control in Panama, US security and national interests would be threatened via this significant waterway. Senators deemed that the initial proposals offered insufficient protection of US rights and critics in Panama argued that the treaties challenged the country's sovereignty.

In an attempt to reassure their critics, Carter and Torrijos issued a joint statement affirming US rights to defend the neutrality of the canal. Senator Dennis DeConcini demanded an addition to the terms of the Neutrality Treaty that gave the US the right 'to take such steps as it deems necessary... including the use of military force in Panama, to reopen the Canal' if its security was threatened. The definitive wording of the treaty gave the US the right to defend the canal from any threat that would interfere with its neutral operation for all shipping.

In Panama, this addition was perceived as giving the US the unilateral rights to use military force to intervene in Panama's internal affairs. In response, Torrijos threatened to denounce the treaties on Panamanian television. To save the treaties, Carter managed to persuade DeConcini to agree to an amendment to the second canal treaty which redressed the fear of US intervention in Panama. The treaties were signed by both governments in September 1977.

Carter managed to finally get congressional approval for the agreement, despite opinion polls in the US suggesting 75 per cent of the public were against it. On 18 April 1978, the Senate approved the treaty with the narrowest of margins; just one vote more than the required two-thirds majority.

How successful was Carter over the Panama Canal issue?

In the US, some perceived the treaty as a great achievement for Carter, whereas his critics accused him of giving away an important asset. Ultimately, the treaty was a key factor in the decline of domestic support for Carter's administration. US historian George Gaddis Smith argues, in *Morality, Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years*, that although Carter won a hard political fight over the treaty and had prevented a 'possible disaster' abroad, it brought him no credit domestically. Indeed, the treaty could be deemed a 'pyrrhic victory'.

Activity 22

ATL Thinking and communication skills

Read the sources and answer the questions that follow.

Source A

Cartoonist PD Lankovsky depicts Jimmy Carter on his knees handing the Panama Canal, shaped liked a turkey, to Torrijos, 2011.



Source B

“All in all, Carter won the legislative battle but lost the political and ideological war. Conservatives out organized Carter and his liberal supporters and clearly won the fight for public support. The struggle for ratification of the Panama Canal treaties proved a costly affair for Carter and helped encourage a growing cautiousness and conservatism in his approach to foreign affairs.”

David Skidmore, 'Recent Titles in Contributions in Political Science', in Herbert D Rosenbaum and Alexej Ugrinsky (eds) (1994). *Jimmy Carter: Foreign Policy and Post-Presidential Years*. Greenwood Press, p. 310.

1. What does Source A suggest about US perception of the Panama Canal Treaty?
2. According to Source B what were the results of the Panama Canal Treaty?
3. In pairs, review the material on Carter's quest for human rights and the Panama Canal Treaty, 1977. Choose who will be Student A and who will be Student B. Write a newspaper article for an international audience on Carter's quest for human rights. Student A will focus on the successes of his administration, including his achievement in signing the Panama Canal Treaty. Student B will focus on the failures of his administration, including the limitations of the Panama Canal Treaty.

Essay planning

In small groups, develop detailed essay plans for the following questions.

1. Evaluate the successes and failures of Carter's quest for human rights between 1977 and 1980.
2. Examine the reasons for, and the implications of, the Panama Canal Treaty, 1977.

Share your essay plans with the class. Make sure you identify and address the command terms, outline a coherent and focused structure for your main body paragraphs, and include detailed supporting evidence.

Case study: What was the impact of the Cold War on Cuba?

After 1959, Cuba became a theatre of Cold War confrontations. Fidel Castro's revolution dramatically changed the foreign policy of the country; from being an ally of the US, Cuba developed into a threat to US security, reputation and influence. As a result, the US attempted to end Castro's rule by means of economic measures, territorial invasion, diplomatic isolation and covert operations.

Although Castro declared Cuba to be a Marxist state in 1961, his foreign policy was not automatically aligned to Soviet Cold War interests; nor was it confined to Cuban interests in the region. Castro's words and actions had a significant impact on the Cold War in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. He transformed the way Latin America related to both the US and the USSR in the Cold War years.

This case study explores the ways and extent to which events in Cuba influenced the Cold War in the Americas up to 1980. It focuses on US–Cuban relations under Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon and Carter. It also examines the changing nature of Soviet–Cuban relations between 1959 and 1980. Finally, it analyses the impact of the Cold War on Cuban social and cultural policies.


Timeline		
1952	March	Batista seizes power in military coup
1953	July	Moncada army barracks attack
1955	July	Castro arrives in Mexico
1959	Jan	The Cuban Revolution overthrows Batista and establishes a provisional government
1960	Oct	Cuba signs diplomatic and trade treaties with USSR
	July	US bans exports to Cuba, except for medicine and food
1961	Jan	US abolishes Cuban sugar quota
	Jan	US cuts diplomatic ties with Cuba
	April	Bay of Pigs Invasion
	Nov	Operation Mongoose is approved
1962	Dec	Castro announces the socialist character of the revolution
	Jan	OAS suspends Cuba
	Feb	The US imposes an embargo on all Cuban imports
1963	Oct	Cuban Missile Crisis
	June	Castro visits the USSR for the first time
1966	Jan	First Tricontinental Congress
1967	Oct	Che Guevara is executed in Bolivia
	Aug	OLAS Conference
1968	March	Castro announces Revolutionary Offensive
	Aug	Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
1972	July	Cuba becomes a COMECON member
1974	July	OAS votes to lift mandatory economic sanctions
1975	Nov	Cuban intervention in Angola begins (1975–91)
1977	March	Carter allows travel between the US and Cuba
	Sept	The US and Cuba establish Diplomatic Interest Sections
1980	April–Sept	Maribel Crisis

The background to the Cuban Revolution

Significant individual: Fidel Castro (1926–2016)

Fidel Alejandro Castro Ruz was a Cuban lawyer and politician who led his country between 1959 and 2008, when he resigned. In 1953, he tried to depose dictator Fulgencio Batista by attacking the Moncada military barracks. The coup failed and Castro was sentenced to prison. It was his trial for Moncada that gained public visibility and enabled him to found the 26th of July Movement, the political organization which led him to power.

When he was pardoned by Batista in 1955, he left for Mexico, where he planned the expedition that brought him back to Cuba. In 1956, he landed in Cuba and began fighting against Batista using guerrilla warfare around Sierra Maestra. In January 1959, Batista fled the country and the triumph of the revolution was proclaimed. Castro was a nationalist, who opposed US economic and political influence. He also advocated better living and working conditions for Cubans as well as a fairer distribution of the land. He soon transformed Cuba into a communist state. His foreign policy focused on exporting the revolution by supporting national liberation movements in developing countries.



The 26th of July Movement, led by Fidel Castro, Camilo Cienfuegos, Huber Matos and Che Guevara, among others, fought in the Sierra Maestra mountain range between 1956 and 1959 to bring Fulgencio Batista's dictatorship to an end. On 1 January 1959, having lost US support, Batista fled Cuba and a provisional government, of which Fidel Castro was a member, seized power.

Castro's policies, such as agrarian reform and the nationalization of foreign enterprises, became models for rural and working-class organizations across Latin America. The revolution became an example of what was both possible and desirable.

Activity 1



Research, social and communication skills

- In groups find more information on the reasons for the success of the Cuban Revolution and the rise to power of Fidel Castro. You should focus on the conditions that contributed to Castro's rise. These are some of the issues each group may decide to cover:
 - the social and economic situation of Cuba before 1959
 - the aims of the 26th of July Movement as explained between 1956 and 1959
 - Fidel Castro's appeal and charisma
 - the extent to which Fulgencio Batista contributed to his own fall
 - the role of other leaders, such as Ernesto Che Guevara, Haydée Santamaría, Raúl Castro, Camilo Cienfuegos or Celia Sánchez.
- Share your findings with the rest of the class. Which were the most significant factors that led to Castro's rise to power?

Eisenhower and Cuba, 1953–61

Although it could be argued that the Eisenhower administration contributed to Castro's rise by, for example, suspending weapon shipments to Batista, it soon became clear that US–Cuban relations would take a turn for the worse. Almost from the beginning, the US did not make a secret of the fact that it wanted the Cuban revolutionary government to fail. Domestic policies, such as agrarian reform and the expropriation of US companies, threatened US economic interests. Successive US governments also worried about the Cuban example spreading throughout Latin America and weakening the US image and influence in the region.

Eisenhower's policy towards Cuba was based on a combination of economic and diplomatic measures and avoided a military option, such as an invasion of the island. The aim of these measures was to cause an economic crisis so deep that it would lead to popular uprisings and the collapse of Castro's regime. It also aimed to make Latin America, and to some extent the rest of the world, see the consequences of defying the US. This, in the Cold War years, was of paramount importance.

Members of the Eisenhower administration were divided as to what attitude the US government should take towards Castro. Some believed that if the US offered economic assistance to restore the Cuban economy, Castro could be appeased. Others argued that Castro was not to be trusted and that no economic aid should be offered.

Fidel Castro travelled to the US in April 1959, invited not by the US government but by the American Society of Press Editors. Eisenhower refused to meet Castro, who was received by Vice President Richard Nixon. When Nixon asked Castro when there would be elections in Cuba, he replied they would be held once Cuba was ready and that democracy was not a priority at a time when so many other pressing economic and social problems needed solutions. Although Castro did not make ideological statements, it became clear that major changes were to take place in Cuba.

When he returned to Cuba, Castro signed the agrarian reform that nationalized any parcel of land in excess of 1,000 acres. This affected US sugar companies in Cuba. Soon after, Castro nationalized foreign holdings in Cuba. As a response, Eisenhower suspended the import of Cuban sugar. Later in 1960, he extended economic **sanctions** to a trade embargo on sugar, oil and weapons. This was expanded by his successor, John F Kennedy, the following year. Tension continued to escalate when Castro nationalized US oil refineries in Cuba after these refused to process oil arriving from the USSR.

Eisenhower also took political measures. In January 1961, US diplomatic relations with Cuba were cut. Eisenhower ordered the CIA to secretly train a group of Cuban exiles with the aim of overthrowing Castro. This was the starting point of the Bay of Pigs Invasion, launched by Kennedy in 1961.

Sanctions and embargoes in the form of economic, financial, trade and travel restrictions imposed on Cuba aimed to democratize the country and improve the human rights situation on the island.



What were the effects of US economic policies on Cuba?


- The embargo did not succeed in making Castro unpopular and no counter-revolution started. US policies were seen as provocative and Castro rallied nationalist support among the population.
- Although the Cuban economy felt the effects of US sanctions, its impact was lessened by the immediate Soviet offer to buy the former sugar quota and to supply Cuba with oil. Cuban goods were given access to the Eastern European markets. However, transportation costs for Cuban exports increased.
- Cuba lost access to replacement parts for US equipment. This caused disruptions as most of the machinery operating in Cuba was imported from the US.

Activity 2

ATL Thinking and communication skills

Analyse the source and answer the questions that follow.

This Franklin cartoon shows Fidel Castro filling up his car while Dwight Eisenhower and Harold Macmillan look on, 5 July 1960.



1. What is the message conveyed by this source?
2. In pairs, find additional information on the reforms implemented in Cuba between 1959 and 1961. Provide specific examples to explain why, and to what extent, they affected US–Cuban relations.
3. 'The US drove Cuba into the arms of the USSR.' Using your own knowledge and the source, to what extent do you agree with this statement?

Key concepts: Consequence and significance

Kennedy and Cuba: How were relations between the US and Cuba affected by Kennedy's foreign policy?

Kennedy intensified the economic and diplomatic policies of Eisenhower towards Cuba. However, unlike his predecessor, Kennedy also ordered military operations against Castro. Although the plan for what became known as the Bay of Pigs Invasion had been initiated by Eisenhower, it was Kennedy who ordered its implementation on 17 April 1961.

In January 1962, Cuba, a founding member, was excluded from the OAS on the grounds that Marxism–Leninism was incompatible with the principles of the organization. With the exception of Mexico, OAS members cut diplomatic relations and trade with Cuba. Kennedy also tightened the embargo implemented by Eisenhower and worked on persuading NATO members to stop trading with Cuba. He launched the Alliance for Progress (see Chapter 5), a program to aid Latin American countries in their development so that they would become less likely to become communist.

The Bay of Pigs Invasion, April 1961

According to the plan, the invasion of Cuba by exiles who had been trained by the CIA in Guatemala and Nicaragua was intended to trigger a counter-revolution and depose Castro. It was expected that the 1,500 exiles landing in the Bay of Pigs would be joined by masses of Cubans willing to overthrow Castro. However, the level of opposition to Castro was far lower than the CIA had anticipated. Cubans did not join the invaders, but instead defended the country against foreign intervention.

Kennedy, who had had reservations about the plan, refused to give it full military support. This, combined with poor planning at various levels, contributed to the failure of the invasion. The original landing site was changed and terrain at the Bay of Pigs made landing difficult.

The US had failed to understand the nature of the Cuban Revolution and its appeal to the population. After the implementation of social and economic reforms, such as agrarian reform, Castro's popularity was high. Moreover, Castro, who had been expecting a US attack, ordered the arrest of many Cubans who were suspected by the regime before the invasion took place.

The invasion did not only fail in military terms but was also a diplomatic failure for the US. It had a significant impact on their relations with Latin America, who saw the Bay of Pigs Invasion as an imperialist act, showing that the US under Kennedy continued to intervene in the domestic affairs of other countries (see page 122, the Punta del Este Conference). The strategy to present the Bay of Pigs as purely a Cuban exiles' plan failed. US involvement was evident from the beginning and the defeat at the hands of Cuba also sent the message that the Kennedy administration was weak. This was a very serious problem for the US in the Cold War context.

What was the impact of the Bay of Pigs Invasion in Cuba?

The defeat of the US at the hands of the Cuban population was a historic moment. It also marked a point of no return in US–Cuban relations. It was after the invasion that Castro announced he was a Marxist–Leninist and would continue to be one until his death. The successful defeat of the invasion increased Castro's popularity, both at home as well as overseas. The incident strengthened Castro's position for several reasons.

- It reinforced Cuban nationalism and showed Castro as a national hero. His popularity in Latin America increased at the expense of the image of the US as an imperialist nation.
- The invasion confirmed Castro's accusations that the US was trying to interfere in Cuban affairs and his credibility was strengthened. Throughout his rule, the idea that Cuba could be invaded again allowed Castro to capitalize on Cuban fears and demand sacrifices of the population. For example, volunteer labour became a national priority.
- It contributed to Castro's consolidation of power. The invasion gave him the opportunity to arrest over 100,000 people the regime considered to be conspirators.
- Cuban forces captured 1,303 men who had taken part in the invasion. They were later exchanged for medicines and supplies.
- It led the USSR to strengthen its relations with Cuba and to consider establishing a strong military presence to defend the country.

Activity 3

ATL Thinking and communication skills

Study the sources and answer the questions that follow.

Source A

A photograph showing weapons captured from the soldiers who landed at the Bay of Pigs in 1961.



Source B

“As JFK [John F Kennedy] was receiving his party’s nomination, Fidel Castro was telling Cubans that ‘our enemies are used to threatening countries, they are used to trampling on the sovereignty of nations and issuing orders. But there are no Yankee soldiers commanding our armies any more, and there are no workers without weapons to defend themselves.’ During the preceding year, Cuba had established diplomatic relations with every communist government except that of East Germany and had signed cooperative accords with all but Albania, in the process doubling Cuba’s credit lines and disposing of 70 percent of the 1961 sugar harvest. Then, two days before Kennedy’s inauguration, Banco Nacional president Che Guevara had returned from a three-month tour of communist countries, his briefcase bulging with trade agreements.

Lars Schoultz (2009). *That Infernal Little Cuban Republic: The United States and the Cuban Revolution*. University of North Carolina Press, p. 144.

1. What is the message conveyed by Source A?
2. What does Source B reveal about the relations between Cuba and communist countries in 1961?
3. To what extent does Source A contribute to support the view that the Bay of Pigs fiasco was a triumph for Cuba?
4. In groups find out more information on Cuba’s domestic policies between 1959 and 1961. Areas you may consider are: the agrarian reform of 1959; nationalization policies; treatment of opposition; labour reforms; the literacy campaign (1961); cultural policies.
5. As a class, discuss the extent to which these policies were either motivated or influenced by US policy towards Cuba.
6. Assess the role played by the CIA in the Bay of Pigs Invasion.



Inconsolable Memories and Memories of the Underdevelopment

Inconsolable Memories (1965), is a novel by Cuban writer Edmundo Desnoes which takes place at the time of the Bay of Pigs Invasion and the Cuban Missile Crisis. It tells the story of a man who struggles to come to terms with the changes brought about by the Cuban Revolution and feels like a foreigner in his own country. The main character has received compensation for nationalized property and decides to become a writer. The memories he writes offer great insight into the first years of the revolution. One of Cuba’s most prestigious film directors, Tomás Gutiérrez Alea, turned the novel into *Memories of the Underdevelopment* (1968). The film was banned from being screened in the US until 1973 because of the trade restrictions imposed on Cuba.

Operation Mongoose

In November 1961, following the failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion, Kennedy authorized a secret operation to overthrow Castro by infiltrating and sabotaging his government. This plan authorized intelligence, political, economic and covert operations to instigate popular uprisings against Castro which would then receive US support. In charge of the operation was General Lansdale, an expert on guerrilla warfare.

Cuba was a threat to US leadership in the region and, after the failed invasion, Kennedy was prepared to bring about the end of the revolution at all costs. Operation Mongoose became the largest US intelligence operation to that point, costing the CIA alone between \$50 and \$60 million a year. It consisted of:

- supporting resistance groups inside Cuba and dividing the top Cuban leadership by promoting psychological warfare and spreading anti-Castro propaganda
- supporting sabotage operations such as the breaking of farming and industrial machinery, communication facilities and oil refinery plants, as well as the burning of crops and the destruction of processed sugar ready to be exported
- several plans to murder Castro.

Along with these measures, the US continued to work on persuading countries to join in the embargo of Cuba to achieve its economic and diplomatic isolation. It also carried out naval manoeuvres in the Caribbean Sea with the aim of intimidating Cubans.

Why did Operation Mongoose fail?

Operation Mongoose failed to create an atmosphere conducive for the fall of Castro. After the revolution, many opponents to the new regime had left Cuba and many others were imprisoned. It became difficult to build up opposition because Castro had developed the CDR (Committees for the Defense of the Revolution), which reported any suspicious activity. By 1963, it was estimated that over 30 per cent of the Cuban population had joined a committee, increasing the level of peer surveillance and intimidating the population.

The intensification of US policy against Castro persuaded the USSR that these were all steps leading to another US invasion of Cuba. In that context, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev decided to place missiles on Cuban soil. The Cuban Missile Crisis that developed from this decision put Operation Mongoose on hold.

Activity 4

ATL Research, thinking and communication skills

1. In groups, find out information about the nature and extent of US activities in Cuba under Operation Mongoose up to 1962.
2. Discuss why you think they failed to bring about the fall of Castro. In doing so, consider the influence of different factors, such as the role of Cuban domestic issues, the influence of the USSR, and the extent to which the US understood Cuban politics.

The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962

The Bay of Pigs Invasion had confirmed to both Cuba and the USSR that the US was determined to end Castro's communist rule. Information received in Moscow talked about further diplomatic and military plans to overthrow Castro (Operation Mongoose). Khrushchev decided to increase support for Cuba, now a declared Marxist state. Among the measures taken, he decided to place missiles in Cuba. There were several reasons why Khrushchev decided to place the missiles.

- They would deter an invasion by the US.
- Cuba was a socialist example in Latin America and, as such, had to be protected.
- The Soviets would have the capacity to strike US cities from Cuba, as the US had the capacity to strike the USSR with their missiles placed in Europe.
- If Cuba was lost, the USSR would no longer be seen as a leader of socialism in the developing world and would give way to China.

However, allowing for the placement of missiles brought risks to Cuba as it turned the country into a US strategic target. Additionally, it could be interpreted as Cuba bowing to Soviet strategic needs at a time when Castro was trying to position himself as leader of the Latin American struggle against imperialism. On the other hand, the suggestion that the placing of missiles could alternatively be interpreted as Soviet endorsement of Cuba's revolutionary leadership in the region played a part in Castro's decision to accept the missiles.

When the crisis broke out, Fidel Castro thought Cuban demands could be included in the negotiations. He wanted the end of the embargo and diplomatic isolation of the regime, US evacuation of the military base in Guantanamo and the end of all subversive operations against Cuba. However, none of these demands were included in the negotiations, which took place exclusively between the US and the Soviet governments.

There are several factors that explain why Cuba was excluded from the negotiations. Khrushchev feared that Castro would not be willing to make concessions or compromise to reach a solution. Castro's reactions during the crisis had led some Soviet politicians to think that he welcomed an escalation more than a diffusion of the tensions. This seemed to be confirmed by the letters he sent to Khrushchev during the crisis, in which he stated that Cuba was prepared for an imminent US attack. Khrushchev also feared that if Castro's demands became part of the negotiations, these would be complicated further.

The crisis was resolved when the USSR agreed to remove the missiles from Cuba and the US promised not to invade Cuba again. Negotiations included a secret agreement that the US would remove their missiles from Turkey, and the dismantling of the missiles in Cuba was to be internationally supervised.

The resolution of the crisis deeply affected Soviet–Cuban relations, which took a turn for the worse until 1968. When the Cubans heard that the missiles were to be dismantled and that Cuba was not gaining anything except a promise that the US would not invade, anti-Soviet demonstrations broke out across the country.

Activity 5



Communication and social skills

In groups, work on a chart that compares and contrasts the aims and results of the Cuban Missile Crisis for the US, the USSR and Cuba. Explain in detail what each country expected to achieve at the start and what they had achieved by the end of the crisis.

Why were Soviet–Cuban relations affected by the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis?

The fact that Khrushchev decided to negotiate with the US unilaterally was one of the factors leading to the tension with Cuba. Castro had expected the negotiations to make Cuba safer. He believed the Bay of Pigs Invasion had provided enough evidence that Cuba was in danger and to deny him a seat at the negotiating table was to deny Cuba's sovereignty.

Not only did the Soviets negotiate with the US unilaterally, but Castro was not informed of the terms of the negotiations until the end of the crisis. Castro stated that the Cubans had heard that there had been an agreement over the radio and they felt humiliated rather than relieved. He was told that there had not been enough time to open consultations with him.

When, later, Castro found out that the Soviets had obtained the removal of missiles in Turkey, he was infuriated. He claimed the USSR had exchanged Cuba for Turkey while Cuba had not gained anything. Clearly Castro did not believe in the US promise not to invade.

Tension between Cuba and the USSR also escalated when Castro refused to allow an international inspection of the missile site. This issue became a point of contention and an obstacle to concluding the crisis. US surveillance planes continued to fly over Cuban airspace. Castro's refusal to allow the inspection was not only based on arguments of sovereignty. He protested before the UN Acting Secretary General, U Thant, that the US was not being asked to guarantee its pledge not to invade Cuba. In the end, neither the missile site verification nor a formal US pledge came about.

Castro drew several lessons from the crisis. He acknowledged that Cuban security was highly compromised. Although its armed forces had improved since the Bay of Pigs Invasion, Cuba did not have the means to resist a US invasion. After the missile crisis, it became clear to Castro that Cuba could not automatically count on the USSR. The Soviets were not prepared to risk peaceful coexistence for the safety of Cuba and, if made to choose, they would choose the US over Cuba. In Castro's view, he would have to find other ways to protect Cuba. He decided to make the world safer for the Cuban Revolution by spreading it.

Activity 6

ATL Thinking and communication skills

Read the sources and answer the questions that follow.

Source A

Edmund Valtman depicts Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro in the cartoon 'This hurts me more than it hurts you', published in *The Hartford Times*, 30 October 1962.



Source B

Oleg Darusenkov, Soviet Head of Cuban Affairs at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, in an interview in 1996:

“From Fidel’s point of view, I can see why he lost confidence in the Soviet Union after the October missile crisis. After that, he no longer believed that the USSR would protect Cuba from US aggression. He was always pushing the Soviet Union to change, to take views that he thought would protect Cuban security. I believe he was always testing our limits, like stretching the cloth, watching carefully to see when it will rip. That was from Fidel’s point of view. But from our point of view, we could only stand so much... In other words, there was growing sentiment to think seriously about reducing the level of our material support to Cuba.

James G Blight and Philip Brenner (2007). *Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba’s Struggle with the Superpowers after the Missile Crisis*. Rowman & Littlefield, p. 111.

1. What is the message conveyed by Source A?
2. With reference to its origins, purpose and content, assess the value and limitations of Source B to a historian studying Soviet–Cuban relations in 1962.
3. Using the sources so far in this chapter and your own knowledge, to what extent do you agree with Castro’s claim that although an international conflict had been avoided, peace had not been achieved for Cuba?
4. To what extent do you agree with the view that US foreign policy towards Cuba between 1959 and 1963 was largely responsible for Castro’s turn to communism?

In what ways did Cold War events between 1962 and 1968 affect Cuba?

Cuban diplomatic relations in this period were marked by two key concerns. One was the continued efforts on the part of the US to isolate Cuba and prevent Castro from providing support to insurgent groups in other countries, and it was the support for revolution in other countries which contributed to the second issue – a deterioration of the relations with the USSR, which had started with Cuba’s frustration at the resolution of the Missile Crisis.

The diplomatic isolation of Cuba and the Cuban response

One aim of isolating Cuba from the international community was to make it more difficult for Castro to collect information and distribute assistance to insurgent groups, since Cuba would no longer have a physical presence (i.e. an embassy or consulate) in those countries. Also, travelling to and from Cuba became difficult. For example, US passport holders were banned from travelling to Cuba and became liable to prosecutions if they did. However, Thomas C Wright (2000) claimed:

“While the disruption of contact between Cuba and the rest of Latin America succeeded in impeding Castro’s intervention in those countries, it did little to reduce the most important influence that the Cuban Revolution exercised in the hemisphere: the power of its example.
Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution. Praeger, p. 61.

The strategies used by Castro to try to overcome the attempts to isolate Cuba

The Non-Aligned Movement

Cuba joined the Non-Aligned Movement in 1964. This international organization was officially established in Belgrade in 1961. It aimed to represent the developing world in their purpose of opposing all forms of colonialism and imperialism and adopting a neutral position in the Cold War. The post-war period had brought about processes of **decolonization**, especially in Africa and Asia, and the newly independent states wanted to be neutral in the Cold War scenario and continue to support national liberation movements.

The Tricontinental Conference, 1966

The aim of this conference, attended by revolutionary organizations and governments from Latin America, Asia and Africa, was to support armed revolution in the developing world. The conference founded the Organization of Solidarity with the People of Asia, Africa and Latin America (OSPAAAL).

Decolonization

This is the process by which territories under foreign control become politically independent. After the Second World War, many territories in Asia and Africa began their independence processes.



Poster advertising the Tricontinental Congress of 1966.



Cuba and the national liberation movements

Cuba's interventions in support of national liberation movements led to involvement in Latin America and Africa. Aid came in the forms of military training, troop deployments, weapons, medical assistance and economic support. This policy continued beyond 1968 and provided Castro with both successes and failures.

Cuba's determination to follow an independent foreign policy that satisfied its needs independently from those of the Soviet Union was also made possible by developments in the US. Lars Schoultz said, 'Cuba disappeared from Washington's consciousness'. After the murder of Kennedy in 1963, US foreign policy under Lyndon Johnson became mainly focused on events in Vietnam, a conflict which compromised the US economy and image, and led to domestic issues (see Chapter 4).

While Castro was extremely critical of US intervention in Vietnam, he also suggested the Soviets were not doing enough to contribute to the nationalist cause there. The Soviet Union's reaction to Cuba's foreign policy was ambiguous. In some cases, it was supportive of Castro. But the Soviets refused to support him when US–Soviet relations were at stake. On balance, Castro's defiance negatively affected Soviet–Cuban relations in this period.

What was the impact of Cuban intervention?

Although the main aim of intervention was to increase the success of the revolutionary movements in the developing world, Castro was aware that Cuba's contribution also increased the cost of counter-insurgency operations by the US. The success of revolutions in these countries meant allied governments in power that could help break the diplomatic and economic isolation of Cuba.

Antoni Kapcia, in *Cuba in Revolution: A History since the Fifties*, suggests that Cuban interventions had significant domestic impact. It served to employ the over-trained workforce that existed since the educational reforms; it offered those travelling abroad the opportunity to see that the situation in other countries was worse than it was in Cuba; and it increased the national pride and the international reputation of Cuba.

Activity 7



Communication and thinking skills

Read the following source and answer the question.

Fidel Castro's speech delivered at the closing session of the Tricontinental Conference, 16 January 1966:

We are a small nation, not too far from the shores of the imperialist homeland. Our arms are eminently defensive. But our men, wholeheartedly, our revolutionary militants, our fighters, are prepared to fight the imperialists in any part of the world. [Applause] Our country is a small one; our territory could even be partially occupied by the enemy; but that would never mean a cessation of our resistance.

But the world is big, and the imperialists are everywhere, and for the Cuban revolutionaries the field of battle against imperialism takes in the whole world. [...] Hence we say and we declare that Cuban fighters can be counted on by the revolutionary movement in any corner of the earth. [Applause]

Thousands and thousands of Cubans have expressed the desire and readiness to go anywhere in the world where they may be needed to help the revolutionary movement and this is logical.

1. With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of this source for historians studying Cuban foreign policy in the Cold War.
2. How do you think the US and the Soviets would respond to this speech?

Soviet-Cuban relations

The Cuban Revolution was a nationalist revolution. It aimed to defend the independence of the country not only from US intervention but also from Soviet control. However, as long as Cuba continued to depend economically on the Soviet Union, this would prove difficult to sustain.

Castro's speech at the 1966 Tricontinental Conference (see the source in Activity 7),

CHALLENGE YOURSELF

ATL

Thinking skills

Why might Castro claim the Soviets wanted to curb revolutionary movements?

which made indirect reference to Soviet lack of support to North Vietnam, irritated Soviet diplomats. This was aggravated by Castro's closing speech at the 1967 Organization of Latin American Solidarity (OLAS) Conference held in Havana, which referred to the Soviets as 'revolutionary in word' and being among those 'who want to curb the revolution'.

Alexei Kosygin, Soviet premier, and Lyndon Johnson met in a summit in 1967 at which Fidel Castro's role in international affairs was discussed. Kosygin then travelled to Havana to meet Castro. During their interview, the Cuban leader accused the USSR of making too many concessions to the US. He repeated that Cuba was threatened by the US and that acting to spread the revolution was a matter of self-preservation. But the meeting did not resolve the conflict between the USSR and Cuba:

“ This time, however, the Russians were not asking for the return of what was essentially Soviet property [missiles] but for a fundamental reversal of Cuban foreign policy that reflects some of the most deeply held beliefs of the Cuban leadership.

James G Blight and Philip Brenner (2007). *Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba's Struggle with the Superpowers after the Missile Crisis*. Rowman & Littlefield, p. 126.


Although the USSR put diplomatic pressure on Cuba to end such policy, Che Guevara departed to Bolivia in 1966 to extend the revolutionary fighting. James G Blight and Philip Brenner argue that Guevara's mission in Bolivia exhausted the Soviet patience. They had tolerated Castro's rhetoric, but refused to have the rapprochement with the US ruined by Cuba's foreign interventions.

Activity 8

ATL

Communication and thinking skills

An official Cuban poster commemorating the Day of the Heroic Guerrilla, 1968.



What is the message conveyed by this source?

When Guevara was executed in Bolivia in 1967, Castro declared 1968 to be the 'Year of the Heroic Guerrilla'. This carried the message that Cuba was determined to continue with its interventions. Castro accused the USSR of not having instructed the Bolivian Communist Party to assist Guevara and, therefore, being responsible for his death. He was told that if his provocations led to US military intervention, the Soviets would not defend Cuba.

Activity 9

ATL Research and social skills

Read the source and answer the questions that follow.

“Despite the ultimate failure of his aspirations for a truly independent Cuban foreign policy, in his first few years Castro had exceeded the dreams of the most ardent Latin American nationalists: He had removed Cuba from the US orbit and challenged Yankee supremacy throughout the hemisphere. In fulfilling the anti-Imperialist aspirations of the Latin American left, Castro set an example that enflamed nationalist sentiment throughout the hemisphere. For many years, the fact that Cuba had failed to achieve its sovereignty was far less important to Latin American progressives than the fact that Castro had broken the ties of subservience to Washington and Wall Street – ties as strong in the Cuban case as they were in any Latin American country.

Thomas C Wright (2001). *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution*. Praeger, p. 35.

1. To what extent do you agree with the view that Castro's first years exceeded all nationalist dreams?
2. In groups, choose one country (other than the US and USSR) that was affected by Cuban foreign policy between 1959 and 1970. Explain the nature, methods and outcome of the influence of Cuba in their domestic and foreign policies.
3. Evaluate the successes and failures of Castro's foreign policy between 1962 and 1968.

A turning point – 1968

The year 1968 was of particular significance in the Cold War and, as such, it had important consequences for Soviet–Cuban relations.

- In January, to try to bring Castro into line, the USSR cut down exports of Soviet oil, leading to **rationing**.
- In March, Castro announced a new phase of agrarian reform and further expropriations which extended from small shops to street vendors. Self-employment was banned. This new plan, the Revolutionary Offensive, aimed to remove what was left of capitalism in Cuba. But it caused administrative chaos and severe economic problems.
- Soviet–Cuban relations entered a different phase in August after Soviet tanks entered Czechoslovakia to suppress the Prague Spring, an attempted reform implemented by President Alexander Dubček.

When the invasion of Czechoslovakia took place, Cuban public opinion immediately sided with the Czechs. They sympathized with the cause of a small country invaded by a superpower, which echoed the Cuban history with the US. While waiting for Castro's official pronouncement on events, there was a large degree of certainty that he would condemn the invasion. Not doing so would be setting a dangerous precedent for Cuba and would be incompatible with his support for national liberation movements worldwide.

It took Castro three days to announce the official standpoint. Contrary to the widespread belief, and although he conceded that the invasion was a 'truly traumatic situation of foreign occupation', Castro endorsed it (Schoultz). On 23 August, he said, 'I



Questions that ask you to write on a specific period could tempt you into offering chronological narratives which become descriptive answers. Avoid this by organizing your response thematically. For each theme, use a separate paragraph. This will help you to produce a more focused response. An effective starting point is to identify the aims of Castro's foreign policy in this period. This will help you to decide how successful his foreign policy was by assessing whether the aims were achieved.

You could decide to write on successes and failures as two separate concepts that help structure the answer. Or, alternatively, you could think of events that took place in the given period and for each one, discuss how successful they were for Castro's foreign policy. For example, although it may look as if Castro's foreign policy was unable to sustain its challenge to the USSR, it could also be argued that Castro remained a significant player in international relations.

had no doubt that the Czechoslovak political situation was deteriorating and Czechoslovakia was sliding downhill to a return to capitalism and would inexorably fall into the hands of imperialism'. Castro's main justification for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, which he labelled 'a bitter necessity', was based on the argument that the socialist bloc could not allow one of its members to break away.

Several factors influenced Castro's decision to support the Soviets.

- Opposing the USSR would damage their relations, which Cuba could not afford. The economic problems and the failure of the Revolutionary Offensive to address them were clear evidence that the Cuban economy was in no position to lose the Soviet assistance.
- Castro believed that if Cuba became more vulnerable as a result of conflict with the USSR, the US might decide to take advantage and attack.
- Some members of the Cuban government expressed their concern about how supporting Czechoslovakia could put Cuba on the same ideological side as the US and how Castro would be forced to use similar arguments to defend his views. This would send mixed messages to all developing countries that looked up to Cuba as an example and was, therefore, not an option.

Key concepts: Change and significance

The Nixon years, 1969–74



Salvador Allende with Fidel Castro, greeted by Chilean students upon his arrival in Santiago on 10 November 1971.

Before coming to power in 1969, Richard Nixon had been Eisenhower's Vice President. In that role, he had supported a hard policy towards Cuba and agreed with the plan to train Cuban exiles with the aim of overthrowing Castro. During his presidential

campaign in 1968, he repeatedly gave assurances to Americans that he would enforce a strong policy against Castro. Once in power, he continued to advocate the diplomatic isolation of Cuba to reduce Castro's influence in Latin America. However, it was not Cuba but Chile that became the focus of US foreign policy in Latin America.

In Chapter 5 you have read about Allende's coming to power in Chile and Nixon's covert operations contributing to Allende's fall in 1973. You will now read about the relationship between Fidel Castro and Salvador Allende and reflect on whether this relationship helped or hindered the Chilean 'way to socialism'.

To what extent did Cuba help the Chilean 'way to socialism'?

Cuban-Chilean relations, 1970–73

The Cuban Revolution represented a nationalist, popular and anti-imperialist experience with great appeal worldwide. The fact that a socialist model only 90 miles from US territory had survived every attempt to overthrow it was inspirational to many. Salvador Allende, who in 1959 was Senator for the Antofagasta region, travelled to Havana to see the Cuban Revolution at first hand. He met Castro and Che Guevara and described the atmosphere in Havana as one with *'a united people, a people with political conscience, a people whose leaders have moral strength'* (Tanya Harmer).

After his visit, Allende remained in contact with Castro. The Chilean future President was openly critical of US policies towards Cuba. He participated in the 1966 Tricontinental Conference and endorsed the formation of OSPAAAL. Once in power, Allende challenged the US by immediately restabilizing diplomatic relations with Cuba and was accused by the US government of overriding the OAS resolution that had suspended Cuba.

Richard Nixon interpreted Allende's rise as the first communist elected President in 1970 as an indirect effect of Castro's *'revolutionary internationalism'*. Castro, for his part, saw Allende's triumph as a victory against US imperialism and welcomed policies like nationalization of copper.

Castro cooperated with Allende's government in many ways. He sent Cuban intelligence officers and members of the military. He offered military training in both Chile and Cuba. Chile received weapons smuggled in boats carrying sugar. There is an ongoing debate as to whether Castro wished to influence Allende's government or was merely offering the help requested by Allende.

In November 1971, Castro made an unprecedented 24-day visit to Chile. He travelled across the country, met with politicians and trade union leaders and addressed crowds eager to hear about the Cuban experience and the way forward. However, his visit led the opposition to claim that Castro was influencing Allende and some argue that Allende himself began to consider Castro's attitude intrusive.

CHALLENGE YOURSELF



Thinking skills

What role do you think the Castro–Allende relationship had on Nixon's decision to engage in covert CIA actions in Chile?

Activity 10

ATL Communication and thinking skills

Read the source and answer the questions that follow.

Salvador Allende, in a joint interview with Fidel Castro, Santiago, November 1971:

“But they [counter-revolutionaries] know what it means to have the presence of Cuba and the presence of Fidel Castro in Chile. They are aware that it revitalizes the Latin American revolutionary process. They have evidence that the unity of our people is an undeniable factor that strengthens the will and the decision of the peoples to break with dependence. And furthermore, it indisputably contributes to the end of the deliberate isolation of Cuba. That’s why it has intensified. And more so Fidel, also because your success hurts them deeply. The fact that miners, peasants, workers, soldiers and priests have had talks with you. The great mass rallies... of course, they have obviously been about fondness and affection for you and the Cuban Revolution. But also, deep down they have been about support for the government, because it is the government of the people that has made your presence here possible, right?”

1. Why, according to the source, was Castro’s visit to Chile significant?
2. With reference to its origin, purpose and content, analyse the value and limitations of this source for historians studying the role of Cuba in the Cold War.

In the months before the coup, anti-Cuban propaganda escalated in Chile. Bombs exploded, targeting Cuban buildings such as the embassy and a Cuban school. On the morning of 11 September 1973, the day of the coup, the Cuban embassy was surrounded by the army. As the coup developed, confrontations between the Chilean military and the people at the Cuban embassy occurred. The next day, Chile broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba and Cuban diplomats were given 24 hours to leave the country.

Activity 11

ATL Communication and thinking skills

Read the source and answer the questions that follow.

“There also does not appear to have been a joint Cuban–Chilean plan to defend the government. Rather, there was a general expectation that the Cubans would assist if the time came. And although their embassy remained a central point of reference to the various sectors of the Chilean Left, in the context of fragmented left-wing planning the Cubans had become dislocated and unable to direct any decisive countermeasures for a coup. Ultimately, Havana’s role depended on Allende to take decisive action to unite these forces and request the Cubans’ help. But this request never came. The only option was to try to arm the popular forces,’ Castro later [said]; ‘Naturally it would have been dangerous, but it was more dangerous to do nothing... For the enemy was mobilized, the fascists were mobilized, and the masses were nowhere to be seen because the government had not mobilized them.’”

Dr Tanya Harmer (2011). *Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War*. University of North Carolina Press, p. 246.

1. Why, according to this source, did the Cubans in Santiago not help Allende?
2. Examine the significance of Cuba in both the rule and the fall of Salvador Allende.

Key concepts:

Significance and consequence

In what ways was Cuba affected by the Cold War during the Carter years?

When Jimmy Carter came to power in 1977, he announced a policy towards Cuba which aimed to normalize relations between the two countries. A process to re-establish diplomatic relations began immediately and soon saw some promising

progress. However, later in Carter's term, relations deteriorated and with them, Carter's opportunities to be re-elected. This section will look at the nature of US–Cuban relations under Carter. It will then explore the reasons why events took a turn for the worse and assess the extent to which this was related to the Cold War.

Jimmy Carter's decision to improve relations with Cuba should be understood in the context of his quest for human rights. He hoped that ending Cuba's relative diplomatic isolation and the embargo would encourage an improvement in the human rights situation on the island, where Castro continued to imprison political opponents.

Carter lifted restrictions for Americans wishing to travel to Cuba – which had been imposed by Eisenhower – and announced that both governments would negotiate a fisheries and maritime boundaries agreement. In September 1977, a significant step towards the normalization of relations was taken when the two governments established 'Interest Sections', which operated as de facto embassies.

However, these measures did not bring about the changes Carter was hoping for. By early 1978, it was clear to Carter that Cuba's policies would not change in the direction he had hoped. He was particularly concerned about Cuban activities in Africa (for example, in **Angola**) and their unwillingness to withdraw from the region. Moreover, members of Carter's administration were convinced that Cuba was not acting in Africa as a 'puppet' of the USSR but was rather advancing its own agenda, to expand the revolution in that continent.

Castro further defied the US by announcing Cuba would continue to support liberation movements in Africa as well as the independence of Puerto Rico (see page 117). He called Carter's administration hypocritical because it spoke of human rights while maintaining the blockade over Cuba, which he defined as an attempt to starve millions of human beings. He also denounced the deployment of US troops worldwide and the occupation of Guantanamo. In the words of Lars Schoultz, *'the honeymoon was over'*.

Cuban intervention in Angola (Operation Carlota)

In 1975, Cuba – without consulting the USSR – deployed troops in Angola in support of a newly independent, nationalist, leftist government (the MPLA) fighting against a US-supported faction. Cuban troops remained in Angola between 1975 and 1991. The intervention cost Cuba many lives and had a negative impact on its economy. However, Castro's assistance to the MPLA allowed him to play a significant part in other conflicts in the region and to act as a supporter of the end of Apartheid.

Activity 12



Communication, research and social skills

In groups, read the sources and answer the questions that follow.

Source A

President Jimmy Carter in an interview, 5 March 1977:

'I would like to do what I can to ease tensions with Cuba... Before any full normalization of relationships can take place, though, Cuba would have to make some fairly substantial changes in their attitude. I would like to insist, for instance, that they not interfere in the internal affairs of countries in this hemisphere, and that they decrease their military involvement in Africa, and that they reinforce a commitment to human rights by releasing political prisoners that have been in jail now in Cuba for 17 or 18 years, things of that kind.'

Quoted in Robert A Pastor, 'The Carter-Castro Years: A Unique Opportunity', in Soraya M Castro Mariño and Ronald W Pruessen (2012). *Fifty Years of Revolution: Perspectives on Cuba, the United States, and the World*. University Press of Florida, p. 240.

Source B

Fidel Castro, in a conversation with Erich Honecker, leader of the German Democratic Republic, in Berlin on 3 April 1978:

'The ruling circles in the United States are wasting their time by obstinately making an improvement in state relations... dependent on the withdrawal of the international Cuban

troops in Angola... Cuba's solidarity with the African peoples is not negotiable... If the US government believes that in order for relations to improve, our people must give up their internationalist principles, then in the same manner that in the past, we fought against five presidents of the United States, we will now fight against the sixth.

Quoted in Robert A Pastor, 'The Carter-Castro Years: a Unique Opportunity', in Soraya M Castro Mariño and Ronald W Pruessen (2012). *Fifty Years of Revolution: Perspectives on Cuba, the United States, and the World*. University Press of Florida, p. 244.

1. In Source A, Carter mentioned several issues that Cuba needed to address before full normalization of relations could take place. Provide examples of these issues based on what you have studied about the Cold War in the Americas. Which of the impediments mentioned by Carter do you consider was more significant in the deterioration of US-Cuban relations? Explain your answer.
2. Divide the class into two groups. One group will act as advisers to President Carter and the other group will act as advisers to Fidel Castro. Each group should discuss:
 - a) the aims of the negotiation for your country
 - b) the points of conflict between both governments
 - c) strategies to persuade the other party to agree to your aims.
3. Which issues did each group consider played a more significant role in the failure to improve US-Cuban relations? Explain your answer fully.

The Mariel Crisis, 1980


In April 1980, a group of Cuban citizens broke into the Peruvian embassy in Havana seeking asylum. When the Peruvian government refused to return the citizens, Castro withdrew security from the Peruvian embassy. This led to a wave of over 10,000 asylum-seeking Cubans descending on the embassy. They were flown to Lima or the US via Costa Rica. Upon leaving Cuba, their valuables and personal belongings were confiscated. Carter's initial response was to allow 3,500 refugees into the US and he asked other Latin American countries to do the same.

Castro responded by suspending the airlift and announcing that he would open the Cuban ports and allow anyone wishing to leave Cuba to do so, as long as someone came for them. This was a message to exiles in Florida. Many of them had left Cuba in the first wave of immigration in the early 1960s, leaving relatives and friends behind. Carter's response was that the United States would welcome 'freedom-loving Cubans' escaping repression 'with open arms'. His Vice President, Walter Mondale, regarded the exodus as the best proof of the failure of the Cuban Revolution.

What followed was the arrival of boats from Florida to take Cubans back to the US. It is estimated that 125,000 Cubans left from Mariel in approximately 5,000 vessels which made the journey between the two countries. Cubans emigrating also included dissidents like Cuban writer Reinaldo Arenas. Later, Cuban authorities began to force approximately 5,000 alleged criminals and mentally ill people into the boats.

Significant individual: Reinaldo Arenas (1943-90)

Arenas was a Cuban novelist, poet and playwright. In 1959, he supported the revolution, but in later years he became critical of many of the policies. Arenas published only one work in Cuba, 'Singing from the Well [*Celestino antes del Alba*]' in 1962. His other manuscripts were smuggled out of the island and published overseas. He was considered anti-revolutionary, so he was persecuted and imprisoned between 1974 and 1976. He left Cuba for the US in 1980 during the Mariel exodus. His autobiography, *Before Night Falls*, was published posthumously.



The Mariel exodus, which ended on 31 October, had a negative impact on Carter's re-election campaign. The numbers of Cuban exiles arriving overwhelmed US authorities. There were insufficient housing facilities and refugees had to be placed in military bases until their entry was processed. The Republican opposition to Carter questioned the cost of the operation and claimed the US was no longer in control of its frontiers. Yet, the end of the operation received as many criticisms.

Activity 13

ATL Thinking and communication skills

President Jimmy Carter, in an interview on the day after the presidential elections (which he lost to Ronald Reagan), 5 November 1980:

“The refugee question has hurt us badly. It wasn't just in Florida, but it was throughout the country. It was a burning issue. It made us look impotent when we received these refugees from Cuba. I think in retrospect we handled the situation properly. We took them in. We tried to restrict the flow and enforce the American law.

1. To what extent was the Mariel Crisis a success for Fidel Castro?
2. Using the source and your own knowledge, to what extent do you agree with the view that Carter's administration looked impotent in the face of the Mariel exodus?

Activity 14

ATL Thinking and communication skills

The following map shows some of the countries where Cuba intervened between the 1960s and the early 1990s. Some of these conflicts involved military intervention; others included sending doctors, teachers, advisers and workers.



Some areas of Cuban intervention around the world, between the 1960s and the early 1990s.

1. In groups, find out about the role of Fidel Castro in one conflict in a country other than Angola. Why did Cuba become involved in that particular conflict? What role did it play? What was the result of the intervention for both the country of your choice and Cuba? What impact did it have on both the conflict in question, and on Cuba and Fidel Castro?
2. Looking at the map above, assess the extent to which the United States felt threatened by Cuba's foreign policy under Fidel Castro. How legitimate do you consider these fears to be?

Activity 15



Thinking, social and self-management skills

In this chapter, you have read about different reasons why Cuba's relations with the US and the USSR underwent moments of tension as well as moments of collaboration. In groups, discuss how the following factors affected Cuba's relations with both the US and the USSR between 1959 and 1980, providing specific examples for each one:

- US imperialism
- personalities of the key players
- Cuba's interest in '*exporting the revolution*'
- Castro's ambition to play a major role in international relations
- Cuba's economic dependence on the USSR
- the challenge Cuba posed to the US in the Americas
- the role of US policy in pushing Cuba to the Soviet camp
- the importance of an '*external enemy*' to Castro's consolidation and rule.

Each group should then select the two factors they consider played a larger part in events and explain why these were deemed the most significant. Use the criteria you developed earlier in the book to evaluate the factors and to determine the significance of the factor.

Activity 16



Thinking skills

Examine the view that Carter's foreign policy had a significant impact in US-Cuban relations.

What can you expect when you choose to write an Extended Essay in History?

As you are doing History at Higher level, you may well choose to do your Extended Essay in History. This will give you the opportunity to independently study an area of history in depth and give you the experience of writing a formal, university-style essay.

- You will need to write between 3,000 and 4,000 words.
- You are expected to spend about 40 hours on the essay.
- The essay should be based on a narrow, focused topic and framed around a question, which will allow you to be analytical in your response.
- You should use a range of primary and secondary sources.
- You will have a supervisor who will give you guidance throughout the process; you will have three 'formal' sessions to discuss the progress of your essay as well as other more informal sessions. The last of the 'formal' sessions will take place after you have finished your essay and will be a viva voce (an interview about your essay).
- The essay will be marked according to clear criteria (see below).
- You should use a consistent style of referencing throughout.
- You will be expected to reflect on your experiences of writing the essay by using a researcher's reflection space (RRS); this will form the basis of discussion at your formal sessions with your supervisor. These discussions will be recorded on the Reflections on Planning and Progress Form (RPPF).

Note that you cannot choose a topic from the last ten years or one that you have already covered in your Internal Assessment.

How do the Extended Essay criteria apply to a History essay?

These are the criteria against which your essay will be marked:

A: Focus and method	B: Knowledge and understanding	C: Critical thinking	D: Formal presentation	E: Engagement
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Topic • Research • Methodology 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Context • Subject-specific terminology and concepts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Research • Analysis • Discussion and evaluation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Structure • Layout 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Process • Research focus
Marks	Marks	Marks	Marks	Marks
6	6	12	4	6

For an Extended Essay in History you need to consider the following questions for each of the criteria:

A: Focus and method

- Is your choice of topic appropriate and not in the last ten years?
- Have you a focused research question which can be answered within 4,000 words?
- Have you given the historical context for your topic and explained why it is worth investigating?
- Do you have an appropriate range of relevant sources, both primary and secondary, which will provide enough material to allow you to answer the question?

B: Knowledge and understanding

- Have you placed your research question in the broader historical context?
- Have you accurately and confidently used historical concepts and terms relevant to your topic?
- Have you used your sources effectively to help you analyse and answer your question?

C: Critical thinking

- Have you developed an argument that will answer your research question?
- Are your points supported with evidence from your sources?
- Are all of your points and evidence relevant to the question?
- Is your conclusion consistent with the evidence that you have presented and does it answer the question?
- Have you evaluated the sources that you have used to show an awareness of their value and limitations?

D: Formal presentation

- Are your subheadings clear and relevant to the essay?
- Have you used a consistent method of referencing and acknowledged all information from other sources?
- Do you have a bibliography correctly presented in alphabetical order?
- Do you have a title page, table of contents and page numbering?
- Is the essay within the limit of 4,000 words?

E: Engagement

Assessment of this criterion will be based on what you have written in the RPPF. After your third formal session, which is the viva voce, your supervisor will also make a comment on this form as to your engagement with the whole research and writing process.

Make sure you consider the following in your reflections:

- *Are your reflections on your decision-making and planning evaluative (i.e. not just descriptive)?*
- *Do your reflections communicate a high degree of intellectual and personal engagement with the research process?*
- *Have you indicated where you faced challenges and how you overcame these challenges?*
- *Have you indicated where your conceptual understanding has developed or changed?*
- *Have you indicated what you might do differently if you did this task again or what questions you still have unanswered?*

Tips for choosing your topic and formulating your question

- Once you have chosen a subject area, decide on specific topics that interest you.
- Discuss these topics with your supervisor and narrow them down to one topic area.
- Begin to read around the topic so that you can identify possible research questions; check any recent research on this area and any areas of controversy that could be a focus for your question.
- Continue to discuss and refine possible questions with your supervisor as you find out more about your topic; you may end up changing your question several times.

These are examples of topics and questions that have led to effective investigations. Note the narrow and clearly defined focus of each question:

Topic: OAS

Question: To what extent was the Organization of American States (OAS) successful in maintaining an impartial approach towards the US–Cuba conflict between 1960 and 1965?

Topic: The Vietnam War

Question: To what extent did cultural misunderstandings between the Vietnamese and the US influence the outcome of the war?

Topic: The Alliance for Progress

Question: To what extent was the Alliance for Progress successful in achieving its aims in Colombia?

Topic: Nixon's covert operations in Chile

Question: 'Nixon bears a crucial responsibility for inciting the coup that overthrew Allende in Chile.' To what extent do you agree with this statement?

WRITING AN EXTENDED ESSAY: THE PROCESS

A topic – is there something you want to learn more about?



Where to begin? Start by looking for more information online or in the school library.



Do some wide reading and then try to narrow your focus. If you want to know more about the McCarthy era, is there a narrower topic you would like to investigate? Maybe something about the kind of propaganda that was used to persuade the American people that there was a serious threat to their freedom?



Think of possible research questions and command terms. Your research question must end with a '?'. Try out 'to what extent...' or 'what were the main reasons...' or find a quotation and ask if this was an accurate judgement or assertion. Would any of these work for you?



Do more reading but be sure that you make a note of every relevant point you come across and that you have all the information you need for your citations, in case you decide to include it in your Extended Essay.



Start planning.



Write your outline to discuss with your supervisor.

Some tips for effective research

- Start by reading the relevant sections of the Extended Essay Guide to understand the demands of the EE and the marking criteria. This will help you focus on what you need to keep in mind to write a solid Extended Essay.
- It's important that you discuss the topic and the research question with your supervisor early in the process. You may start reading about a topic of your interest without necessarily having a specific research question, but once you start writing, a focused and narrow question which can be answered in 4,000 words needs to be in place.
- You must ensure that there is enough information available to support your research. Compiling a bibliography of the sources you will be using will help you assess whether you need to find additional supporting material on a particular aspect of the investigation.
- You will need to include some evaluation of your sources and this should be included when you refer to the sources – not as a separate section or in your footnotes – just think about any limitations (especially) that may have influenced how you used your sources.
- Your page of contents will come after your title page, although this may not seem so important, it can give an examiner a sense of how you have planned your essay so pay attention to this and make sure it is complete.
- Examiners don't have to read appendices so make sure that you include relevant material in the body of your EE.
- AND... don't confuse your EE with your IA. These are structured differently.

Glossary

17th parallel: Temporary division of North and South Vietnam established by the Geneva Accords.

38th parallel: The latitude line chosen to divide Korea after the Second World War. North of the line was put under Soviet administration and south of the line was put under American administration. It was intended to be a temporary division, but after the Korean War it became the permanent dividing line between North Korea and South Korea.

A-bomb: Weapon with huge explosive power that results from the sudden release of atomic energy.

armistice: An agreement to end fighting so that peace negotiations can begin.

arms race: Competition between states regarding numbers and/or types of weapons.

authoritarian: A style of government in which there is complete obedience or submission to authority as opposed to individual freedom.

belligerents: The parties who are engaged in war.

bourgeoisie: Relating to the middle classes. It is usually used in a negative way in the context of Marxist writings, where the bourgeoisie are contrasted with the proletariat, or working classes.

capitalism: An economic system where a great deal of trade and industry is privately owned and runs to make a profit.

carte blanche: Complete freedom to act as one pleases.

civil war: When fighting takes place within one country between two or more different factions.

collective security: Alliances between states with the aim of defending each other from aggression on the principle that an attack on one member is an attack on all its allies.

Comintern: The abbreviation for the Communist International. This organization was set up in Moscow in March 1919 and its task was to coordinate communist parties all over the world, helping the spread of global communism.

coup: Violent or illegal seizure of power by a small group or clique.

diplomacy: Managing relations between governments of different countries by discussion and peaceful means

embargo: An official ban on trade or other commercial activity with a specific country.

FBI: (Federal Bureau of Investigation) A US government agency that investigates crime and is an intelligence agency. It was established in 1908.

Ho Chi Minh Trail: This is the supply route between North Vietnam and South Vietnam that was used by the Vietcong. It ran through Laos and Cambodia in an attempt to avoid US bombing raids.

imperialism: The act of building an empire; the acquisition of colonies.

infrastructure: The basic equipment and structures (such as roads and bridges) that are needed for a country to function effectively.

isolationism: A policy that involves not engaging with other countries or dealing with international problems.

League of Nations: An international organization set up after the First World War, intended to maintain peace and encourage disarmament.

Machiavellian: Unscrupulous and opportunistic, particularly in politics.

Marxism: A political ideology based on the works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, the main belief of which is that the workers rise up against the middle and upper classes to create a society where all resources are shared.

NATO: (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) A military alliance founded in 1949 by European and North American states for the defence of Europe and the North Atlantic against the perceived threat of Soviet aggression.

nom de guerre: An assumed name, or pseudonym, used by someone engaging in combat.

plebiscite: A process in which voters are given the opportunity to express their support of or opposition to a single issue.

rationing: The policy of giving each person a fixed allowance of provisions or food during a shortage.

realpolitik: Refers to politics based on pragmatic, realistic objectives, as opposed to theoretical ideas.

sanctions: An action, sometimes in the form of withholding aid or trade, by one or more states towards another state, calculated to force it to comply with legal obligations.

socialism: A political theory of social organization stressing shared or state ownership of production, industry, land, etc.

Warsaw Pact: A defence treaty between eight communist European states during the Cold War, formed in 1955.

Yalta Conference: This was called to help the Allied powers decide what would happen to Europe, and in particular Germany, at the end of the Second World War. At Yalta, in early 1945, one of the main decisions was to split Germany into four zones of occupation after the war.

Index

Italic page numbers indicate an illustration, be it a picture, table or map. Bold page numbers indicate information on a significant topic or individual.

Numbers

26th of July Movement 163

A

Acheson, Dean 12, 39, 41, 51, 91, 92
Act of Chapultepec (1945) 31
'active defence' policy 104
Adenauer, Konrad 73
Agent Orange **99**, 117
aid, foreign 15–16, 30
 US to Europe 42
 US to Latin America 33, 126, 128
aid, military 93, 96, 97, 99, 128–9
Alessandri, Jorge 138–9, 140
Alien Registration Act (1940) 18
Allende, Salvador 129, 137, **138**, 146
 and Castro 177
 political crisis 144–5
 President of Chile 139–41
Alliance for Progress **124**
 aims 124–5
 failures 131–2
 historians' perspectives 134
 and Latin America 126
 motives 125–6
 successes 129–31
American Communist Party 18
Anglo-Persian Oil Company 64
Angola **179**
anti-communism 18–19
 and American culture 22
 hysteria 92
anti-McCarthyism 22
anti-US propaganda 33
anti-war movement 106, 110–11, 119–20
 in Canada 116
Árbenz Guzmán, Jacobo **79**, 81
Arenas, Reinaldo **180**
Arévalo, Juan José 79
Argentina 31, 154
arms race 65, 67, 68–9, 76
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 99, 104, 106
Army-McCarthy hearings 23
asylum seekers 180–1
Atlantic Charter 6
atomic bombs (A-Bomb) 8, 10–11, 18, 67
 in Korea 49, 53
 Soviet 42
Atomic Development Authority 12
Attlee, Clement 10, 49
'August Revolution' 89

Avro Arrow Project 76

Axis Powers 6

B

ballistic missiles 69
Baruch Plan 12
Batista, Fulgencio 163
Bay of Pigs Invasion 127, 164, 165, 166
Berlin, 1953, case study 70–3
Berlin Airlift 17
Berlin Crisis, 1958–61, case study 73–6
Berlin Riots 71
Berlin Wall 75
Betancourt, Rómulo 126, 130
blacklisted **18**, 22
Bolivia 174–5
Brazil 130
 and the Korean War 57
 and the Vietnam War 118
Bretton Woods Conference **12**
'brinkmanship' 66, 75
'British Spies' **41**
Brown, George 25
Brown, Harold 159
Brzezinski, Zbigniew 153
Buddhism 96, 100
Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs 153
Burgess, Guy 41
Byrnes, James 14

C

C2K1 54
Cambodia 95–6, 109
Canada
 containment of communism 24–7
 and Eisenhower's 'New Look' policy 76
 and Guatemala 80
 and the Korean War 56
 and Latin America 77
 and the Marshall Plan 26
 and NATO 26–7
 and the Vietnam War 114–17
Canadian Army Special Force (CASF) 56
capitalism 65
Carter, Jimmy **152**
 and Cuba 178–81
 foreign policy 152
 and human rights 152–3, 154–5, 179
 and Latin America 152, 154
 and the Panama Treaty 158–60
case studies

- Berlin, 1953 70–3
 - Berlin Crisis, 1958–61 73–6
 - Castillo Armas, Carlos 81
 - Castro, Fidel 162, **163**
 - and Allende 177
 - and Cuban Missile Crisis 169
 - response to isolation of Cuba 172–3
 - in the US 164
 - Catholic Church 30
 - Catholicism 96
 - Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 19, 22
 - and Chile 137, 139, 140, 142, 147–8
 - and Cuba 164, 168
 - and Guatemala 81
 - and Vietnam 103
 - see also* covert operations
 - Charter 77 (Czechoslovakia) 153
 - Chile 129, 137, 138–40, 154
 - and Cuba 144
 - economy 144
 - historians' perspectives** (covert operations) 150–1
 - military coups 146
 - and Nixon 137, 140–4
 - in political crisis 144–5
 - China 20, 42
 - aggressor in Korea 51
 - involvement in Korean War 49
 - involvement in Vietnam 93
 - rapprochement with USA 113
 - Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) 49
 - Christopher, Warren 153
 - Church Committee **147**
 - Church Committee Report 142
 - Churchill, Winston 6
 - Iron Curtain Speech 13
 - CIA *see* Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
 - Cienfuegos, Camilo 163
 - civil rights 19, 54, 110
 - Cold War, origins, **historians' perspectives** 3
 - Collazo, Oscar 33
 - collective security 26
 - Colombia 57, 131, 157
 - Comintern 88
 - communism
 - combatting 64, 132
 - containment. *see* containment (of communism)
 - US fear of 21, 92, 125–6
 - and the Vietnam War 85
 - conflicts, ideological 37
 - containment (of communism) 14, 15, **16**, 19, 23–4, **39**, 64
 - economic measures 77
 - and Eisenhower 67
 - impact on Canada 24–7
 - impact on Latin America 28–35
 - replacing isolationism 42
 - in South Korea 39
 - timelines 4
 - copper industry 138, 140
 - covert operations 65, 141–3
 - in Cuba 164, 168
 - Guatemala 81
 - historians' perspectives** (in Chile) 150–1
 - see also* Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
 - CPV *see* Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV)
 - Crucible, The* (Miller) 22
 - Cuba 77
 - art **167**
 - and Carter 178–81
 - and Chile 144
 - CIA covert operations 164, 168
 - and Eisenhower 163–4
 - exclusion from OAS 165
 - failed invasion of 98
 - foreign policy 172–4
 - isolation 171–3, 177, 179
 - and Kennedy 165–70
 - and Nixon 176–8
 - relations with USSR 169–70, 173–5, 175–6
 - timelines 162
 - and the Vietnam War 118–19
 - Cuban Missile Crisis 114, 132, 168–70
 - Cuban–Chilean relations 177–8
 - culture
 - and anti-communism 22
 - Latin American 33–4
 - Czechoslovakia 17
 - communist coup 16
 - Soviet invasion 175–6
- D**
- De Kooning, Willem 22
 - Declaration of Caracas 80
 - Declaration on Liberated Europe 6, 7
 - decolonization **172**
 - DeConcini, Dennis 160
 - Decree 900 (Guatemala) 80
 - Defence Perimeter Speech **41**
 - defoliants 99
 - demilitarized zone (DMZ) 53
 - democracy 6–7, 132
 - Democratic Party **4**
 - Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) 89
 - Department of Defense (US) 19
 - Derian, Patricia 153
 - de-segregation 19, 54
 - Desnoes, Edmundo 167
 - deterrent power 66
 - Deutschmark 17

Dewey, Thomas 19–20, 63
 dictators 31
 dictatorships 154
 Diefenbaker, John 76–7, **76**, 114
 Diem, Ngo Dinh 96–7, 99–101
 Dien Bien Phu 94
 Dixiecrats 19
 ‘dollar imperialism’ 85
 Dominican Republic 132
 draft (army) 111
 draft dodgers 116
 Dulles, John Foster 55, **65**, 74, 97

E

East Germany 71, 72
 Eastern Europe 12–13
 Eastern Mediterranean, Soviet influence 15
 Eisenhower, Dwight 21, 23, 53
 administration, timelines 61–2
 and Canada 76
 and containment 67
 and Cuba 163–4
 and East Germany 72
 historians’ perspectives (‘New Look’ policy) 75
 and Khrushchev 69
 party allegiance **63**
 problems faced 63–4
 and Vietnam 93–8
 El Salvador 131
 elections
 free and fair 6–7
 US, 1948 19–20
 US, 1952 **53**
 embargos 77, 164
 espionage 18, 21, 41, 65, 69
 in Canada 24–5
 in Vietnam 103
 in WWII 22–3
 Europe, post-war, timelines 12, 14
 European Recovery Programme (ERP) *see* Marshall Plan

F

false flag operatives **143**
 Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 71
 first-strike attack **67**
 ‘flexible response’ policy 98
 France, interests in Vietnam 91–3
 FRAP *see* Popular Action Front (FRAP)
 Fraser, Dan 153
 Frei, Eduardo 139
 Frondizi, Arturo 126, 128

G

General Confederation of Guatemalan Workers 80

Geneva Accords 95–6
 Geneva Conference (1954) 94–5, 95
 German Democratic Republic (GDR) 71
 Germany 71
 economic recovery 14
 occupation of **6**
 refugee crisis 73
 Giap, Vo Nguyen 93–4
 Gómez, Laureano 57
 Goodwin, Richard N. 124
 Gouzenko, Igor 24–5, **25**
 Greece, Civil War 15–16
 Gromyko, Andrei 9, 44
 Guatemala 78–82, **79**
 and Canada 80
 historians’ perspectives (US intervention) 81
 land reform 80
 US intervention 80, 82
 guerrilla warfare 93, 99, 128, 163
 Guevara, Che **81**, 127, 163, 174–5
 Gulf of Tonkin Incident 103
 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution 103–4
 Gutiérrez, Tomás 167

H

Haiti 129, 131
 Hiroshima 10–11
 historians’ perspectives 11
 Hiss, Alger 18, 20
historians’ perspectives
 Alliance for Progress 134
 Cold War origins 3
 covert operations in Chile 150–1
 Hiroshima 11
 Kennedy and Vietnam 101
 ‘New Look’ policy 75
 Soviet absence from UNSC 44
 US intervention in Guatemala 81
 US involvement in Vietnam 107, 113
 Ho, Chi Minh 87–9, **88**, 91, 95–6, 96–7
 Ho Chi Minh Trail 98, 104, 109
 Hodge, John Reed 39
 Hollywood 22
 Hollywood Ten 18
 House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) 18
 HRCG *see* Human Rights Coordinating Group (HRCG)
 HUAC *see* House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC)
 Hue 106
 Human Rights Coordinating Group (HRCG) 153
 Hungary 17
 hydrogen bombs (H-bomb) 67

I

ICBMs *see* intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)

- ideological conflicts 85
 - IMF *see* International Monetary Fund (IMF)
 - imperialist interests 95
 - Inchon landings 45–6
 - Indochina **63**, 85, 88
 - Indochinese Communist Party 88
 - industrialization 29, 126
 - Interagency Working Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance 153
 - intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) 69
 - International Control Commission (ICC) 114
 - International Monetary Fund (IMF) 12
 - International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT) 142
 - Iran 15, 64, 153
 - Iron Curtain Speech 13
 - ISI policies **29**
 - isolationism 6, 42
- J**
- Japan, defeat in WWII 39
 - Jiang, Jie-Shi 92
 - Johnson, Lyndon B. 174
 - and Canada 115
 - domestic policies 110
 - and Vietnam 102–4, 106–7
- K**
- Kansas Line 53
 - KC2 23
 - Kefauver, Estes 21
 - Kennan, George 13, 31, **31**, 51
 - Kennedy, John F. 75, 114
 - anti-communist 98
 - and Cuba 165–70
 - historians' perspectives** (Vietnam) 101
 - and Latin America 124–8
 - and Vietnam 98–101
 - Khrushchev, Nikita **68**, 168–9
 - and the Berlin Crisis 74–5
 - and Eisenhower 69
 - Kim, Il-sung 38, **39**, 40, 47
 - Kissinger, Henry **109**, 112, 141, 143
 - Korea 38
 - division of 38
 - and Mao 41
 - post WWII 39–40
 - and Stalin 40–1
 - and Truman 42
 - Korean Communist Party 38
 - Korean War 24, 26–7, 49–50
 - armistice **53**
 - armistice line 54
 - Canadian involvement in 56
 - ceasefire negotiations 51–2
 - China involvement in 49
 - factors leading to 40–3
 - impact 54–5
 - Latin American involvement in 57
 - timelines 37
 - USSR involvement in 48
 - world response to 43–4
 - Korry, Edward 141
 - Kosygin, Alexei 174
 - Ky, Nguyen Cao 104
- L**
- land distribution 130
 - land reform (Guatemala) 80
 - Lansdale, Edward 167
 - Laos 95–6, 98
 - Latin America 28
 - and the Alliance for Progress 126
 - and Canada 77
 - containment (of communism) 28–35
 - culture 33–4
 - industrialization 29
 - and Kennedy 124–8
 - and the Korean War 57
 - social developments 29
 - and the UN 31
 - US trade 29, 137
 - and the Vietnam War 118–20
 - and WWII 29
 - Lesseps, Ferdinand de 156
 - literacy, adult 130
 - Lodge, Henry Cabot 100
 - 'London Poles' 9
 - 'long leash' policy 22
 - Long Telegram 13
 - Lublin government (Poland) 9
- M**
- MacArthur, Douglas 45, 48, 49, 50
 - Mackenzie King, William 25, 26
 - Maclean, Donald 41
 - Malik, Jacob 43, 51
 - Manhattan Project **8**
 - Mann, Thomas 132
 - Mann Doctrine **132**
 - Mao, Zedong 20, **48**, 92
 - interference in Korean War 47–8
 - and Korea 41
 - Mariel Crisis 180–1
 - Marshall, George 14, 16, 21
 - Marshall Plan 16–17, 26, 42
 - Marxism 30
 - 'massive retaliation' 66, 67
 - Matos, Huber 163

- McCarthy, Joseph 20–1, 21, 42, 92
 McCarthyism 20–4
 timelines 17
 McNamara, Robert 98, 104, 128–9
 Mexico 31, 130
 military coups 132, 140
 Chile 146
 CIA planning of 143
 Military Security Program for Latin America 57
 military strategy, US 55
 Miller, Arthur 22
 minimum wage 131
 Molotov, Vyacheslav 9, 17
 Mondale, Walter 180
 Mosaddegh, Mohammad 64
 Moscow Conference 6
 Mr X article **13**
- N**
 napalm **104**, 117
 national debt 132
 National Liberation Army *see* Vietcong (VC)
 national liberation movements 172
 National Security Act (1947) 19
 nationalism (Vietnam) 87–9
 nationalization 164
 Neruda, Pablo **33**, 34
 Neutrality Treaty 158
 New Deal 4–5
 ‘New Look’ policy 61, 64–5
 historians’ perspectives 75
 impact 68–70
 Nhu, Ngo Dinh 96
 Nicaragua 131
 Nixon, Richard 97
 and Castro 164
 and Chile 137, 140–4
 and Cuba 176–8
 and Latin America 136–7
 and military coup in Chile 147–8
 and Vietnam 108–9
 Nixon Doctrine 109
 Non-Aligned Movement 172
 North American Defense Agreement (NORAD) 76–7
 North Atlantic Treaty 26
 North Korea 20, 24, 38, 38
 military superiority 44–5
 UN forces in 46, 47
 NSC-68 (National Security Council Memo #68) 23–4, 42, 64, 65, 92
 nuclear war 21
 US defence against 70
 nuclear weapons 54–5, 63, 65, 66, 67
 on Canadian soil 76–7
 in Germany 73–4
 monopoly of 12
 tactical **67**
- O**
 OAS *see* Organization of American States (OAS)
 occupation, zones of 6
 oil industry 64
 Onfray, Roberto 145
 ‘Open Skies’ 69
 Operation Mongoose 167–8
 Operation Pan America 125
 Operation PBSUCCESS 80–1
 Operation Rolling Thunder 104
 Organization of American States (OAS) 31, 32–3, 57
 Cuban exclusion 165
- P**
 Panama Canal 156–7, 156, 157
 Panama Canal Zone 157
 Panama Treaty 158–60
 Paris Peace Talks 112–13
 Peace Corps 110, 128
 ‘peace with honor’ strategy 108, 112
 Pearl Harbour 6
 Pearson, Lester 26, 27, **114**
 ‘Pearsonian internationalism’ 26
 People’s Republic of China (PRC) 92
 see also China
 Percentage Agreement 6
 Permanent Joint Board on Defence 24
 Perón, Juan 30
 Philby, Kim 41
 Pinochet, Augusto 137, 145, 146, **148**, 154
 Poland 6, **9**, 17
 Pollock, Jackson 22
 Popular Action Front (FRAP) 138
 Popular Union (UP) 139
 population growth 132, 138
 Postdam Conference **10**, **90**
 Powers, Gary 75
 Prats, Carlos 144, 145
 PRC *see* People’s Republic of China (PRC)
 Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry **56**
 prisoners of war (POWs) 52
 Progressive Party 19
 Project FUBELT 140
 Puerto Rico **33**, **120**, 179
 and the Vietnam War 119
 Punta del Este Charter 127–8
 Punta del Este Conference 126–7
- Q**
 ‘quiet diplomacy’ policy 152

R

'realpolitik' 132
refugees 73, 180–1
Reichsmark 17
religion 96, 100
Reza, Mohammed 64
Rhee, Syngman 39, 40, 52
Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) 153
Ridgeway, Matthew 49
Rio Pact 32, 80
Rockefeller, Nelson 132
Roosevelt, Franklin D. 4–5, 5, 6, 7, 90
Rose, Fred 25
Rosenberg, Ethel 21
Rosenberg, Julius 21
Rostow, Walt W. 125
Rusk, Dean 129

S

Salami tactics **12**
sanctions 77, **164**
satellite states **17**
Schneider, Rene **143**
'search and destroy' strategy 104
SEATO *see* Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)
Second Red Scare 18, 23, 92
Seeger, Pete 22
Smith Act (1940) **18**
social developments, Latin America 29, 132
Solidarity (Poland) 153
South Africa 153
South Korea 20, 24, 38, 153
 invasion of 44–5
 US occupation 39
 withdrawal of 45
South Vietnam, military aid to 96
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) 55, 95–6
Soviet expansion in to Latin America 29–31
Soviet Objectives in Latin America (CIA) 30–1
Soviet-Cuban relations 169–70, 173–5, 175–6
space race 69, 126
spheres of influence 3
Sputnik 69
Stalin, Joseph 3, 6
 and atomic bombs 20
 death 53
 interference in Korean War 47–8
 and Korea 40–1
 and the Marshall Plan 17
 Moscow speech 13
 and Poland 9
States Rights Democratic Party 19
Stevenson, Adlai 23
St-Laurent, Louis 26–7

Strategic Hamlet Program 99
structuralism 126
Stuttgart Speech 14
Suez Crisis 114
superpower enmity 3

T

Taylor, Maxwell 99
Tet Offensive 106, 111
Thieu, Nguyen Van 104
timelines
 Cuba 162
 Eisenhower's administration 61–2
 Europe, post-war 12, 14
 Korean War 37
 McCarthyism 17
 Truman 4
 US foreign policy 123
 Vietnam War 86–7
Tirado, Hugo 143
Tito, Josip 15
Toronto Anti-Draft Programme 116
Torresola, Grieselio 33
Torrijos, Omar 157, **158**, 160
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (1947) 31, 32
Tricontinental Conference (1966) 172, 177
Trudeau, Pierre 116
Truman, Harry S. 3
 as anti-communist 8
 becomes President 7–8
 election as Vice President 4–5
 and Korea 42
 and McCarthy 21
 and Molotov 9
 timelines 4
 and Vietnam 90–3
Truman Doctrine 15
Turkey 15–16
Twenty-Second Amendment **5**

U

U-2 planes 69
UFCO *see* United Fruit Company (UFCO)
Uganda, and Carter 153
Ulbricht, Walter 71, 74
UN forces, in North Korea 46, 47
United Fruit Company (UFCO) **78**, 80
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 24
 historians' perspectives 44
 and Korean War 43–4
 Soviet absence 43–4
United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea
 (UNTCOK) 39–40
United Nations (UN) 6, 13, 31, 42

UNSC *see* United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
 UNTCOK *see* United Nations Temporary Commission on
 Korea (UNTCOK)
 UP *see* Popular Union (UP)
 Uruguay 31
 USA
 anti-war movement 106
 combat troops in Vietnam 104
 defence against nuclear war 70
 defence budget 65
 defence policy 64–7
 detente with USSR 113
 fear of communism 21, 92, 125–6
 foreign policy, timelines 123
 military cutbacks 66
 military intervention in Guatemala 80, 82
 military intervention in Vietnam 85
 military strategy after Korean War 55
 relations with USSR 8
 rapprochement with China 113
 security issues 64
 trade with Latin America 29, 137
 US-Latin American trade 29
 US-Soviet relations 8
 USSR
 and Carter 153
 detente with USA 113
 expansion into Latin America 29–31
 involvement in Korean War 48
 relations with Cuba 169–70, 173–5, 175–6
 relations with USA 8

V

Valenzuela, Camilo 143

Vance, Cyrus 152
 Venezuela 130
 Viaux, Roberto 143
 Vietcong (VC) 97, 98–9, 104
 Vietnam 88–9, 91, 93
 Vietnam
 French interests 91–3
 Geneva Accord ceasefire 96
 historians' perspectives (US involvement) 107, 113
 imperialist interests 91–3
 Vietnam War
 and Brazil 118
 and Canada 114–17
 and communism 85
 and Cuba 118–19
 domestic effects in US 110–11
 economic factors 85
 and Latin America 118–20
 timelines 86–7
 US escalation 103–4
 withdrawal of US troops 109
 Vietnamese Communist Party 87
 Vuskovic, Pedro 144

W

Wallace, Henry 4, 14, 16, 19
 Watergate Scandal 111, **147**
 West Germany 71
 World Bank 12
 World War II (WWII) 3, 22–3, 29, 39
 Wrong, Hume 26

Y

Yalta Conference 6